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They walked on, thinking of This and That, and by-and-by they came to an 
enchanted place on the top of the Forest called Galleons Lap… It was the only 
place in the Forest that you could sit down carelessly without getting up again 
almost at once and looking for somewhere else. Sitting there they could see the 
whole world spread out until it reached the sky and whatever there was all over 
the world was with them… 
 - A. A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Gregory Joseph Blair 
 
PLACE-PRODUCED THOUGHT: 
THE AGENCY OF PLACE AND THE CO-PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
IN HEIDEGGER, BAUDRILLARD, AND OTHERS  
 
Place has been a central consideration in much philosophical discourse 
since at least the ancient Greeks. This dissertation will argue, however, that in 
certain instances in the history of thinking, place has played a significant and 
unique role, one beyond typical considerations.  
In these specific intellectual projects, place is a method for situating and 
focusing the development of thought. This relationship with place produces a 
particular type of thought, one that ontologically fuses place and thinker together. 
I regard this merger as a topographical convergence of situated contemplation that 
creates a localized episteme, or in other words, “place-produced thought.” Within 
this reciprocal relationship between place, thinker, and thought, I argue that the 
agency of place plays a far more significant role than it is routinely ascribed. 
Throughout this thesis, I also argue for the distinctive possibilities of 
indigenous knowledge. Much of this argument is built upon certain instances of 
thinking with/in place, in which the place itself asserts its agency and influence 
  vii
into the actual production of thought.  My argument is constructed in a manner 
that illustrates how this relationship between thinker and place is much different 
than other approaches of creating a relationship with one’s surroundings. Finally, 
I have tried to elucidate the innovative and irruptive possibilities for place-
produced thought—important sources of new identities, thoughts, boundaries, and 
modes of being. In an increasingly globalized and technological world, the 
potential value and efficacy of such thought needs to be considered.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Place is something most people don’t think about on a regular basis, yet most 
would agree that place is profoundly important in their lives. It is deeply woven 
into the nature of our being. Place is often a source of identity, position, security, 
clarity, and a sense of our own subjectivity. And while place is not a principal 
preoccupation for most people, it has long been a central consideration for 
philosophers. From Plato to Heidegger, philosophers have incorporated the 
concept of place into their own discourse. While place has been a staple in much 
philosophical discourse, this dissertation will argue that in certain intellectual 
projects, place has played a unique role, one in excess of typical considerations. In 
these instances, place is a method for situating and focusing thinking. This 
engagement with place engenders a particular type of thought, one that 
ontologically fuses place, thinker, and thought together. I regard this merger as a 
topographical convergence of situated contemplation that produces a localized 
episteme, or in other words, “place-produced thought.”  
In order to articulate a typology for “place-produced thought,” I consider 
several specific projects to reveal how thinking can have a vital interconnectivity 
with place. The hyphenation of “place” and “produced” in this phrasing is meant 
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to emphasize the imbrication of location and activity, echoing Heidegger’s 
attempt to diminish the chasm between being and the phenomena of objects by 
expressing the constitution of being as “being-in-the-world.”1  In a similar 
fashion, the connectivity between the place and production in place-produced 
thought is conveyed through a shared ontological status. Within this reciprocal 
relationship between place, thinker, and thought, I argue that the agency of place 
plays a significant role. Part of this argument, set forth here, considers ways in 
which places have much greater agency than most people ascribe to them. This 
assertion attempts to reassess human centrality and privilege in many of our 
encounters with place in exchange for greater recognition of the power of place.  
 
DEFINING TERMS  
Throughout this analysis of place-produced thought, the word “place” is 
repeatedly used as a central term. Therefore, it is useful to note at the outset why 
“place” has been adopted, instead of another similar term such as “space” or 
“region.” Both “place” and “space” carry a plethora of meanings. The Oxford 
English Dictionary lists nineteen different definitions for the word “place,” an 
abundance which poses its own set of problems.  Because of its ambiguous 
plurality, the constitution of a “place” is not easily defined. Moreover, along with 
“space,” “place” has been an ongoing source of dispute and conjecture in 
differing strains of philosophy, social science, and geography. It should be noted 
that this investigation of place is focused on the modern conception of place; the 
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case studies that comprise most of the remaining chapters occur between the 19th 
and 21st centuries. 
Despite the multiplicity if the term “place,” philosophers of place do share 
some conceptualizations about their central term and what it denotes.  In his book 
Place: A Short Introduction, Tim Cresswell provides a distinction between 
“space” and “place,” devoting a chapter to “work that uses place as an analytical 
concept that involves the process of shaping meaning and practice in material 
space.”2 For Cresswell, space is more abstract than place, serving as the stuff from 
which places with particular meaning emerge. The environmental writer 
Lawrence Buell provides a similar differentiation between space and place: “Place 
entails spatial location, entails a spatial container of some sort. But space as 
against place connotes geometrical or topographical abstraction, whereas place is 
‘space to which meaning has been ascribed.’”3 This is a significant point because 
it denotes an ontological shift – from abstract “space” to meaningful “place.” 
Another less explicit, yet parallel, conceptualization of place is evident in Miwon 
Kwon’s genealogy of site-specificity and locational identity in artistic practices.  
In describing contemporary “site-orientated” practices, she claims that “site [what 
we are calling place] is now structured (inter)textually rather than spatially… a 
fragmentary sequence of events and actions through spaces, that is, a nomadic 
narrative whose path is articulated by the passage of the artist (Kwon’s italics).”4 
For Kwon, site (or place) implies meaning and narrative that is more than a basic 
spatial form. Each of these writers seem to share the sense that place is different 
from space. While space is often considered more abstract, describing a relative 
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position, place is considered something like “space to which human meaning is 
ascribed and value is felt.”5 Marc Augé calls this “anthropological place” in the 
recognition that it is “established and symbolized.”6 An understanding of place as 
a location for intertextual meaning and value is of the sort that will be put into 
action throughout this typology of place-produced thought.7 At the same time, the 
anthropocentrism inherent in many of the claims about place will be challenged 
by returning to place itself—by examining the importance of materiality and the 
agency of place within place-produced thought. 
 
CONCEPTS OF PLACE  
One especially noteworthy philosophical effort to articulate the constitution of 
place is Phenomenology. Many of the key thinkers of place have a 
Phenomenological bent, including Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Edward S. Casey, and Jeff Malpas. In general terms, 
Phenomenologists have proposed that it is the direct relation to the phenomena of 
place constitutes that place.  “The world is not what I think,” writes Merleau-
Ponty, “but what I live through.”8 This relationship is ontological, as Heidegger 
strives to make clear by hyphenating da-sein, or being-there.  By directly 
conjoining “being” with “there,” Heidegger implies that being necessarily 
involves presence in a place.  
A similar relationship between being and place is evident in Gaston 
Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, in which he describes his own 
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Phenomenological concept of place: “A house that has been experienced is not an 
inert box,” states Bachelard, “Inhabited space transcends geometrical space.”9 In 
describing a Phenomenological place, Bachelard illustrates how geometrical or 
abstract space can become intimate, precious, fetishized, or even “areas of being” 
through engagement or experience.10 For Bachelard, the place of the house is very 
much akin to the “there” of Heidegger’s da-sein. The lived experience of the 
house gives being its Being. “The house remodels man,” claims Bachelard.11 His 
critical contention, and that of many other Phenomenologists, is that place is 
constructed through the experience of phenomena and space. This relation 
between the constitution of place and the necessity of experience identifies a 
direct connection to the shift from space to place. As Jeff Malpas, another 
Phenomenologist, asserts, the “starting point for philosophical reflection is not a 
world of empty space… but is a world given in relation to activity.”12 Bachelard 
calls this activity the inhabitation of space. What all of these articulations share is 
the sense that embodied apprehension of phenomena is key to defining place.  
At times, my analysis of place-produced thought draws upon aspects of 
Phenomenology that accentuate the vital and significant role of place phenomena 
in the development of place-produced thought. However, this analysis is not 
purely Phenomenological. Instead, it also incorporates other theories that explore 
how places are constituted. In addition to Phenomenologists, Poststructuralist and 
Marxist thinkers, in particular, others have expressed important ideas about place 
that will be utilized to develop a more pluralistic notion of place as it operates 
within place-produced thought.  
  6 
Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and Edward Soja are some of the major 
Marxist thinkers who consider place. In his opus, The Production of Space, 
Lefebvre proposes that the constitution, or production, of space [what we are 
calling place] occurs through economic spatial relations. “Absolute space,” he 
argues, is consumed by the spatial relations of capitalism (spaces are structured 
and arranged according to the dispersion and flows of capital) as a means to 
reproduce its dominance, and is transformed into “abstract space.” Lefebvre calls 
for a “differential space,” as a dialectic of the two others, which serves as a 
resistance to the homogenization of “abstract space.” For Lefebvre, space is not a 
blank neutral canvas, but is rather the stage of an ongoing production, reflecting 
the spatial relations of social/economic hegemony. For Lefebvre and other 
Marxists, the main constituting force of place lies at the heart of these relations 
and exchanges. In place-produced thought, economic exchanges are recognized as 
important determinants of the constitution of place, but are viewed as only one of 
the many layers of exchanges/relations that accumulate and converge into the 
constitution of place.  
An alternative position concerning the constitution of place has been 
articulated within the Poststructuralisms of Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard. 
For the Poststructuralists, the constitution of place occurs through language and 
semiotics. For these thinkers, the reading of cultural signs within individual 
spaces initiates the shift from an abstract “space” into a “place” saturated with 
meaning and value. In an oft-cited essay, Des Espace Autres (Of Other Spaces), 
Michel Foucault discusses his notion of “heterotopias,” spaces rendered disparate 
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from other spaces by the ways that they are utilized, and via the ordering of space 
by discursive structures of language and knowledge. The semiotic markings in 
these spaces become seemingly naturalized significations, where space is no 
longer abstract, nor an object to be merely seen, but a place marked by a litany of 
active ideological signs. Because of their naturalization within place, these signs 
often become unnoticed. For poststructuralists, even in their invisibility, these 
cultural signs serve to frame the understanding and meaning of place.  For 
instance, the space of a national park, often thought of as one of the last truly 
“natural” places, can be understood as a delineated heterotopia wrought with 
impositions of power.13 Like Bachelard, Foucault maintains that places are not 
empty. However, in distinction from Bachelard, Foucault sees place as constituted 
not only by lived experience, but also through culturally “superimposed 
meaning[s]” and their “precise and determined function[s].”14  
 
ZONES OF ACTIVE EXCHANGE  
In order to understand what occurs through the development of place-produced 
thought, and how place itself operates as an active agent, we need to think 
differently than has been suggested in the theories mentioned above. Clearly, 
these divergent philosophical considerations offer varying accounts of both what 
place is and how it is constituted. However, in the context of this argument about 
place-produced thought, I propose that none of them provides a sufficient 
understanding of the processes and forces that converge to constitute a place. 
Because of this inadequacy, I begin with two separate, but mutually effecting, 
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claims about the constitution of place in place-produced thought. First, in the 
instances of place-produced thought surveyed in the following chapters, the 
manifestation of place is best understood by incorporating a hybridized notion of 
place that draws upon various components of Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, 
Postmodernism, Marxism, environmentalism, ethnography, object-orientated 
philosophy, and thing theory. By not adhering solely to a single approach for 
understanding the constitution of place in place-produced thought, we can allow 
varying conceptions to remain in unresolved dialogue.  
This dialogical methodology has inherent challenges.  As the 
anthropologist Arturo Escobar noted, “precisely because they are grounded in 
different epistemologies (and in some cases ontological assumptions), there are 
levels at which the positions are incommensurable.”15 However, as will be shown 
in some instances of place-produced thought, this weaving together of critical 
appreciations of place has already occurred. Therefore, we can think of the 
“place” in place-produced thought as being perpetually modified in a feedback 
loop of varying forces. 
 This notion of place leads to a second claim: in place-produced thought 
place is nourished through a type of perpetual ellipsis in which constituting forces 
operate on the thinker’s perception of place, while at the same time, place itself 
pushed back against some of the cultural impositions and presumptions of the 
thinker. Place is never static; its constitution continues to transform throughout 
the development of place-produced thought. Therefore, we can understand place 
as a bio-socio-historical zone of active exchange between subjectivity, experience, 
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signs, politics, ethics, economics, and phenomena. This definition indicates one of 
the key distinctions between this project and some of its antecedents because it 
presents a sense of place as complex and elusive, immanent and cryptic. These 
characteristics point us toward understanding place as a subject with agency that 
remains in a continuous negotiation between its own desires and motivations, and 
those of other forces acting upon it. This understanding of place stresses the 
notion that places are not merely receptacles of human inscriptions. Instead, it 
identifies the ability of place to resist and push against inscriptions as they touch 
upon place, move off, and then perhaps return again, in an ongoing elliptical 
exchange.   
Tim Cresswell describes the elliptical exchange of place in similar terms: 
“Place involves a multi-faceted understanding of the coming together of the 
physical world (both ‘natural’ and ‘physical’), the processes of meaning 
production and the practices of power that mark relations between social 
groups.”16  This understanding of place recognizes an unfinalized in-betweenness, 
or liminality, due to the movement and fluctuation of the polyvalent forces that 
constitute place. Nicholas Entrikin calls this liminal quality “narrative,” because it 
links material phenomena with social practices and collective identities. In 
Entrikin’s words, “geographer and geography are hermeneutically joined.”17 Even 
with these expanded and more complex definitions, place still remains elusive and 
dynamic. The constitution of place is slippery; once we think we have it pinned 
down and defined, it can shift and transform into something new. 
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That elusiveness is evident in the instances of place-produced thought 
investigated here.  In them, place is formed through a complex and evolving 
process. Just as the thinker transforms place and leaves marks upon it, the place 
also pushes back on the thinker, modifying his or her perceptions, thoughts, and 
ontology. Therefore, the agency and subjectivity of both place and thinker are 
central to the development of place-produced thought because thinking occurs 
through a dialogical negotiation between thinker and place that reworks the nature 
of their beings.  
The role of subjectivity and agency within place-produced thought is also 
important as a source for strategic disruption and negation. Through the 
development of place-produced thought, the redefinition or destabilization of both 
place and thinker emerge as points of epistemic origination. Thus, place-produced 
thought allows—potentially—for radical transformation. Indeed, a vital rupture in 
the regulating discourses and discursive practices acting upon a place or thinker 
may occur, allowing for the generation of a new reading or understanding. While 
the operations generated through place-produced thought vary (the term 
“operation” is meant to stress the performativity of working, functioning, and 
thinking), each relies on a negotiation between the thinking subject and the 
agency of place. In order to look into the nature of this negotiation a little further, 
we can start with a discussion of the thinking subject. 
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THE THINKING SUBJECT  
In some recent philosophy, one finds evidence of a desire to move beyond the 
linguistic turn and the dominance of language in philosophy represented by the 
poststructuralists. Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Judith Butler, and Giorgio 
Agamben, among others, have reinvigorated the notions of action, embodiment, 
and individual subjectivity. Within this movement is a turn towards agency 
enacted in the world, in the realm of place. For example, in his extension of the 
Foucauldian analysis of apparatuses, Agamben identifies and investigates their 
effects on the subject.18  In a departure from Foucault, however, Agamben 
advocates finding new ways to dismantle them through individual agency, and 
indeed points out that “this problem [of reclaiming the desubjective power of an 
apparatus] cannot be properly raised as long as those who are concerned with it 
are unable to intervene in their own process of subjectification.”19 Agamben 
asserts that the subject plays a part in the production of his or her own 
subjectivity.  
Judith Butler makes similar claim in her discussion of subjectification 
when she candidly asks: “how can it be that the subject, taken to be the condition 
for and instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination, 
understood as the deprivation of agency?”20 In the following pages, it will be 
demonstrated that the thinking subject does exercise a degree of agency in place-
produced thought that is reflective of Agamben and Butler’s ideas.   
In developing place-produced thought, one of the methods in which 
agency is exercised by the thinker is in locating or determining the margins of a 
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place. In each specific case, these (often temporary) boundaries are perceived by 
the thinker based upon what is most appropriate for their project. While the 
boundaries and constituting forces of a place are present before it is engaged by a 
thinker (and those forces frequently appear as natural or embedded), they are 
often reconfigured by the subjective agency of the thinker as they engage with 
place as a locus for thought. In most of the instances of place-produced thought, 
the subject/thinker has some conception of the thought that will be developed in 
situ.  Therefore, through the exertion of agency, the thinker actually contributes to 
the making or production of the place as an optimal environment for his or her 
project.  
One may want to argue against the power afforded to the subject within 
place-produced thought by pointing out that this view privileges the individual 
ego or opens up the possibility for the violent imposition of power. Indeed, there 
is a concern that giving too much power to the agency of the thinking subject 
could mean that place becomes merely a stage in which the desires of an 
individual are acted out. This concern has been addressed by Kwon in her 
assessment of several historical site-specific and community based art practices. 
An alternative to this scenario entails an understanding of active subject formation 
and its own constitution as an agent in the world that is a departure from the 
traditional segregation of self and other – of self and world.  In place-produced 
thought, the relationship between thinker and place is one that acknowledges a 
mutual link—an ontological bond—in the making of thought. This type of 
connection to one’s environment is phenomenological in nature and contradicts 
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the constrictive separation of subject and world evident in empiricism (Locke and 
Hume), rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant) and even in the linguistic turn.21  
In order to re-articulate and critique the traditional binary estrangement of thinker 
and world, I propose an adaptation of Hannah Arendt’s discourse on ethics. 
The basis of Arendt’s discourse is derived from a reading of the Socratic 
dialogues. In many ways, her reading of the dialogues can be considered a re-
reading, one that is directed at the core of Socratic philosophy, leaving aside the 
intermediary rhetoric of his student, Plato. In the context of her own meditations 
on collective responsibility, Arendt focuses on Socrates’ concept of the inner 
dialogue, or what he called dianoeisthai (a reflection on the nature of something), 
in which thinking occurs through conversation between self and I (being-one). 
One crucial aspect of Arendt’s Socratic re-examination is how she circuitously 
navigates the critical connection between the singular subject and the plural (or 
the political as Arendt names it).  Arendt, like Socrates, advocates for solitude as 
the situation in which the inner dialogue can best be realized, and thought may 
properly occur.  Any contact during dianoeisthai is considered unsettling and 
detrimental; “if somebody addresses me, “Arendt writes, “I must now talk to him, 
and not to myself.”22  Socratic estrangement, however, is given a clever 
hermeneutic twist by Arendt when she ponders that “the Socratic ‘being-one’ is 
not so unproblematic as it seems; I am not only just for others but for myself, and 
in the latter case, I clearly am not just one. A difference is inserted into my 
Oneness.”23 What Arendt points toward is the interdependence of the singular and 
collective. She also deftly, yet subtlety, pokes at the unity of the hermetic singular 
  14
subject – the metaphysical “oneness” – into which Arendt inserts a difference. 
The interdependence between subject and world emphasized by their Arendtian 
inseparability is significant in the context of place-produced thought because it 
raises them both to the positions of co-producers of thought. 
The ontological links expressed in Arendt’s inseparability of subject and 
world share similarities with Heidegger’s da-sein because they both work at 
reducing the illusory divide between the subject and the world. Heidegger’s 
phenomenology is significant because it re-articulated the ontological status of the 
singular so that being is melded with the world it is thrown into. Extending 
Heidegger’s ontology of being-in-the-world, Jean-Luc Nancy also attempts to 
navigate the terrain between singular and plural. Nancy pushes toward an even 
more radical ontological bond when he posits that being itself depends upon a 
“being-in-common,” upon an understanding that inextricably locates the 
collective within the singular. Nancy deems this ontological status as being 
“singular plural,” in which the individual is given through the plural, and where 
“consciousness is never mine, but to the contrary, I only have it in and through 
community (Nancy’s italics).”24  
A comparable melding of the individual and community operates in the 
thinker/place exchanges of place-produced thought. This critical connection 
disavows a pejorative “un-siting,” in which place is pressed into, or appropriated 
for, the servitude of an individual agenda. In place-produced thought, the 
community, the plural, remains an active influence on place identity. The 
Arendtian “difference” that is inserted into the subject is uncovered as the 
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presence of the polyphonic multiple of community. Therefore, community can be 
understood as being active in two different stages of place-produced thought. 
Firstly, as Arendt and others have illustrated, the collective is preserved within the 
singular subject. Secondly, community is also evident in place as one of its 
constituting forces – part of the intertextual dialogue of events and actions 
occurring with/in place.  
I have included this discussion of the thinking subject in between the 
sections about the definition of place and the delineation of place in place-
produced thought in order to further emphasize the presence and effect of the 
collective in the individual subject – the perpetual to and fro between the inside 
and the outside. Just as the strict division of the singular and collective is 
deconstructed in some of the theories discussed above, there is a similar 
relationship that marks the delineation of place in place-produced thought. 
This brief discussion of the “I-Other” relationship is significant because it 
is reflective of the “thinker-place” relationship in place-produced thought. While I 
do not continue a more in-depth examination of the “I-Other” in each instance of 
place-produced thought, it is important to note the Arendtian problematizing of 
Socratic solitude because place-produced thought provides such a vivid 
illustration of how the outside or collective touches upon and is ontologically 
embedded into the seemingly divided, the hermetic, and the contained. 
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DELINEATION OF PLACE  
In many ways, the multi-faceted process of constituting place (as described 
above) is paralleled by the act of delineation. As has already been noted, even 
though the individual thinker arrives at the determination of the margins of place, 
the process can’t be considered as univocal or unilateral, but instead is infused 
with the polyphony of community. The term “margin” is used to imply a sort of 
fluidity and malleability to the boundaries of a place.  The parameters of the 
places in place-produced thought often reflect these semantics, remaining elusive 
and enigmatic – like the horizon line on a foggy winter morning. Even setting the 
boundaries of place does not entail an absolute break from what is external: “A 
boundary is not that at which something stops…,” Heidegger advises us, “the 
boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding.”25 In the 
instances of place-produced thought explored in the following chapters, that 
which is outside the margins of a place matters as much as that which is within 
place.  
Jacques Derrida provides some insights into why this must be the case in 
his theory of the ergon and parerga in works of art. Calling upon the traditions of 
aesthetic discourse, he conveys that to even “think art in general” is to adopt a 
series of oppositions –form/content, inside/outside, subject/object.26 By 
identifying these oppositional presuppositions, Derrida is able to build a discourse 
about liminality; and through that method, he begins to explore a space of in-
betweeness where nothing is fixed or certain, where différance resides.27 The 
deconstruction of the frame between the artwork (ergon) and the ostensibly 
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extrinsic (parerga) is one of Derrida’s critical gestures.  In fact, he argues, the two 
spaces are entwined:  “a parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the 
ergon… but it does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the 
operation, from a certain outside.”28 Giorgio Agamben conceives of a similar 
contingency among stasis and dynamis in a work of art. “Every image is animated 
by an antinimous polarity,” announces Agamben, “[the dynamis] always refers 
beyond itself, towards a whole of which it is a part.”29 Within place-produced 
thought, we see the same connectivity between the inside and outside of place; 
between place and the wider environs. In most instances, discerning a locus of 
thought reveals the presence of two (or more) significant places and an exchange 
between them. All of these places, together, comprise the actual site of indigenous 
knowledge production.  
As Derrida demonstrated within works of art, the juxtaposition between 
the ergon, and the demarcation of its exterior, are locked in a mutual relationship 
of epistemic production by a “link which rivets [the parerga]… to the lack in the 
interior of the ergon.”30 As a means of delineation, the seemingly diametrically 
opposed places and the liminality between them are temporarily and contingently 
defined for the purpose of the thinking project. However, the place of thought is 
continuously produced, deterritorialized, and produced again in a process that 
“stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface (my 
italics).”31  
In many ways, the approach taken by the first few thinkers whom I’ll 
consider—notably Thoreau and Heidegger—involves finding a place to situate 
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thought that relies on a strategy of negation. Within this tradition, negation is 
destabilizing and creative, used to “celebrate a genuine point of beginning – with 
its attendant hope and promise for the future.”32 Such negation can be especially 
effective when ideological impositions have become fixed in place as normative 
or as part of tradition. Strategic negation in the delineation of place affirms as it 
denies, erases as it generates, and can function as “a kind of provisional 
erasure.”33 In that regard, this action of erasure can be apophatic – enabling the 
derivation of knowledge through negation. 
Other strategies that a thinker may use to delineate a locus of thought 
often begin with the established and recognized borders of a place. Thinkers have 
approached the demarcation of these pre-existing boundaries in various ways. 
Some thinkers work to a reaffirm and reassert existing borders in order to 
accentuate their importance or call attention to the circumstances of their 
formation. In Gordon Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates project (Chapter 3), for 
instance, he purposefully draws attention to the peculiar shapes of the properties 
that he purchased from the city of New York in order to underscore the 
arbitrariness and the absurdity of their creation. A thinker may also begin their 
strategy of delineation with the existing borders of a place in order to undermine 
or think beyond those borders. This may be a crucial component for some 
instances of place-produced thought that attempt to question the limitations and 
impositions of the pre-existing borders of place.  
Whatever strategy is deployed in the development of place-produced 
thought, place is temporarily and contingently delineated in order to focus 
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thinking. At the same time, the delineated place of thought remains attuned and 
responsive to the parerga outside of its boundaries—continuously challenging the 
inside/outside division. Even though the margins of place remain recalcitrant, the 
key point is that in place-produced thought, some form of delineation occurs. The 
demarcation of place by Thoreau, Heidegger, and others can be understood as a 
strategic exegesis, an instrument to position a localizing center of knowledge 
production – a centrum cogitationis. Within the strategic delineation, place 
becomes activated as “we intend within it; we critique intentions within it; we 
play with it through significations as well as references.”34 
Even though I have argued for the role that human agency plays in the 
development of place-produced thought, I am wary of over-emphasizing the 
power of the human subject in a way that is anthropocentric and does not 
“recognize objects [and places] as participants in the reshaping of the world.”35 In 
fact, the agency of place has a vibrant and central role in place-produced thought. 
 
AGENCY OF PLACE 
While the last section mostly focused on the way that the agency of the thinker 
can redefine a place, in each of the case studies in the following chapters, I also 
examine how place resists the thinker, how places make evident their own wants 
and desires. Bill Brown broaches these concerns in his “thing theory” when he 
asks: “What claims on your attention and on your action are made on behalf of 
things?”36 Just as many recent theories have reinvested agency in the subject, I 
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argue that places also have agency, and that the agency of place plays a 
significant role in place-produced thought.  
 As place exerts itself in place-produced thought, an intimate and 
distinctive relationship between the thinker and place emerges. The thinker enters 
into interdependence with place, a relationship that reduces the unilateral 
authority of the thinker in favor of a shared and co-constitutive production of 
knowledge. It may seem startling, at first, to seriously consider the questions of 
“What do places want?” and “What desires and motivations might a place have?”  
But such questions are of a piece with those of other contemporary thinkers.  
When W.J.T. Mitchell asks the question “What Do Pictures Want?” he also 
wonders if the exploration of non-human agency will be met with suspicious 
incredulity. He addresses these doubts head on: “I am well aware that this is a 
bizarre, even objectionable, question. I am aware that it involves a subjectivitzing 
of images, a dubious personification of inanimate objects; that it flirts with a 
regressive, superstitious attitude toward images.”37 Nevertheless, Mitchell 
proceeds to explore his question and is able to demonstrate the real possibility of 
agency in images. Just as Mitchell describes of pictures, I argue that the role of 
place in place-produced thought “makes an appeal or issues a demand whose 
precise effect and power emerges in the an intersubjective encounter.”38 The 
agency of place is inscribed and woven into the thinking produced with/in it—the 
force of this agency lies in the co-produced nature of the thought. Place-produced 
thought can be understood as a record, a trace, of the agency of place. One of the 
most powerful ways that the agency of place is manifested in place-produced 
  21
thought is through material irruption. The insurgency of the materiality of place is 
a crucial component in the production of indigenous knowledge. 
 
MATERIAL IRRUPTION 
What ties together the various instances of place-produced thought, and helps 
clarify their difference from other place-influenced thought, is that place-
produced thought is not only a method of thinking, but it is a mode of producing 
radical knowledge. Indeed, as will be demonstrated over the following chapters, 
the production of radical knowledge is one of the most significant functions of 
place-produced thought. Even for artists and thinkers steeped in an awareness of 
how discourse or cultural constructs can impact being and knowledge, those 
cultural discursive constructs often become fossilized and accepted. I am not 
implying that place-produced thought offers an absolute return to the real or a 
way out of discourse; rather, I believe that it holds the potential for disrupting 
established norms and calcified modes of thinking that have become entrenched 
in cultural consciousness. 
What place-produced thought can do is suggest some of the ways that we 
can experience and understand place in a manner that admits to the agency of 
place itself. The writer Seth Kim-Cohen documents an example of how a place 
can assert its own agency and interrupts the apprehension of a thinker or viewer 
when he describes his experience of Janet Cardiff’s 1999 walking piece in 
London, The Missing Voice: Case Study B. After taking the audio tour, Kim-
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Cohen wrote that “the environment in which the walks take place is much more 
than a narrative setting… They are not passive sets, but constantly transforming 
social-architectural-commercial organisms. As the listener navigates the 
fictionalized version of the environment as presented in the audio, one is 
simultaneously navigating the factual physicality of the actual locale,” and as he 
continues a little later, “the fiction of the audio and the fact of the streets become 
confused. Just as a not-real sound can cause the listener to turn toward it, the 
sound of a very real oncoming car can be ignored as part of the audio.”39 When 
Kim-Cohen is nearly hit by ignoring an oncoming car as he walks through 
London’s East End, he is experiencing the place pushing back – the real physical 
materiality of place interrupting his experience as a viewer/listener. Even though 
Kim-Cohen is not the maker of the artwork, his experience of the power of 
irruption by place as part of the artwork, is tantamount to the disruption of 
existing knowledge. In the same way that the oncoming car interrupts the fictional 
narrative of Cardiff’s audio, the agency of place can interrupt the established 
perceptions and beliefs about a particular place, putting the solidity of these pre-
existing notions into doubt. This power of irruption is one of the most vital 
components of place-produced thought as it offers the means to think beyond 
current categories, delineations, or descriptions.  
Place-produced thought is a method of thinking that recognizes the 
potency, agency, and—to use Jane Bennett’s language—the “vibrancy of matter,” 
in non-human places and things. This recognition does not completely disregard 
or abandon the discursive presence that also shapes our understanding and 
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experience of places and things. Instead, place-produced thought encompasses a 
multiplicity of constituting forces, even if they are not actively acted upon or 
acknowledged by the thinker. The power of the forces acting upon a place can’t 
be underestimated, as they often influence the production of thought without the 
thinker having full consciousness of their significance. Whether one is conscious 
of their impact or not, the entanglement of knowledge production with/in the 
forces of place suggests a relationship between thinker and place that is 
symbiotic, dialogical, and active. 
The embodiment of agency in the production of place-produced thought 
calls for a reconsideration of the anti-humanism so prominent since the linguistic 
turn.  This reassessment is not to suggest an abandonment of signification in the 
discourse of subject formation; rather, it promotes an elliptical approach that 
resists a singular, univocal and dominant model.  In this reconsideration of 
Postmodern anti-humanism and the primacy of language, each philosophical 
theory can retain some of its efficacy and validity. Therefore, rather than focusing 
on the divergence between theories, we would do well to analyze the relation, 
impasse, expression, and violence between the constituting forces of place, as 
they trace onto one another. Both the agency of the subject and the agency of 
place within place-produced thought work in tandem to negotiate those traces. 
The relational and temporal organization of the constituting forces of place 
includes the disruption and continuous redistribution of these forces by the 
coalescing actions/thoughts of the thinker/place.  
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AGENCIES IN NEGOTIATION  
What I am edging towards with this assertion is no less than an incursion into the 
history of the discourse on the formation of the subject.40 I am certainly not going 
to attempt a thorough analysis of subjectivity here, but I do want to touch upon 
the shifting notions of subject formation (beginning with Descartes) to further my 
case for the presence of the collective in the singular subject, and to argue for the 
powerful role that place plays in human subjectivity. 
Descartes imagined the formation of the subject as autogenic through 
thought – res cogitans. Against indictments of solipsism towards the subject 
conceived of in the early Enlightenment, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau countered 
with a subject that acknowledged an external world, but also remained pure, 
unified, and singular. Indeed, the intelligibility of their theories is grounded in the 
productive autonomous subject. If we could imagine the formation of the later 
Enlightenment subject being translated into an equation, it might appear as such: 
purity + unity + autonomy = subject. After Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the 
prominence of the individual mind in the formation of the subject was extended 
by the transcendental idealism of Kant, who positioned the mind as central to all 
experience and epistemology. Kant suggested that all phenomena were interpreted 
by the a priori Concepts of the Understanding. Therefore, the pre-existing 
structure of the subject’s mind formed the foundation of experience and thought. 
This notion of the centrality of the individual human mind stood, basically intact, 
until the 20th century.  
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In the 20th century, the shift toward the anti-humanism of 
Poststructuralism emerged from Structuralism’s tendency to negate the primacy 
of the subject in favor of structures, signs, and discourse. For Claude Levi-Strauss 
and other Structuralists, the subject was given through the underlying structures of 
society – the driving force of universal patterns in human thought subsumed 
individual agency. During the latter part of the century, the postmodernist critique 
of the subject effectively dismantled each of the variables in the subject formation 
equation so that it came to read: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of 
outside power = subject (with no subjectivity). For Foucault and other 
Postmodernists, the critical distinction of the Enlightenment subject was that it 
was brought to the discourse of subject formation. As Foucault suggests, the 
concept of the autonomous subject was an invention of the Enlightenment, a 
product of a specific episteme. For Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, it was a 
historical moment when the subject could finally slide out from under the thumb 
of the monarchy and church, and emerge from the shadows of the Platonic cave 
into the world of light, knowledge, and self-formation.  
Much like Foucault, his contemporary, Louis Althusser also claimed that 
the modern subject was a construct.  As a Marxist, Althusser believed that the 
state produced subjects that would best sustain and solidify its own power and 
ideology. Through the determination by Ideological State Apparatuses (mass 
media, cultural institutions, educational institutions and so on), and not by 
individual agency or autonomy, the individual subject is produced. 
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In the development of place-produced thought, human subjectivity is 
considered as an active instrument of organization for constituting forces. This is 
not a device of unitary power, but one that is encumbered by the plural, as both an 
active and receptive epistemic organizer of meaning.41 While the human subject is 
recognized as being active and possessing important agency in place-produced 
thought, it is also shown to be one among many sources of agency, power, force, 
and change. Therefore, in the creation of place-produced thought, the 
postmodernist version of the subject formation equation has been modified as 
such: multiplicity + fragmentation + imposition of outside power + subject + 
place + agency = negotiation. We have retained and added to the variables leading 
to the postmodern negation of the subject, but have recalibrated their sum.  In 
place-produced thought, an active subject and place operate within the fractured, 
multiple, and collective terrain(s) of their formation to generate a continuous 
negotiation.  
While this typology does criticize the near complete annulment of 
subjective agency in poststructuralist thought, it simultaneously recognizes that it 
was those very thinkers who deconstructed the grand authority of the cohesive 
singular subject. Many of the poststructuralists were quick to point out the 
fractures and slippages in the logos of Western metaphysics, including the 
concept of a free willing, self-contained subject. The intimate negotiation and 
connectivity between thinker and place in place-produced thought achieves this 
very proposition, as it resists the absolutism and ferocious autonomy of the 
singular Enlightenment subject. This resistance echoes the same pitfall that 
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Derrida read within Heidegger and others, namely the megalomaniacal centrality 
of the self-creating subject. 
Jacques Rancière offers a similar deconstruction of a primary and singular 
source of meaning in his description of a viewer’s emancipation while 
interpreting a work of art: “It means that every situation can be cracked open from 
the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification.”42 A 
reconfiguration of place also occurs in the creation of place-produced thought. 
However, in each instance of place-produced thought, the thinker is also 
transformed. Through the negotiation and close production of knowledge, both 
thinker and place emerge as unretractably marking one another. This type of 
connection means that localized knowledge is given concomitantly through the 
agency of the existing place and the thinking action of the subject; the production 
of indigenous knowledge is a collective exchange.  
In framing place-produced thought as a negotiation, we embrace yet 
another tenet of Poststructuralism, the notion of maneuvering the slippages 
between systems and constituting forces.  In thinking of the relation between 
different philosophies, Derrida makes an announcement that can be adapted to the 
methodology of place-produced thought, as it stresses the importance of 
dialogical play. Similarly, we note that the negotiation of constituting forces in 
place is “to meditate upon the circularity which makes them pass into one another 
indefinitely,” and furthermore “to let some elliptical displacement be produced in 
the difference of repetition: a deficient displacement, doubtless, but deficient in a 
way which is not yet – or is no longer – absence, negativity, non-Being, lack, 
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silence (Derrida’s italics).”43 The displacement detailed by Derrida is akin to the 
re-configuration or un-siting of place in place-produced thought, and indeed it 
does not emerge as an absence of non-being, but rather as a powerful and 
productive epistemic source.  
Before moving on to examine other historical relationships with place that 
are distinct from place-produced thought, I want to make a further note about the 
intersection between epistemological production and ontological transformation. 
As already suggested, the ontological melding of place and thinker occurs in the 
development of thought with/in place. Both Foucault and Butler have written 
about how epistemology can both limit and bear the possibilities for being. What 
is knowable about a subject or place limits the potentiality of its being. For 
Foucault, an “a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of 
experience a field of knowledge, [and] defines the mode of being (Foucault’s 
italics).”44 
In her text, Gender Trouble, Butler criticizes Foucault’s presumption of 
the body as a static tabula rasa awaiting cultural inscription. In a similar manner, 
I want to suggest, through this typology, that place-produced thought provides 
methods to negotiate and navigate an epistemological space that includes, but 
relinquishes the predominance of signification (or any other singular constituting 
force), in the formation of knowledge.  Instead, the development of place-
produced thought maintains the potential of acting and thinking (what Butler calls 
performance) that “suggests an openness to resignification and 
recontextualization.”45 The key point is that place-produced thought holds 
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ontological weight, as the emergent localized episteme becomes a part of the 
being of both place and thinker. The unretractable marks of thought etch 
themselves into thinker and place, causing the distinction between place, thinker, 
and the thought produced to fade – thinking, doing, and place coalesce.  
 
OTHER CREATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH PLACE  
As we move toward a better understanding of place-produced thought, it will be 
helpful to clarify the engagement with place developed through place-produced 
thought, by contrasting them with other relationships that thinkers and creators 
have with their surroundings. I would like to draw an important differentiation 
between “thinking places” generally and sites of “place-produced thought” in 
particular. “Thinking places” have been the focus of several studies; for example, 
Carolyn and Jack Fleming recently published Thinking Places: Where Great 
Ideas Were Born. They recount many of their visits to, and observations of, 
famous thinking places throughout Europe and the USA.  The description and 
conceptualization of thinking in place as portrayed in their text is an important 
counterpoint to the relationship between thinker and place that I maintain is 
cultivated through the making of place-produced thought.  
  Instead of recognizing place as an active agent in the production of 
thought, some historical thinkers have cultivated a correspondence with place that 
casts the “thinking place” as a “creative muse.” In such cases, place is denied 
some of its agency and is often considered an object or experience meant to 
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inspire the thinking subject. For example, in the general account of the thinking 
places surveyed in their book, Carolyn and Jack Fleming describe them as a 
“structure or memorable site where a visitor may receive his [sic] own inspiration 
and, perhaps, as if in some mystical way, tap into the creative muse and be 
energized by its power.”46 In these instances, the thinker is not in a genuine 
dialogue with place, as they are much more likely to “use” place as means toward 
a particular end. In place-produced thought, the place is much more than an 
utilitarian object; it is a co-producer of situated knowledge.  
The use of place as a creative muse in the thinking places described by the 
Flemings is also related to a noteworthy distinction in the intentionality of the 
thinker. Many of the creative people who have utilized thinking places that are 
included in the Fleming’s book, demonstrate an intentionality in their projects, but 
one that is mostly focused on finding seclusion in “a special cloister place to 
nurture the creative process.”47  In place-produced thought however, there is often 
a desire for more than sheer solitude (although that may be important for some). 
In these instances, each thinker has attempted to converse and to think “with/in” 
place. This turn of phrase should not be taken as merely a puckish neologism, for 
it points to the heart of a place-produced thought as the fusion of thinker, place, 
and being. “Thinking with/in” place implies a co-mingled interdependence of 
polyphonic agents, each sharing in the production of indigenous knowledge. 
By conjoining the actions of thinking “with” and “in,” a distinctive sort of 
connectedness is implied. The intrinsic conjunction between thinker and place in 
place-produced thought means that the “with” and “in” of thinking are also 
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necessarily merged and expressed as “with/in.” The thinker does not merely think 
“within” place – by developing place-produced thought, they enter a sort of 
marriage with place, each their own bringing desires and ideas to the table, but 
also remaining responsive, reflexive, and attuned to the other. Both place and 
thinker push one another to realize new insights, applications, and sensibilities in 
a dialogical exchange. Thinking occurs both with, and inside of place, as the 
participants assert their agency on the other in an ongoing ellipsis of transforming 
production.  
 
NATURE WRITING/ LANDSCAPE PAINTING 
Another method of developing a relationship with the environment that contrasts 
to “thinking with/in” is found in some traditional nature writing and landscape 
painting. Both nature writing and landscape painting are genres that evoke an 
appreciation of, and connection between, the writer/artist and the environment. In 
recent years, “new” nature writing has surfaced that more directly attempts to 
think with/in place by “looking more closely at how the local feels.”48 In this 
sense, much of the new nature writing is “personal and intimate” with place. As 
such, new nature writing seems to be, potentially, one of the prodigious avenues 
for place-produced thought. Certain projects by writers such as Robert 
MacFarlane, Kathleen Jamie, Rebecca Solnit, John Elder, C. S. Giscombe, and 
Brenda Hillman are creating connections with place that can often be considered 
as place-produced thought. 
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While newer forms of nature writing may be more akin to place-produced 
thought, the type of engagement with place in some historical nature writing is 
often pervaded by clichéd tropes such as the “country/city divide” or “nature as 
redemptive other,” in a manner that does not acknowledge the same level of 
agency that is present and so crucial to the development of place-produced 
thought.  
Many of the narratives in some historical nature writing epitomize the 
transformative journey or struggle and rely on the cult of nature for redemptive 
catharsis.  For example, Farley Mowatt describes one such narrative about his 
work for the Canadian government in northern Canada, where he collected 
information about the diets and mobility patterns of wolves.  Although his 
account of the experience documents amazingly complex wolf behaviors and the 
beautifully intimate relationship that he was able to develop with the pack of 
wolves, at times it slips into the problematic and reductive contrast of the 
country/city binary. This classic contrast typecasts the exploitive, careless, and 
consumerist urban existence against one that is more mystical, magical, in tune 
with, and respectful of nature.  This often “simple” existence is believed to 
connect human beings with a more truthful and wholesome mode of being.  In 
John Krakauer’s account of Christopher McCandless’ journey into the Alaskan 
wilderness, there are some remnants of the moral and ideological divide between 
the country and the city. For example, McCandless underlined the following 
passage in his copy of Doctor Zhivago: “Oh, how one wishes sometimes to escape 
from the meaningless dullness of human eloquence, from all those sublime 
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phrases, to take refuge in nature.”49 In examples of nature writing such as these, 
nature and place often function more as signifiers of cultural meaning, than as 
active producers of knowledge in their own right. Many of these kinds of usages 
in nature writing can be collectively referred to as promoting “the cult of nature” 
and are historically rooted in the ideas of Romanticism. The relationship between 
Romantic cultural concepts of nature and place, and their similarity to the cult of 
nature is explored in the next section.  
In the cult of nature, nature becomes a signifier in a sort of Barthesian 
shift—that is, it takes on a mythic dimension, often carrying paradoxical 
significations for moral purity, healthy living, longevity, death, fortitude, justice, 
intelligence, simplicity, and altruism (to name a few). Such significations are 
often based upon the notion that some intangible spirituality or deep ethereal 
connection that humans once had has been lost and if we could only regain it, our 
culture could be radically transformed for the better. In this sense, nature is used 
as a signifier for an absence and loss. The cult of nature also often defines nature 
as a moralizing and redemptive other.  These representations of nature tell us 
more about the cultist than about nature.  As Arendt reminds us, we need to be 
aware that “representations are formations, they have purposes.”50 Each of the 
myths of nature have been created for a specific purpose, one that does not 
necessarily lead us to recognize the ways that place can become active and push 
back against the attempted impositions of culture or thinker. The greatest point to 
be made here is that these meanings are inscribed onto nature (and place) in ways 
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that do not recognize, to the full extent, the appeals or demands of the agency of 
place.   
To illustrate this disparity between the more passive roles that nature or 
place may play as a mythic signifier or creative muse versus the active role of 
knowledge co-producer, I often think of Albert Bierstadt’s paintings of the 
American West (Fig.1).  Many scholars have criticized Bierstadt for his 
romanticized notions of the picturesque and his glorified and embellished use of 
light.51 While I understand many of these critiques, I would also argue that the 
role of the landscape in the painting is akin to the role of place in the Flemings’ 
“thinking places,” as neither of them endows place with its full role as productive 
agent, nor do they acknowledge – to once again use Bennett’s term – the 
“vibrancy of matter.” Instead, images such as Bierstadt’s are anthropocentric  
 
Figure 1. Albert Bierstadt, The Domes of Yosemite, 1867  
Image courtesy St. Johnsbury Athenaeum. 
because they are the “direct descendant of the scenery cult’s key concept: the 
picturesque. This term literally means ‘picturelike’ and indicates a mode of 
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appreciation by which the natural world is divided into scenes, each aiming at an 
ideal dictated by art, especially landscape painting.”52 In these types of 
representations, place is restricted to being an object for aesthetic contemplation 
and reflection. Even though landscape painting is often celebrated for its 
expression of the harmonic relation between nature and humans, it can also be 
read as fetishizing the landscape, turning it into an aesthetic object functioning as 
a creative muse.  
By contrast, in the instances of place-produced thought included in this 
discussion, place often pushes back against these types of fetishizing, urging the 
thinker to “acknowledge a force that, though quite real and powerful, is 
intrinsically resistant to representation.”53 Therefore, the role of place in place-
produced thought is much different than that of a creative muse, as it involves a 
more dialogical and inter-subjective exchange.  
 
ROMANTICISM 
Other notions about how thinkers have historically created a relationship with 
their surroundings, is described in the philosophical and artistic ideas of 
Romanticism. As industrialization arose in the 19th century in Germany, France 
and England, so, too, did Romanticism, as many thinkers began to find inspiration 
in the natural world. These writers and artists were interested in the “pursuit of 
natural supernaturalism, of divinity in nature” as well as a spiritual connection 
with nature.54 As a reaction to both the mechanized urbanization of the Industrial 
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Revolution and the Positivist rationality of the Enlightenment, Romantics turned 
to nature for a sublime encounter as means to counteract or escape the ills of 
modern society. Nature was prized for its ability to remove or cleanse the thinker 
from the debilitating realities and restrictions of rationally structured urban life.  
Many of the Romantics sought out specific places that suited their 
sensibilities.  In England, most of the Romantic writers and artists either migrated 
to, or frequented, the mountainous Lake District in northwest England. For many, 
the Lake District represented the harmonious existence of human beings with a 
picturesque natural landscape. After visiting the region in 1855, American 
Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote, “I question whether any part of the world looks so 
beautiful as England—this part of England, at least—on a fine summer morning. 
It makes one think the more cheerfully of human life to see such a bright 
universal verdure; such sweet, rural, peaceful, flower-bordered cottages… and 
such nice villas along the roadside, so tastefully contrived for comfort and 
beauty.”55 Much of the attraction to this region was because it matched the 
discursive aesthetic ideals that the Romantics sought in the landscape – the rustic, 
pastoral, and interdependence of humans and nature (Fig.2). 
The interpretations of the Romantic ideas of nature and place are so 
widely varied that they include everything from a celebration of ecological 
thought in Romanticism, to a critique of the projection of cultural attitudes and 
beliefs onto nature. Without favoring either side in this debate, an important 
differentiation between place-produced thought and Romanticized “thinking 
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Figure 2. John Constable, The White Horse, 1819 
Image courtesy The Frick Collection, New York. 
places” can still be discerned. Many of the Romantic thinking places were 
established as a means to escape, as a negation of another place, as a means to get 
out of an unwanted place. For example, the writer William Butler Yeats 
purchased a tower (Thoor Ballylee Castle) in the countryside near the Irish town 
of Gort, in some part because he wanted to escape from the world and find a 
solitary place to be creative. Thoor Ballylee became Yeats’ retreat, as he was 
“attracted to the beauty of the remote site.”56 The remoteness of the site was one 
of the most redeeming qualities for Yeats, since he “had always seen himself as 
one in a line of solitary searchers after a hidden wisdom.”57 
Many of the “thinking places” in the Flemings’ text are also drawn from a 
tradition valorizing solitary thinking, one that can be traced as far back to at least 
Aristotle. Informing this tradition is the idea that the best and most productive 
thinking occurs when one is sequestered from the world without distraction. 
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However, the complete removal from one’s surroundings is at least improbable, 
perhaps impossible. Place-produced thought, on the other hand, is not created as a 
means to get out of place (both Thoreau and Heidegger rejected escapism), but 
rather as a method of getting into, and engaging with, place. The development of 
place-produced thought is driven more by a desire to work with/in place rather 
than to disengage from the world. 
 
SITE-SPECIFIC ART 
Place-produced thought involves a deployment of place that is also in contrast to 
the exchange conventionally understood as site-specific.  The traditional 
relationship of site-specific art to place is described by Robert Morris’ minimalist 
site, in which the “total space is hopefully altered in certain desired ways by the 
presence of the object” (my italics).58 This type of “total” site transformation 
through the intervention of an artistic object is far more imposing, prescriptive, 
and dialectical than the un-siting of place that occurs in place-produced thought. 
Through the development of place-produced thought, the reconfiguration—or un-
siting—of place is achieved when it becomes an active co-producer in the creation 
of thought. This type of ontological transformation of place does not imply a total 
transformation, but rather an addition of new “implications” to its identity. Once 
place-produced thought has been developed, the place should not be considered as 
completely “new,” as suggested by Okui Enwezor, but as a sort of progeny, made 
“anew” through the additional meanings, values, and identities affixed to its 
being.  I want to stress here the fundamental imbrication of place, production, and 
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thought that occurs in the process of developing place-produced thought. The 
“anew” ontology includes its preceding identities, practices, and significations, 
but is augmented and negotiated by the process of engendering place-produced 
thought.  
As described earlier, the ontological connection between the existing place 
and its transformation by the thinker/place exchange in place-produced thought 
has echoes of the relationship between the singular and the community expressed 
by philosophers such as Hannah Arendt and Jean-Luc Nancy.  Each of them 
contends that the individual is never singular. In the enactment of subjective 
agency within place-produce thought, the thinker does not think/act in pure 
solitude. In his concept of the heteroglossic “sideways glance,” Mikhail Bakhtin 
also claims that every person carries the influence of others, so that no one subject 
can be isolated. “The self is an act of grace, a gift of the other,” asserts Bakhtin.59 
Even within the supposed solitude of the Socratic inner dialogue, recall how 
Arendt also illustrates the role of community in the turn toward interiority: “this 
faculty of thought, which is exercised in solitude, extends into the strictly political 
sphere, where I am always together with others.”60 I return to the relationship 
between the singular and the collective again here to further stress the dialogical 
(rather than dialectical) nature of place-produced thought that is always reaching 
beyond its boundaries. As a form of re-composition or un-siting, the development 
of place-produced thought occurs through a networked negotiation and generates 
what Kwon portrays as a “relational sensibility [that] can… transform passing 
intimacies into indelible, unretractable social marks.”61 
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ENVIRONMENTAL ART 
Another approach that artists have used to build a relationship with their 
surroundings is through producing earth art or environmental art.  These art 
practices are typically conducted outdoors and often utilize local materials, forms, 
and histories to create a work of art. Andy Goldsworthy, a renowned 
environmental artist, creates works of art utilizing the natural materials found at 
particular sites. Goldsworthy manipulates these materials into visually pleasing 
creations inspired by organic forms.  The meandering path of a river, the 
smoothness of a sphere, the order of a rectangle, all repeat throughout 
Goldsworthy’s work. His work often emphasizes the beauty in nature. Yet, it is 
evident at times that “valuable beauty” originates from, and is placed upon nature 
by, the aesthetic appreciation of Goldsworthy and his audience. He states, “When 
I see a snake I am fascinated by its form and movement. It draws beautifully the 
surface over which it travels…the perfect sculpture.”62 The valuation of the 
formal qualities of nature or a place is derived from what Allen Carlson calls the 
“object model of appreciation.”63  Carlson describes this type of appreciation and 
value placement vis á vis our appreciation of a visual artistic object.  The object is 
admired for its inherent form, color, and texture but not actually as a thing in of 
itself.  Carlson explains the model as such: “natural objects are granted what is 
called artistic enfranchisement, and they, like artifacts as Marcel Duchamp’s 
Urinal, …become works of art. Appreciating a sculpture that was once driftwood 
is, therefore, no closer to appreciating nature than is appreciating a purse that was 
once a sow’s ear.”64 
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 Carlson’s assessment suggests that environmental artists typically do not 
engage with place in the same manner as is inherent to place-produced thought. 
The distinction is that environmental art does not always recognize the active 
agency of place. Many environmental works do exhibit sensitivity and an accord 
with the specific contingencies of a site, but I argue that this is executed in a way 
that renders and values the place primarily as a passive aesthetic object (as per 
Carlson’s definition) – rather than an active producer of knowledge. 
 In all fairness, Goldsworthy’s outdoor earthworks do seem to exhibit a 
genuine attempt to think with/in place, but often his least successful works fall a 
little short of this goal. They key point here is the contrast between being 
receptive and attuned to place, and working with/in place as an active co-producer 
of knowledge with its own desires and motivations. The repeated themes and 
formal qualities of Goldsworthy’s work, utilized regardless of where he is 
working on the globe (Fig.3, Fig.4 & Fig.5), seem to indicate that the artwork is 
sometimes overlaid or mapped onto place, rather than being inscribed into it.65 
One may argue that some of Goldsworthy’s work and his writings give 
evidence of a desire not to control and dictate nature, but rather to actually work 
with nature/place. As Goldsworthy states, “that these works appear to have grown 
in place is an indication I have understood something of the internal stone and 
tree. They are not an attempt at mimicry.”66  He continues by stating “I don’t see 
them as being under my control.”67 These statements demonstrate his belief in his 
equality with nature.  This is further evidenced by the fact that Goldsworthy takes 
great care not to leave behind any completely verifiable traces of a human mark.   
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Figure 3. Wichita Arch, 2004 – Installed on the campus of Wichita State University, Wichita, KS. 
Image Courtesy of the Ulrich Museum of Art. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Striding Arch, 2008 – Installed on Colt Hill, 3 km from Benbuie, Dumfries And 
Galloway, UK. 
Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 
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Figure 5. Arches 2005, Gibbs Farm, Kaipara Harbour, New Zealand. 
Image Courtesy of Rob Garrett. 
There is an ambiguity in his work, where what we are seeing is in-between natural 
phenomenon and human intervention. However, working “with” place is not the 
same as working “with/in” place. The former seems to grant the place some level 
of equivalence, but this remains granted by the thinking subject, and does not go 
as far in recognizing the intrinsic power of place that is vital to the co-creation of 
place-produced thought. 
 
THINKING WITH/IN PLACE  
Having clarified the distinctions between place-produced thought and the other 
types of relationships that thinkers have with their environments, I would like to 
focus on place-produced thought itself, especially some of its inherent by-
products, as well as its potential for innovation and insurgency as new forms of 
thought.  Place-produced thought is a particularly vital form of localized 
epistemology because of its ability to generate hetereotopic knowledge. In that 
regard, place-produced thought can be unlike any other knowledges; the unique 
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interaction between place, thinker, agency, materiality, and discursivity can be 
powerfully irruptive and can produce alternative readings or understandings of 
people, places, or things.   
 Part of the reason for the uniqueness of this knowledge is that in place-
produced thought, the distinction between thinking and acting, as presented in the 
Arendtian-Socratic model, is undone. Indeed, thinking is posited as action, as a 
process that is forceful and subversive.  The development of place-produced 
thought occurs through an engagement with place and not through disinterested 
transcendental contemplation.  The thinker actually lives the place of his or her 
thought. The conjoined action-thinking of place-produced thought allows us to 
distinguish it from the passive and tacit relationship with place that continuously 
permeates thought and being.  
Place is commonly part of our being and thought processes—we are all 
shapes by the places that we inhabit. However, those who generate place-
produced thought develop a particularly deep link between thought and location. 
Heidegger, for example, articulates a profound bond of place with being when he 
hyphenates da-sein: being occurs “there.” Being has a presence in place, explains 
Heidegger, before the truth of being is covered over and concealed by time. 
However, neither place as the location for being, as Heidegger alleges, nor the 
exertion of place that we experience everyday, fully coincide with the function of 
place in the operation of place-produced thought.  Instead, in each instance of 
place-produced thought there is a concerted effort to make something occur – to 
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derive a new body of thought. Place acts as locator for, and a participant in, the 
emergence of a new episteme.  
In the realm of postcolonial discourse, Enwezor maintains that something 
like place-produced thought can act as a “series of healthy counter discourses to 
colonial modernity’s self-authorized decisions.”68 And, as will be demonstrated in 
the following chapters, that capacity is not limited to challenging colonial 
modernity’s discourses. Rather, the focus of thought in a particular place has often 
led to creativity and innovation, in no small part because place has the capacity to 
react with or affect a thinker in a special way, through the concomitance of 
subjective action and indigenous knowledge. This process is not without risks, but 
it does exhibit an intrinsic bond – a nexus and shared ontology between place and 
production. 
 
METHODS OF THINKING WITH/IN PLACE  
One method for developing place-produced thought can be called think place. 
This term refers to an actual location for thinking, an environment that the thinker 
chooses as a locus for thought. In order for place to serve as a point of 
convergence, the thinker often establishes margins or borders for a place for 
thinking. These boundaries may be permeable, transient, and seemingly arbitrary, 
but their existence remains significant. The threshold of a place can be given 
through various means – physical topography, cartography, relations of power, 
the perceptions of the thinker, or through some combination of these. This 
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delineation may radically depart from established boundaries. The 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization of borders can prompt questions about 
the circumstances of their original demarcation, leading to a new understanding of 
what is and isn’t delineated by a certain place. 
Another possible method for establishing place-produced thought is 
thinking of place. This refers to an instance when place is called upon to put the 
thinker in a certain state of consciousness, emotive disposition, or intellectual 
framework. This does not necessarily occur during the actual physical 
engagement with place. Instead, thinking of place can be achieved through 
recollection and imagination. It is a vicarious embodiment, where place is 
virtually engaged, to provide the thinker with particular intellectual guidance, 
even from afar. Thinking of place enables the thinker to extend place as a focus 
for thought well beyond the initial encounter. Thinking of place involves recalling 
place for the continued creation of place-produced thought. 
A third possible method for developing place-produced thought is thinking 
through a place. This entails positioning place as a sounding board, in which 
thought is drawn out of the negotiation with place.  In this capacity, place can act 
as a type of semi-conductor or as a point of resistance. Thinking through a place 
engages place in a dialogue that can emphasize or diminish the constituting 
variables of place. When one of the constituting forces is muffled or softened as 
the place pushes back, it may still remain active, but may not act upon the thinker 
(and the thought produced) in a substantial manner. In contrast, the enlargement 
or expansion of a particular quality of place may also occur so that it becomes 
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central and formative in place-produced thought.  This diminishing/enlarging can 
be subversive because it calls for the thinker to recognize an unrealized aspect of 
place or turn a blind eye towards a constituting force that is hegemonic or 
autocratic. 
While the emphasis or restriction of certain qualities of place is often 
productive and innovative, it can also be problematic, leading to myopic 
conclusions in which place is used as a means to calcify hegemonic behavior. The 
possibility of using place-produced thought to justify politics of rejection or 
exclusion does exist. 
 
ETHOS OF PLACE  
A newly developed localized epistemology of place-produced thought will also 
inherently include an ethos of place. In the close negotiation between 
place/thinker, the value, idiosyncrasies, and agency of a specific place are brought 
to the forefront of the thinker’s consciousness. Thinking with/in place encourages 
the thinker to build a sense of respect for said place. Even though the push back 
from place might by discomforting, perhaps even irritating, the thinker becomes 
irrevocably engaged with/in his or her locus of thought. This type of engagement 
disallows apathy. Even though the thinker may not be in love with his or her locus 
of thought, by thinking with/in place an indelible awareness is developed, as the 
place inscribes itself onto the very being of the thinker. By generating thought 
with/in a certain locale, place is also recognized as an active agent rather than a 
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passive object. As such, place-produced thought holds the potential for producing 
an original and radical ethos that is both embodied and dialogical. Ewa Ziarek 
describes this type of ethos as transformative because the “shift from moral law to 
the event locates responsibility in the always asymmetrical, embodied relation to 
the Other and redefines freedom as an engagement in the experimental praxis 
aiming to surpass historically sedimented identities and to create new modes of 
life.”69  
To think with/in place is to be engaged with place – forming a contextual 
and idiosyncratic relationship to place. This crucial connection does not mean that 
the thinker can’t develop the same sort of engagement with another place down 
the line. Because thinking with/in place is a mode of encounter that not only 
ontologically entangles the thinker with place, but also importantly creates an 
intimate co-producing relationship, respect is an intrinsic part of that engagement. 
As previously mentioned, the act of thinking with/in place is a process in which 
being, place, and thinking are merged. Emmanuel Levinas describes this type of 
thinking when he writes: “to think is no longer to contemplate, but to be engaged, 
merged with what we think, launched—the dramatic event of being-in-the-
world.”70 Through this union, a place-produced ethos of care can be fostered as 
part of the development of place-produced thought. In many of the instances of 
place-produced thought examined in the following pages, we can discern how a 
place-produced ethos of care was developed as part of the overall creation of 
place-produced thought. 
 
  49
POLITICS OF PLACE  
While a place ethic is an inherent aspect of place-produced thought, each instance 
of place-produced thought also demonstrates a negotiation between knowledge, 
place, and power in the form of an indigenous geospatial politic. If we return to 
our definition of place as a bio-socio-historical zone of active exchange between 
various forces and ideologies—and therefore, a dynamic space of negotiation, 
then we remember that a negotiation of power is inherent to these exchanges. By 
seating the development of thought within the swirling mass of ideologies that 
occur in place, each of these thinkers is confronted with an engagement of 
politics. By immersing themselves, and becoming part of, the exchanges and 
distribution of power within a place, each thinker develops a politics of place that 
is reflective of, and informed by, the micro politics of place.  
By engaging with place, each thinker is confronted with the dispersal of 
power through the various forces acting upon or within it. As a zone, or a 
bracketed site of exchanges, these assorted forces are utterly intertwined within 
place. As Rebecca Solnit writes “something as tangible as soil is embedded with 
something as immaterial as ideology.”71 Consequently, and critically for our 
understanding of place-produced thought, place and politics are inseparable. This 
means that the development of place-produced thought is always political, as each 
instance demonstrates a corollary politics of place. In fact, there is often a mutual 
dependency between the thinking and politics produced with/in place, as they 
both stem from the close encounter between thinker and place. 
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Heidegger’s thinking with/in with the landscape surrounding his mountain 
hut near Todtnauberg is a good example of how a place-based politics is 
intertwined with place-produced thought. While Heidegger’s interaction with the 
landscape was highly determined by his pre-existing thoughts about da-sein and 
being-in-the-world, his direct experience of the landscape between mountain hut 
and city house was profound and illuminating. His affinity for the particular place 
of his thought (especially the valley surrounding the hut), and the politics 
associated with it, was undoubtedly built upon his immediate material 
encounters—wandering along its wooded paths, hearing the placid gurgling of the 
brook which fed his water pump, or the perhaps the brush of the wind on his face 
as it whipped through the valley. For example, in “Why Do I Stay in The 
Provinces?” Heidegger writes that “The gravity of mountains and the hardness of 
their primeval rock, the slow and deliberate growth of the fir-trees, the brilliant, 
simple splendor of the meadows in bloom, the rush of the mountain brook in the 
long autumn night, the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered with snow – all of 
this moves and flows through and penetrates daily existence up there.”72 In 
statement such as this, Heidegger’s writing certainly seems to indicate that he was 
smitten with the materiality of the place. 
When I visited Heidegger’s hut at the beginning of a recent summer, with 
the intentions of exploring its materiality, I found myself struggling prior to 
arrival with how I should experience such a place. I wanted to remain open and 
receptive to the direct confrontation of its phenomena—to best simulate 
Heidegger’s own experience as best as I could. But I also knew that because I had 
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studied and thought about the place so much prior to my visit, that there was no 
way that this pre-existing knowledge could be excluded from the encounter. My 
hope was that I could come a little closer to understanding what the place meant 
for Heidegger—maybe to get a sense of his own being in the landscape. Perhaps it 
was the overall peacefulness, accentuated by the sleepy serenity of the midday 
sun, but I was suddenly struck by a specific sound as my wife and I walked along 
a path near the cabin. The sound was the clanking of a cowbell and I immediately 
turned around to find the source of the bell. To my surprise, it came from a cow 
grazing far away on the other side of the valley. I was startled by how clear and 
close the sound seemed. By hearing the cowbell, I suddenly became conscious of 
the presence of the cattle even though they were far removed from my immediate 
vicinity. Was this a sort of awakening to being-in-the-world that Heidegger wrote 
so extensively about? I am still not really sure… but I do know that my own 
physical encounter with the landscape of Heidegger’s thought did provide me 
with some insight as to why Heidegger was so captivated by that landscape. The 
natural amphitheater of the valley and the views it affords are certainly 
picturesque, and the materiality of the encounter—smells, sounds, and textures of 
the place—seem to stay with you, even after you have made your way off of the 
mountain.  
The materiality of phenomenological encounters however, was not the 
only force acting upon Heidegger as he developed his place-produced thought. 
Heidegger’s thinking with/in place was also defined by the discourses and cultural 
ideas about the place that he brought with him. Some of his discursive baggage 
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included the ideology of the Black Forest peasant as being pragmatic, 
hardworking, and unpretentious. While both the material and the discursive 
conditions of the landscape informed the cultivation of some beautiful thoughts 
for Heidegger, the cultural ideas about the place and its people likely also 
contributed to his development of a blut und boden (blood and soil) politics. As 
described in Chapter Two, the landscape of Heidegger’s thought was thoroughly 
imbued with his beliefs about the Black Forest peasant. Heidegger apparently 
came to believe that the Black Forest peasants’ mode of living was better than 
other types in its ability to embody being-in-the-world. Viewed as being 
undistracted by the vacant charms of technology and urban life, Heidegger 
considered the Black Forest peasants’ way of life as the best means to understand 
the nature of being.  
The political ideology of blut und boden represents the dangerous and 
destructive side of a place-based politics. As geographer David Harvey makes 
clear, when a place is believed to be pristinely and positively hermetic, separated, 
and highly distinct from the Outside, the notion of blut und boden offers great 
potential for breeding fear and xenophobic reactions that can be part of a placed-
based politic. The horrific consequences of an ideology based in blut und boden 
were demonstrated in the actions and propaganda of the Nazi party. 
Unfortunately, Heidegger was also committed to a exclusionary politics of blut 
und boden, and to the belief that the German landscape and ethnicity was superior 
to all others, a belief that culminated in his involvement with the Nazi party.73 
While Heidegger’s politics of place are certainly not agreeable, they emerged in 
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conjunction with his place-produced thought, which does not carry the same 
negative elements. This example illustrates that not all place-produced thought is 
necessarily positive or entirely constructive, and that the same situation can give 
rise to thoughts and politics that are themselves divergent. Heidegger is a 
polarizing and conflicting thinker for many scholars because his philosophy mixes 
the beautiful with the atrocious. The task of untangling Heidegger’s constructive 
thoughts on being from his disturbing politics (both arguably a product of his 
place-produced thought), is certainly tricky, complicated, and perhaps, even 
impossible. In Chapter 3, I revisit Heidegger’s politics and thought to further 
examine the relationship of one to the other. 
What is perhaps most intriguing about the politics of place developed in 
each instance of place-produced thought, whether those politics be troubling or 
constructive, is that the experience of power, knowledge, and space at the micro 
level is translated in some manner to the macro level. This translation provides 
each thinker with a political ideology that is a component to his or her place-
produced thought. In this sense, the politics of place (and we could make this 
claim about an ethos of place as well) exceeds the specificity of the locus of 
thought, as it is imprinted into the continued and lasting thought of each thinker.  
Rebecca Solnit has made a similar claim about the connection between 
landscape and politics when she exclaims “those who deny that nature and 
culture, landscapes and politics, the city and the country are inextricable 
interfused have undermined that route for us all… this makes politics dreary and 
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landscape trivial.”74 Place-produced thought reveals that landscape or place is 
hardly trivial. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF PLACE-PRODUCED THOUGHT 
While we have noted the potentially damaging use of place-produced thought to 
justify bigotry or xenophobia, another possible detriment to thinking with/in place 
can be the formation or reification of boundaries.  While using place to focus 
thought typically requires establishing margins, too much emphasis on borders 
runs the risk of otherizing. Labeled as the “other” to place, and defined by that 
which is “outside” of place, the “other” can be threatened by the normative power 
of place to define, delimit, or dissolve.  This form of binarism has the potential to 
jeopardize and contaminate place-produced thought. Otherization through place 
has often been deployed in establishing radical nationalisms. The fervor of 
dangerous nationalistic rhetoric has historically been grounded in reactionary and 
antagonistic politics derived from place-based identities.  
“Thought based on place haunts us still,” claims Augé, recalling horrific 
extremist marginalizations and genocides of the past. David Harvey also worries 
about how geographies of difference are used to exacerbate the separations among 
communities. According to Harvey, the notion of place as a hermetically, locally 
bound identity is in tension with the mobility of global networks and capital. This 
tension produces anxiety over the potential loss of place and identity. When such 
a climate of fear and loss permeates thought produced with/in place, it can lead to 
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destructive politics of exclusion.75 These limitations of thinking with/in place 
thought do not mean, however, that the methodology of using place as a focus for 
thinking is a doomed or futile venture. Just as with other methods of generating 
thought, place-produced thought is susceptible to the prejudices and fallibilities of 
human thought. But, we should not throw out the baby with the bath water. As 
demonstrated throught the case studies in the following chapters, place-produced 
thought can be a valuable means of making innovative indigenous knowledge, 
and should therefore remain a component of human thought development. 
 
PLACES OF THOUGHT  
Because place-produced thought is not a unified field, it should come as no 
surprise that its articulations use disjunctive methodologies. The scope of the 
various projects analyzed in the following chapters is, therefore, also intentionally 
diverse, encompassing different types of places that have engendered distinctive 
bodies of thought. Ranging from the 19th to the 21st century, encompassing tropes 
of idealism, isolation, identity, walking, nature, the real, and enlisting 
methodologies that include Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and Post-
colonialism, these projects were not created by makers intent upon placing them 
in conversation with one another. However, when they are regarded in that way, 
we can see that they share a crucial attribute: the production of a localized 
episteme through a deep entwinement of place, production, and thinker. In each 
case, indigenous knowledge has been produced by situated contemplation. Each 
instance of place-produced thought also extends the role of place beyond 
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everyday experience and the latent influence of place on one’s identity or 
physiology. In each of these cases, the agency of the thinker and the agency of 
place emerge as co-producers of knowledge. In the following chapters, I explore 
five instances, probing the relation between the formation of the subject, the 
constitution of place, and the performativity of agency.  These instances do not 
encompass a comprehensive taxonomy, but they do comprise significant cases of 
the close intimacy that place can have with thought. They are offered as a starting 
point toward a typology of place-produced thought. I have arranged these case 
studies not only chronologically, but more importantly, on a trajectory from the 
highly localized and materially engaged to a global de-materialized engagement. 
This transition will push us to consider broader assessments for the role of the 
tangible and the articulations of place in place-produced thought. 
 In Chapter One, I examine Thoreau’s Walden experiment as an important 
instance of place-produced thought. When Thoreau made the decision to seek “the 
essence of things” by living in a cabin in the woods outside of Concord, MA, he 
put into motion a thinking project focused with/in place that would impact his 
philosophy far beyond the two years of his actual Walden habitation. Through this 
analysis, Walden and Concord are depicted as the mise-en-scène of Thoreau’s 
place-produced thought, emerging as (some of) the places that have become 
inexorably connected to his thought.76 In the examination of Thoreau’s relation to 
Walden, we begin to better understand how places exercise their agency by 
resisting the intentions of a thinker.  At the same time, the Walden experiment 
also demonstrates the ontological link that is established in the creation of place-
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produced thought, fusing the thinker and place together in an inextricable bond. 
The chapter will also look at some of the specifics of Thoreau’s overall 
philosophy and demonstrate how they are connected to the intimate encounter 
between Thoreau and Walden’s landscape. 
Chapter Two explores the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and his 
relationship with a small cabin in the Black Forest outside the quaint German 
village of Todtnauberg. Much like Thoreau, Heidegger sought out a place suitable 
to develop his thinking. Heidegger’s cabin, or die Hütte as Heidegger called it, 
was built as the optimal place for philosophical meditations on being and 
existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes of existence and its relatedness to 
place: “it is true that we also say of da-sein that it occupies a place.”77 Beginning 
in 1922, Heidegger did almost all of his writing while staying at the cabin. 
However, rather than considering only the cabin, I argue that the movement back 
and forth between the cabin and Heidegger’s Freiburg residence comprises the 
landscape of his place-produced thought. The slow walks between his home in 
Freiburg and the cabin are examined in order to glean revelations about the 
development of Heidegger’s concept of aletheia. I show how the movement 
between modes and places of being produced some critical insights for Heidegger 
about the continuous cycle of concealment and disclosure that characterizes the 
nature of being. By thinking with/in place, Heidegger was able to generate a form 
of indigenous knowledge – marking an important historical instance of place-
produced thought. 
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Chapter Three analyzes the 1973 artistic project Reality Properties: Fake 
Estates by Gordon Matta-Clark. This project served to focus Matta-Clark’s 
thinking in a place comprised of fifteen small lots of property within New York 
City. Matta-Clark’s acquisition of several small, unwanted, “unusable,” and often-
inaccessible properties will be examined as an attempt to develop a locus of 
thought. In reaction to the slicing up of the urban landscape by the freeway 
system during the 1950s and ‘60s, Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates project mirrors 
Foucault’s critique of how ideology and thought “operate upon the entities of our 
world, to put them in order, divide them in classes, group by name.”78 This 
kinship makes sense, as Matta-Clark developed this body of thought as a spatial 
strategy of resistance against the “regulatory systems that dominated urban 
environments.”79  
Chapter Four focuses on the travels of Jean Baudrillard throughout the 
United States in the 1980s. In these wanderings, Baudrillard established a 
particular connection to the deserts of the southwest. While he came to America 
hoping that his experience would present him with support for, and evidence of, 
his theory of simulacra, the place of the desert triggered a new direction of 
thought. Thus, through place-produced thought, he crafted a philosophy of the 
desert – a “place of signs void of all meaning.”80 As Baudrillard discovered, the 
exchange between the immanent signs of the real and the cultural signs of the 
hyperreal was not fixed. Instead, Baudrillard’s engagement with place 
demonstrated how the lived experience of a material encounter can push back 
against the cultural assumptions and significations imposed upon place.   
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Chapter Five investigates the bond between the post-colonial critiques of 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination. Within Spivak’s concerns about the neo-colonialism of capitalism 
and globalization, as well as the Eurocentricity in the major works of Western 
philosophy, there is evidence that the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination was activated as a locus for her thought. I show how the negotiative 
and transformative power of the Indian collective imagination has informed the 
very nature of her thought. Of particular sway on Spivak has been the third 
space’s ability to enable certain subversive disruptions in the hegemonic practices 
of British rule. In her lecture Nationalism and the Imagination, given in 
Hyderabad, India in 2007, Spivak reveals that by thinking with/in the third space 
of the Indian collective imagination, she has been able to develop alternative 
readings of national identity and of the Subaltern to counter those produced in 
dominant discourses. These place-produced thoughts have furnished Spivak with 
alternative strategies for nationalist concerns that employ equivalence rather than 
equality, and oscillate from within and without dominant discourses. Her hope is 
to generate dialogue that searches for a “critical regionalism with trans-frontier 
jurisdiction.”81  
The epilogue circles back to the discussion of a typology of place-
produced thought; this includes reaffirming place-produced thought as a 
distinctive type of encounter with/in place, one that occurs through a unique 
process of situated cognition that produces indigenous knowledge. Included in 
this discussion is an overview of key conditions, variations, and processes for 
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situating place as a focus for thought, leading to the development of radical and 
innovative thinking. This postscript serves as a call for continued analysis and 
understanding of the potentialities of place-produced thought. While the danger 
certainly exists that place-produced thought reinforces politics of exclusion and 
dangerous forms of othering, the horizon for place-produced thought is open and 
encourages a continued analytic of the shared ontology of place and production in 
the development of future projects, and the exciting possibility of emerging local 
epistemologies. 
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INTO THE ESSENCE OF THINGS: 
HENRY DAVID THOREAU  
 
In tomorrow's world, men [sic] will not need artificial instruments such as jets 
and space ships. In the world of tomorrow, the new man will 'think' the place 
he wants to go, then his mind will take him there.  
                                                                         – Sun Ra, 1956         
 
On July 4th, 1845, after walking a mile and a half from the small town of Concord, 
MA, Thoreau settled into a dilapidated cabin on the shore of Walden Pond—
beginning his “Walden experiment.” This two-year engagement with place is an 
important instance of a thinker developing thought with/in place. Thoreau hints at 
how the place would come to inform his thinking when he documented his 
impressions of the first day at Walden: “I had made some progress toward settling 
in the world. This frame, so slightly clad, was a sort of crystallization around me, 
and reacted on the builder.”1 This “reaction” became the source of Thoreau’s 
place-produced thought. Here and throughout his writings, one can sense that 
Thoreau concertedly treated the Walden experiment as a method to derive 
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indigenous knowledge through topographically situated thinking. In order to 
analyze the germination of Thoreau’s place-produced thought, I will examine 
certain details of the Walden experiment and demonstrate how Thoreau entered 
into an active negotiation and interaction with place. 
Throughout Walden; or, Life in the Woods, Thoreau repeatedly refers to 
the impact that Walden had upon the development of his thoughts. He points to 
the significance that he expects situatedness will have for his thinking when he 
proclaims, “I have thought that Walden Pond would be a good place for 
business.”2 While this passage appears in the chapter titled “Economy,” the sort of 
business to which Thoreau alludes does not involve markets or monetary 
concerns. Rather, the “business” he envisions undertaking at Walden Pond is 
“private business with the fewest of obstacles,” that is to say, solitary thinking.3 
Hoping to circumvent some of the inhibitions to thinking and living, such as 
government regulation and societal conventions, Thoreau turned to the wilderness 
in order to live and think outside of those systems – to live and think in a 
newfound freedom. As one progresses through the text, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that Thoreau meant to use Walden as a place to focus thinking and 
living.  
 
LOCATING WALDEN 
Although Thoreau often refers to his place of thought as Walden or Walden Pond, 
his think place actually extended beyond the shoals of the pond, and even beyond 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson’s fourteen-acre plot upon which he resided. While the 
bean field and cabin had particular importance within the place of the experiment, 
all of Walden Pond – indeed, the whole wooded area between the towns of 
Concord and Lincoln, and the towns themselves can be considered as his think 
place. Thoreau did perceive boundaries to it, even though the overall think place 
contained a multiplicity of places.  Some of these were more urban (Concord, 
Lincoln, and the railroad), symbolizing the constraints of societal convention and 
legislation. Others were the sites of actual inhabitation by Thoreau – Walden 
Pond, the cabin, and bean field. Often the movement through the woods between 
these places served to ratify Thoreau’s perception and ideas about each of them. 
The transitions between places, as well as the places themselves, cumulatively 
comprise the landscape of Thoreau’s think place.4 Thoreau explains that when one 
establishes a think place with the “most admirable kind of invisible fence,” a 
locus for thought has been circumscribed – a precondition for the production of 
situated thought.5 
Within Walden, Thoreau chronicles his methodology for choosing the 
place to conduct his thinking/living experiment.  In the chapters “Economy” and 
“Where I Lived, and What I lived For,” Thoreau characterizes the place near 
Walden Pond as well suited to his sensibilities and practical requirements – it was 
in the woods, near a water source, and far enough (but not too far) from town. 
Beyond mere pragmatics, however, Thoreau also perceived that the place 
possessed qualities he believed essential for a thought-producing endeavor, most 
notably, the capacity for solitude and the opportunity to live in nature.  
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One of the most significant attributes of Walden for Thoreau was that it 
allowed solitude. Granted, throughout the experiment, Thoreau never went more 
than a week without some form of human contact. This fact, though, does not 
negate the important role solitude played.  Moreover, it reveals that Thoreau 
himself was at least in part responsible for the constitution of the place he 
inhabited. Thoreau perceived the place as one where he could regulate 
interpersonal contact and engagement with society. Thoreau believed that the 
place was solitary, and therefore it became a place where he could be alone with 
his thoughts. 
For Thoreau, removal from the village of Concord and from the greater 
society afforded him physical and ideological distance from constraints on free 
thought. As Thoreau perceived it, Walden was an open realm, free from societal 
distraction and outside of dominant cultural formations. Thoreau was not so 
opposed to society as to promote anarchy, but throughout his life he did remain an 
advocate of free thought and wary of state control. “No doubt another may also 
think for me,” Thoreau observed, “but it is not therefore desirable that he should 
do so to the exclusion of my thinking for myself (Thoreau’s italics).”6 Although 
Thoreau appeared to turn his back on society from time to time, he did actually 
concede that there needed to be a balance between a civilized and wilderness life. 
The natural world was needed, not to replace civil life, but as a counterpoint to the 
distractions and delusions of government control and capitalist pursuits. “We need 
the tonic of wildness,” exclaims Thoreau, or “village life would stagnate.”7 Even 
though Thoreau frequently expressed his desire to remove himself from Concord, 
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he also realized its necessity. For most of the two-year experiment he walked back 
to town every few days to replenish supplies or hear the latest news.  
Thoreau’s exaggerated emphasis upon solitude is not entirely 
contradictory or hypocritical. In fact some scholars, such as Rebecca Solnit, have 
claimed that it has been the various interpretations of Walden that have framed it 
as an exercise in absolute solitude.8 As Solnit points out, Thoreau himself never 
denied his frequent jaunts to town nor the numerous visitors he entertained at his 
cabin. For Thoreau, Walden was solitary. It was the possibility of this solitude (or 
perceived solitude) that served as the critical aspect of Walden Pond as a place to 
produce thought. In this attraction to solitary thought, Thoreau reveals an affinity 
for the thinking in solitude advocated by Socrates.  For Socrates, thinking is best 
conducted in its (supposed) pure form through an inner dialogue that ideally 
occurs in solitude. Similarly, Thoreau believed that the pace, trappings, and fetters 
of society “distract our attention from serious things” – such as living and 
thinking.9  
On a practical level, much of Thoreau’s time at Walden was spent taking 
care of basic survival: acquiring food, water, and maintaining shelter. In terms of 
the intellectual project, Thoreau managed to settle into an existence that he 
believed was ripe with clarity and truth.  For Thoreau, Walden offered the 
opportunity to become entangled with nature – to get into the essence of things in 
their natural habitat. Describing this, Thoreau used an analogy drawn from 
archaeology. He imagined excavating down through the “mud and slush of 
opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and appearance… till we 
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come to a hard bottom and rocks in place, which we can call reality (Thoreau’s 
italics).”10 This approach characterized the entire Walden experiment. As a 
Transcendentalist, Thoreau used his time at Walden Pond to discover what he 
regarded as a real and truthful existence. By living simply and in direct contact 
with nature, Thoreau believed he was able to reduce living, thinking, and being to 
their “lowest terms,” where he could get to their “whole and genuine character.”11 
 
CULTURAL INSCRIPTIONS  
Thoreau arrived at Walden Pond with many presuppositions, including the 
elements of American Transcendentalism and Romanticism to which I just 
alluded. In addition, he presumed that nature is simple and transcendental, as is 
demonstrated by his call to “let us first be as simple and as well as Nature 
ourselves… Fix not thy heart on that which is transitory,”12 or his exhortation that 
we “spend one day as deliberately as Nature, and not be thrown to the track by 
every nutshell and mosquito’s wing that falls on the rails.”13 The text of Walden is 
interspersed with references to transcendental laws and truths derived from 
nature, laws which he had specifically hoped to discern through the raw contact 
with nature that he experienced while at Walden.  Indeed, an entire chapter is 
entitled “Higher Laws.” There, Thoreau reminds the reader that “Nature is your 
congratulation, and you have cause momentarily to bless yourself.”14 In his 
Journal entry of July 6, 1845 Thoreau writes “I wish to meet the facts of life—the 
vital facts, which where [sic] the phenomena or actuality the Gods meant to show 
us, —face to face, And so I came down here.”15 Statements such as these illustrate 
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Thoreau’s overarching belief that through contact with nature the potential for 
Transcendentalist discovery became tangible. 
 Thoreau also routinely positions nature as a redemptive antidote to the ills 
of society – such as the frivolous pursuit of excess and gluttony. Thoreau viewed 
the sublimity of nature as extremely valuable because it facilitates transgression – 
a jolt to the mind that opens avenues of new intellectual exploration and modes of 
living. Like Kant, who described how the power of nature could transcend the 
capacity of human cognition in the experience of the sublime, Thoreau was a 
believer in the heuristic opportunities offered by an experience of the 
awesomeness of nature.  
These varying concepts of nature reveal what James McIntosh calls 
Thoreau’s “shifting stance toward nature.”16 For Thoreau, nature was certainly 
equated with the real and the true, but Thoreau’s thoughts about the human 
relationship with nature fluctuates greatly throughout Walden. At some moments, 
Thoreau views humans as an imbedded part of nature, while at other moments, he 
views humans as cut off and segregated from nature. In Thoreau’s numerous 
descriptions, nature can entertain a multiplicity of roles: from nature-as-growth, 
nature-as-companion, nature-as-antidote to nature-as-truth.17  
Many of Thoreau’s sentiments about place, identity, and nature, reveal 
ideas that he brought to the Walden experiment. The presence of these pre-
existing views in the development of thought with/in Walden also indicates the 
inescapability of cultural discourse. Through his conceptions of things, his 
  68
perceptions of place, and the capacities of nature, Thoreau brought an a priori 
cultural consciousness into the place of the experiment. Thoreau’s description of 
nature also demonstrates the presence of inscribed cultural meanings, as 
(ironically) when he asserts that nature is “the language which all things and 
events speak without metaphor.”18 These types of assertions by Thoreau are 
evidence of a pre-conceived cultural/discursive signifier which views nature as 
the source of higher laws and absolutes – and that the bare encounter with nature 
reveals meaningful truths. 
The lens of American Romanticism that Thoreau used to survey the 
landscape was perhaps the most significant discursive structure that helped to give 
the place meaning. For Thoreau, these biases often meant that Walden and, more 
generally, nature, was positioned as other to society, and thus suggested that one’s 
return to nature would be redemptive and regenerative. Cultural inscriptions do 
not completely define Thoreau’s place-produced thought, though, for the place 
itself pushed back against many of these cultural prescriptions, often modifying or 
negating their influence. 
Before moving on to the role of place agency in Thoreau’s place-produced 
thought, I want to make note of one of the distinct aspects of Thoreau’s process of 
developing thought with/in Walden. Interestingly, the final manuscript for Walden 
was not actually written in situ, but was worked up from Thoreau’s retrospection 
and the extensive Journal he maintained during the actual inhabitation. Thoreau 
didn’t publish his treatise documenting the Walden experiment until 1854, seven 
years after he departed from Walden. Even so, it can be argued that Thoreau used 
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the place of Walden as a locus for thought by thinking of place during the 
completion of the manuscript. As William Rossi notes, “the Journal provided a 
means of perpetuating, even as it transformed the Walden enterprise and the 
Walden experiment.”19  
I would argue, going even further, that Thoreau extended the epistemology 
of the Walden experiment not solely through reference to the Journal, but also by 
thinking of place. This is a crucial distinction because the continuation of place-
produced thought would have certainly included the Journal, but by thinking of 
place, Thoreau’s thinking also encompassed latent memories, recollections, and 
habits of thought that he established while there. This claim means that the 
Journal was simply one portion of the process of developing thought with/in 
Walden. The continued engagement of place by thinking of place allowed for a 
kind of perpetual performativity and production. Rossi found fault with Thoreau 
for not strictly using his “Journal as journal.”20 However, if we consider what he 
recorded as place-produced thought and the Journal as an intermediary device 
allowing him to return to Walden by thinking of place, then we can understand 
that the Journal was an instrument enabling Thoreau to have a continued thought 
producing relationship with/in Walden even after his departure. 
 
PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS  
While the Walden experiment was fruitful for Thoreau in terms of writing 
production, that does not, in itself, indicate that place was (albeit partially) 
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responsible for producing thought; he may simply have used Walden as a 
“thinking place” rather than a “think place.”  However, we find that when 
Thoreau became engaged with place, the co-production of thought with/in 
Walden began to emerge, specifically as the place exerted itself against the 
preconceptions that Thoreau brought to Walden.   
As I noted in the introduction, the agency of place in place-produced 
thought often pushes back against cultural presumptions and the desires of the 
thinker. In this manner, Walden emerged as a co-author of the place-produced 
thought that is ascribed to Thoreau. In his introduction to the Beacon Press edition 
of Walden, Bill McKibben gives us a glimpse of how place can push back when 
he asserts that “what nature provides is scale and context.”21 What McKibben 
seems to refer to is both how the materiality of place can cause a thinker to 
disregard some aspects of the place while emphasizing others, and how the 
familiar human scale of things can be replaced. For Thoreau, this meant that he 
became sensitive and attuned to both the minute and the grandiose qualities of 
place. By thinking with/in place Thoreau’s attention was directed to the majesty 
encapsulated in even the most minute creature and corner of Walden. For 
example, Thoreau writes: “every little pine needle expanded and swelled with 
sympathy and befriended me.”22 Thoreau also gained a new consciousness of the 
cosmic and large scale, as is evident when he claims that “Walden is a microcosm 
for the world.”23 Both of these levels of attentiveness—of living at a scale other 
than the human—are products of Thoreau’s direct engagement with the 
materiality of place. By sensing and living with/in these phenomenon, Thoreau 
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developed a new awareness of their significance in the constitution and meaning 
of place. 
 Thoreau’s direct experience of the “life force of nature” also functioned to 
reaffirm his disdain for the fuss of society in favor of something more raw and 
spartan – a wilderness existence without the superficial and superfluous 
accouterments of culture. By penetrating into the essence of things, Thoreau 
believed he was able to brush aside societal luxuries and understand what is 
“necessary of life” (Thoreau’s italics). Explaining what he means by “necessary 
of life,” Thoreau wrote “I mean whatever… has been from the first, or from long 
use has become, so important to human life that few, if any, whether from 
savageness, or poverty, or philosophy, ever attempt to do without it.”24 While 
Thoreau is referring to the basic necessities of life – food, water, and shelter – he 
is also alluding to the ideal conditions for free and unrestricted thought and 
existence.  
From early in his residence, Thoreau looked toward the materiality of 
place as a means to encounter the “necessities of life” and the truth of existence. 
For example, he noted: “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, 
to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to 
teach, and not when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to 
live what was not life.”25 In this sense, place operated as an instrument of 
revelation, enabling Thoreau’s thinking to develop greater clarity, magnitude, and 
articulation than it had when he had been in a more “urban” setting. Thoreau’s 
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connectivity to the “vitals of the globe,” developed as a central tenet of his place-
produced thought.26  
Thoreau was very cognizant that his encounters with the material 
phenomena of place and a shifting sense of scale impacted the way his thought 
was developing. “I was suddenly sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in 
Nature, in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sound and sight around my 
house.”27 Similar to Bachelard’s claim, Thoreau’s lived experience of place 
transformed its meaning and the thinking produced with/in it. In a short 
meditation on the pickerel of Walden Pond, Thoreau comments on how they 
contributed to his thinking with/in Walden. After witnessing their “dazzling and 
transcendent beauty,” Thoreau is prompted to write that “They, of course, are 
Walden all over and all through; are themselves small Waldens.”28 Just as he 
regarded Walden as a microcosm of the world, these small fish acted as a 
microcosm of Walden – displaying the same sort of beautiful simplicity and 
honesty of existence found throughout the Walden experiment. 
As an avid naturalist, Thoreau was drawn to directly encounter the 
phenomena of Walden. Because of his naturalist concerns, but more importantly 
because of his entanglement and integration with place, Thoreau’s encounters 
became intrinsically connected to his philosophy. As Bill McKibben wrote of 
Thoreau: “His physics informed his metaphysics.”29 Thoreau believed that 
knowledge of a place – of its physical attributes and constituents – was matched 
by knowledge of being; in other words, for both place and thinker, epistemology 
was informed by materiality. In the process of describing his life at Walden, 
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Thoreau touches upon the interconnectivity of place, thought, and materiality 
when he notes that “my instinct tells me that my head is an organ for burrowing… 
and with it I would mine and burrow my way through these hills [the place of the 
Walden experiment]. I think that the richest vein is somewhere hereabouts.”30 The 
lived experience and engagement with the flora and fauna of place provided 
Thoreau with new insights into what he believed to be a more real existence – a 
free mode of being unclouded by the “shams and delusions” of cultural 
inscriptions. Thoreau’s experience led him to believe that this free mode occurs 
through becoming ensconced—through settling in, and gaining knowledge of 
place by “burrowing in” to discover its “richest vein.” As Thoreau proclaims at a 
particularly reflective moment within the text: “I was as near being resolved into 
the essence of things as ever I was in my life.”31  
 
THINKING WITH/IN WALDEN  
One of my main contentions about the Walden experiment is that the newfound 
freedom, clarity, and interconnectivity that Thoreau discovered in an intimate 
exchange with place created specific thinking that can be demonstrated to be 
place-produced. An important tenet of Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden was the 
recognition of how human/nonhuman and the inside/outside of place function 
together as an integrated whole.  Oddly enough, it was Thoreau’s vocation as a 
land surveyor (whose function is typically to define and delineate boundaries) that 
helped to influence this aspect of his place-produced thought.  
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 Surveying was a meaningful, but ideologically complicated, activity for 
Thoreau; it allowed him to be outdoors and to legally wander where he pleased, 
but it also had significant political and ethical implications. As Patrick Chura 
describes in his text, Thoreau the Land Surveyor, the activity of surveying was 
philosophically important to Thoreau because it emphasized cultural 
interrelationships. As Chura details, Thoreau was highly informed by the “Coast 
Survey ideologies” which had become well known through various surveying 
projects conducted by the federal U.S. Coast Survey initiative throughout the 
1840s and 50s.32 “As both an important intellectual pursuit and a specifically 
American cultural activity,” Chura writes, “the Coast Survey became a focal point 
for the nation’s ideas about economics and the environment.”33  
Using this ideology as his model, Thoreau cultivated a type of surveying 
that brought several facets of culture into contact with one another. His method of 
delineating and measuring place became one that united economics, politics, 
science, philosophy, naturalism, and aesthetics. Even though Thoreau approached 
surveying quite differently than surveying done strictly for “territory and trade,” 
he still maintained ambivalence toward it, recognizing that surveying was the first 
step in the development and exploitation of the landscape. The conflicting 
feelings that Thoreau had about surveying were present when he began the 
Walden experiment. I argue, however, that by thinking with/in Walden, Thoreau 
developed a new understanding of how surveying could be used as a complex 
method of getting into the essence of things. In addition, he came to believe that it 
could also function as a form of civil disobedience. A critical understanding of the 
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function of surveying as a form of political resistance came to Thoreau through 
the development of place-produced thought. 
 Chura states that “by any criterion except economic, Henry Thoreau’s 
surveying career began at Walden.”34 When Thoreau completed a survey of 
Walden Pond in 1846, it was done so for his own purposes in hopes that he would 
increase his acumen about Walden (Fig.1). “To passively experience a world like 
Walden is one thing,” contends Chura, “to survey it is another (Chura’s italics).35  
 
Figure 1. Henry David Thoreau. Walden Pond, manuscript survey (ink on paper), 1846. 
No. 133a in CFPL Thoreau survey collection. 
Image courtesy of the Concord Free Public Library. 
While the survey of Walden Pond gave Thoreau a greater ability to get “into the 
essence of things” and dig below the surface encounter to get at the transcendental 
knowledge that he thought Walden held, perhaps more importantly, it also 
provided him insight as to how surveying could be a transgressive act of civil 
disobedience; a constructive means of un-siting and reclaiming the landscape. The 
conceptualization of surveying in this capacity was a direct product of Thoreau’s 
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place-produced thought and became an important means of justifying his later 
surveying activities. 
 Chura does well to account how the survey of Walden Pond is the first 
instance in which Thoreau uses surveying subversively to create an alternative 
representation of a place. Chura points out how Thoreau’s pond survey can be 
read as iconoclastic more by its purposeful absences than anything else. “The 
omission of the town border is a meaningful silence,” claims Chura, as the survey 
presents a place with “no property lines and no discernible personal or civic 
claims.”36 The only things identified are either natural (hills, trees) or personally 
meaningful to Thoreau’s encounter with Walden (his cabin, railroad).  Thoreau 
intentionally excludes the majority of the “useful” information contained in a 
conventional survey. As Chura reports, Thoreau’s survey “seems to go out of its 
way to offer nothing of conventionally economic or political value to anyone.”37 
In a sense, Thoreau re-constructed the place in manner that erased previous claims 
and impositions and instead tried to emphasize the natural phenomena and agency 
of place. As an outcome of place produced-thought, “the story told by the Walden 
map is thus a forcefully iconoclastic narrative” co-authored by thinker and 
place.38  
Thoreau’s understanding of surveying developed through thinking with/in 
place became imprinted upon his entire body of thought and his profession as a 
surveyor. In many ways, the appreciation of surveying developed with/in Walden 
was likely how Thoreau came to terms with and justified his later surveying 
career. For Thoreau, surveying was a means of being-in-common with the world 
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while also making political and ethical statements. Because Thoreau utilized 
surveying as a means of knowing the landscape and finding truth, he viewed his 
methodology of surveying as crucially distinctive from that of conventional 
surveying for financial gain. In one of Thoreau’s last essays, “Life Without 
Principle,” he extensively discusses this critical difference stating: “As for my 
own business, even that kind of surveying which I could do with most satisfaction 
my employers do not want. They would prefer that I should do my work coarsely 
and not too well, ay, not well enough. When I observe that there are different 
ways of surveying, my employer commonly asks which will give him the most 
land, not which is most correct.”39 Surveying emerged as a central component of 
Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden, as it provided Thoreau not only with an 
identity as a surveyor that personified the “vital personae of philosopher and 
natural historian,” but also became a means to engage place in a direct and 
material fashion in order to produce situated localized knowledge.40  
 
AN INTEGRATED WHOLE  
By surveying and thinking with/in Walden, Thoreau became much more attuned 
to the ways that seemingly divided locations, entities, and philosophies touch 
upon one another in profound and potent exchanges. There are several moments 
throughout Thoreau’s encounter with Walden in which the boundaries and 
distinctions between things become fuzzy or dissolved. For example, when 
observing the small pickerel caught by fisherman, Thoreau remarks how they are 
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Walden, or small “Waldenses” and serve as an embodiment of the place through 
which a critical conflation of location and animal entity occurs. 
The deconstruction or re-territorialization of boundaries was an important 
aspect of Thoreau’s experience and of his place-produced thought, and it is 
perhaps best illustrated by the confusion he recounts after gazing into the glassy 
surface of the pond: “In such transparent and seemingly bottomless water, 
reflecting the clouds, I seemed to be floating through the air as in a balloon, and 
their [perch] swimming impressed me as a kind of flight or hovering, as if they 
were a compact flock of birds passing just beneath my level.”41 This incident was 
far more than just directional confusion for Thoreau, as it made apparent how 
easily the perception of something can slip and transform into something else 
entirely. The loosening of seemingly rigid boundaries or distinctions was 
significant because it demonstrated the ways that discrete entities and ideas cross 
into one another. 
 Place-produced thought often drastically modifies the existing boundaries 
of a place, bringing a new awareness to the relationship of an existing place with 
other places, reassessing their alignment, overlay, and interdependence. The 
thinking developed with/in Walden revealed to Thoreau how individual entities 
are integrated within a greater system or collective. This revelation shares an 
ontological structure with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. “As my living 
present opens upon a past,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “which I nevertheless am no 
longer living through, and on a future which I do not yet live, and perhaps never 
shall, it can also open on to temporalities outside my living experience and 
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acquire a social horizon, with the result that my world is expanded to the 
dimensions of that collective history which my private existence takes up and 
carries forward.”42  
In many ways Thoreau was a phenomenologist, and it was through place-
produced thought that he began to recognize that being occurs in place and is 
highly determined by place. “We are never alone,” wrote Thoreau, in a statement 
that has periphrastic echoes of Heidegger’s phenomenological “being-in-the-
world.”43 In his musings about solitude, Thoreau demonstrates his connections to 
the landscape as an integrated whole. “I have a great deal of company in my 
house; especially when nobody calls… Let me suggest a few comparisons, that 
some one may convey an idea of my situation. I am no more lonely than the loon 
in the pond that laughs so loud, or than Walden Pond itself… I am no more lonely 
than a single mullein or dandelion in a pasture, or a bean leaf, or sorrel, or horse-
fly, or a humble-bee.”44 Initially, this revelation by Thoreau may seem 
inconsistent with the solitude that Thoreau sought and found at Walden. However, 
the type of solitude that Thoreau sought was not one that cut him off from any 
form of contact with others, but rather was solitude from imposed cultural 
restrictions and limitations. He wanted to exercise his individual freedoms while 
also deepening his integration with the landscape. Ironically, it was Thoreau’s 
attempt to be removed from society that led to the place-produced thinking, which 
helped to reify his indelible and crucial relation to the collectively networked 
organization of society.    
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 Thoreau’s understanding of the relation of the individual to the collective 
environment of his habitation also reflects Nancy’s correspondence between the 
individual and the community. For example, Thoreau states in Walden that “to 
cooperate, in the highest as well as the lowest sense, means to get our living 
together (Thoreau’s italics).”45 Here, Thoreau emphasizes the shared ontological 
status of cooperation. He does not simply mean we need to get along together. 
Instead, he insists upon recognizing the fundamental web of interactions that form 
the basis of existence. Compare this notion to Nancy’s assertion that “one cannot 
make the world with simple atoms… There has to be an inclination or an inclining 
from one toward the other, of one by the other, from one to the other. Community 
is at least the clinamen of the individual… that opens up its being-in-common 
(Nancy’s italics).”46 
As Thoreau increasingly became aware of these vital connections, he 
realized that conflicts, social issues, and cultural activities – even those seemingly 
far removed from his localized existence – necessarily demanded his attention and 
response. As part of this greater whole, Thoreau had no choice but to take action 
in response to the Mexican-American war, abolitionism, western expansion, and 
the hanging of local reformist John Brown. For Thoreau, his own existence was 
connected to these issues whether he wanted it to be or not, and therefore they 
demanded he act as an individual within the collective. Just as the small pickerel 
were “themselves small Waldens,” Thoreau’s own small existence was 
emblematic of the entire nation, or even all of humanity.  
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Thoreau’s place-produced thoughts on existence as an integrated whole, 
helped to solidify the distinction of humans who live in separation, as if they are 
segregated from the collective, from those who live as part of an integrated whole. 
This difference enabled Thoreau to comprehend a more complex relationship 
between humans and their environments than the commonplace divide of 
city/country. Thoreau grew to suspect that the ills of society were not an inherent 
part of society, but rather were the product of humans living as separate entities. 
For Thoreau, waste, excess, and superfluous pursuits all stemmed from 
individualized greed and desires. In this lengthy passage, for example, Thoreau 
compares the problems of the nation to the problems of the segregated individual 
– both living as though disconnected, blindly striving for the next innovation 
rather than living more simply and as a community:  
Our life is like a German confederacy, made up of petty states, 
with its boundary forever fluctuating, so that even a German 
cannot tell you how it is bounded at any moment. The nation itself, 
with all its so called internal improvements, which, by the way, are 
all external and superficial, is just such an unwieldy and 
overgrown establishment, cluttered with furniture and tripped up 
by its own traps, ruined by luxury and heedless expense, by want 
of calculation and a worthy aim, as the million households in the 
land; and the only cure for it as for them is in rigid economy, a 
stern and more Spartan simplicity of life and elevation of purpose. 
It lives too fast. Men think that it is essential that the Nation have 
commerce, and export ice, and talk through a telegraph, and ride 
thirty miles and hour… But if we stay at home and mind our 
business, who will want railroads? We do not ride on the railroad; 
the railroad rides upon us.47 
 
For Thoreau, living as separate entities gets us off track from a productive 
existence. This concept of being-in-common with the world surfaced as a vital 
aspect of Thoreau’s place-produced thought, one that was considerably less 
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evident in his earlier work. Before the Walden experiment, Thoreau often wrote 
about the human connection with nature in different terms. For example, in one of 
his earliest essays, Aulus Persius Flaccus, eponymously titled after the Roman 
poet, Thoreau writes that “the divinest poem, or the life of a great man, is the 
severest satire; as impersonal as nature herself, and like the sighs of her winds in 
the woods, which convey ever a slight reproof to the hearer.”48 Another mention 
of nature can be found in the essay, A Walk to Wachusett, in which Thoreau 
comments that “all nature lay passive, to be viewed and travelled.”49 While these 
examples demonstrate Thoreau’s interest in the natural world, I contend that it 
was not until his intimate engagement with Walden, having experienced firsthand 
the agency of place, as well as the epistemological and ontological reciprocations 
with/in place, that Thoreau emerged with a new appreciation of how the 
individual connects with the world. For example, Thoreau writes in Walden that 
“a lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature. It is earth’s eye; 
looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature.”50 Through 
the Walden experiment, Thoreau deepened his perception of the ways that 
humans are interrelated with nature. It is with/in Walden that he identifies 
“himself with wild nature”51 and comes to the realization that “I go and come with 
a strange liberty in Nature, a part of herself.”52 
 
THINKING BEYOND WALDEN 
While Thoreau’s thinking with/in Walden produced a significant body of 
indigenous knowledge, Thoreau was also able to extend and apply many of the 
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ideas cultivated there throughout the rest of his life. Many of these thoughts 
informed Thoreau’s philosophy long after the physical encounter with Walden 
had ended. “Perhaps I can never find so good a setting for my thoughts,” writes 
Thoreau in his Journal, “as I shall thus have taken them out of.”53  This statement 
speaks to the impact that Walden had on the development of his thought, but I 
argue that it also suggests that Thoreau took the indigenous knowledge cultivated 
at Walden and carried it forward as a part of his being. 
Rebecca Solnit has made a similar claim about the derivation of Thoreau’s 
politics. She does not allege that his political leanings were directly manifested 
through place-produced thought in the same manner that I do, but she does assert 
that his indigenous encounters helped to affirm his wider views on national 
political debates and issues. That she should think so is not a great surprise, for 
Solnit is resolute in asserting that landscapes are political and that encounters 
within landscapes help to shape and inform individual politics. 
In Thoreau’s case, Solnit points to his experience of picking and eating 
huckleberries as one filled with political implications. In Solnit’s estimation, 
Thoreau’s gathering and enjoyment of a huckleberry feast was a political 
metaphor for freedom. Upon being released from a night spent in jail for not 
paying his taxes (Thoreau’s method of protesting the Mexican-American war), 
Thoreau’s first act was to walk two miles to a huckleberry patch where he could 
pick and enjoy the berries as he pleased. Solnit argues that this was deliberate: “If 
he went to jail to demonstrate his commitment to the freedom of others, he went 
to the berries to exercise his own recovered freedom, the liberty to do whatever he 
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wished—and the evidence in all his writing is that he very often wished to pick 
berries.”54  
Thoreau himself alludes to how collecting wild berries can be a means of 
disrupting capitalism and acting out one’s own personal freedom. Thoreau wrote 
in “Resistance to Civil Government” that upon his release from incarceration, he 
was soon “in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two 
miles off; and then the State was nowhere to be seen.”55 The equivalence of wild 
fruit with freedom, and the activities of collecting and consuming wild fruit 
became an important political fusion that influenced Thoreau throughout the rest 
of his life. In Wild Fruits, one of Thoreau’s last texts to be written, he notes of 
black huckleberries that “this crop grows wild all over the country—wholesome, 
bountiful, and free, a real ambrosia. And yet men, the foolish demons that they 
are, devote themselves to the culture of tobacco, inventing slavery and a thousand 
other curses for that purpose.”56 The critical connection between wild berries and 
free existence is even more explicit when Thoreau reminisces about “a sense of 
freedom and spirit of adventure I used to take my way across the fields with my 
pail [for gathering fruit].”57  
For Thoreau, as for other makers of place-produced thought, local political 
events were often translated into personal political viewpoints. In Thoreau’s case, 
thinking produced with/in place furthered his political strategies of resistance. 
Through the newfound freedom that he discovered by thinking with/in place, 
Thoreau solidified a firm belief in active resistance against regulatory systems 
that restricted individual personal freedoms – leading to ideas, writings, and 
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actions espousing civil disobedience. For example, Thoreau recorded these 
thoughts in his Journal less than a year into his stay at Walden: “In my short 
experience of human life I have found that the outward obstacles which stood in 
my way were not living men—but dead institutions.”58 
Perhaps the most important thing that the Walden experiment taught 
Thoreau was the preciousness and value of the individual being able to act and 
think for his or herself. Near the end of Walden, as Thoreau ruminates on the 
lessons learned through thinking with/in place, he urges others to seek out similar 
experiences in which “new universal, and more liberal laws will begin to establish 
themselves around and within.”59 In doing so, Thoreau recognizes that this may 
need to be done in opposition to civil government. There is a direct link between 
the place-produced thought with/in Walden and the political ideology of 
resistance that Thoreau adamantly defended for the rest of his life. Indeed, this 
connection is made even more matter-of-fact because Thoreau wrote his original 
essay, “Resistance to Civil Government” during the Walden experiment after 
spending the night in jail for not having paid his taxes.  
Viewing Thoreau’s night in jail as part of his Walden experience is key to 
recognizing the connection between his politics and place-produced thought.  For 
Thoreau, the night in jail served to further emphasize the freedom of living in the 
woods, as well as the inhibitions that the state can impose upon those freedoms. 
Upon emerging from prison Thoreau scanned the landscape and wrote about his 
newfound consciousness – “I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived.”60 
Prior to his inhabitation of Walden, Thoreau writes pejoratively of the state on 
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several occasions. In “Herald to Freedom,” Thoreau describes the abolitionist 
Nathaniel P. Rodgers “not as scientific explorer under government, but as a 
Yankee sealer rather, who makes those unexplored continents his harbors in 
which to refit for more adventurous cruises. He was a fund of news and freshness 
in himself (my italics).”61 In another essay, “Wendell Phillips Before the Concord 
Lyceum,” he writes of the “timidity and selfishness of the state.”62 In these 
examples, Thoreau displays an inkling of the juxtaposition between individual 
freedoms and the control of the state that would be fully realized with/in Walden. 
While his sentiments preceding the Walden encounter demonstrate 
Thoreau’s disdain for the state, I contend that it was not until the thinking 
developed with/in Walden that Thoreau conceived of a particular type of living 
and thinking as a form of resistance to the state. I argue that the experience of the 
night in jail cannot stand alone as the source of this thinking because it was the 
relation between imprisonment by the state and the freedom experienced at 
Walden (epitomized by eating wild berries) that prompted Thoreau to set upon a 
course of active political resistance. Living truthfully, freely, and near to the 
“vitals of the globe” with/in place became more meaningful after the night in jail 
because its political implications were magnified. Thoreau realized that his frugal 
and simple existence was not acceptable according to the state. “If I will not 
fight—if I will not pray—if I will not be taxed—if I will not bury the unsettled 
prairie—my neighbor will still tolerate me and sometimes even sustains me—but 
not the state.”63  
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After the night in jail, Thoreau increasingly began to understand how the 
entire Walden experiment could be considered a form of civil disobedience. In 
many ways, Thoreau’s existence at Walden was antithetical to the program of the 
state, and because of its independence from the state, it could be measured both as 
a literal and a symbolic challenge to state control. As Thoreau recorded in his 
Journal shortly after the night in prison: “When I have indulged a poets dream of 
a terrestrial paradise I have not foreseen that any Cossack or Chipeway (sic)—
would disturb it—but some monster institution would swallow it— The only 
highway man I ever met was the state itself.”64 
The influence of place-produced thought on Thoreau’s politics is evident 
when we compare Thoreau’s closing remarks in Walden (stated above), and the 
beginning statements of the “Resistance” essay written while living at Walden: “It 
is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The 
only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think 
right.”65 For Thoreau, it was more important to do what one felt was right than 
follow the law, meaning that each individual could establish his or her own laws. 
Recall that Thoreau’s assertion is derived not only from the sense of freedom that 
he found with/in Walden but also the interconnectivity that he found there. For 
Thoreau, the government and its laws often promoted greed, personal gain and 
selfishness. Therefore, to do what is right in spite of the law could be a means to 
counteract self-interest and more consciously exist as part of a collective whole. 
Thoreau did not pay his taxes as a form of protest against the actions of the 
government because he realized that what happens “there” affects the “here.” 
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Living in nature at Walden gave Thoreau a sense of being able to act as one 
wished, rather than being forced into harmful and wasteful action. This sense of 
freedom and personal responsibility toward the integrated whole became a 
permanent mark not only on Thoreau’s political ideology, but on his being as 
well. 
 
TOPOPHILIA 
One of the other significant aspects of Thoreau’s thought developed with/in 
Walden was his ethos of place. “What I have observed of the pond,” writes 
Thoreau “is no less true in ethics.”66 Thoreau is not projecting human morality 
into nature here, but rather is constructing a metaphysical concept based upon 
observation of the physical world through the eyes of a surveyor. Thoreau’s 
physics to metaphysics surveyor-like analogy implies that just as one can obtain a 
measure of water depth in a cove by studying the “outlines of its surface and the 
character of its shores,”67 one can also “draw lines through the length and breadth 
of the aggregate of a man’s particular daily behaviors and waves of life into his 
coves and inlets, and where they intersect will be the height and depth of his 
character.”68  
This type of translation from physics to metaphysics was particularly 
significant for Thoreau because it meant that each unique place was an 
opportunity for learning – each distinctive place offered an equally exclusive 
piece of knowledge. I argue that this realization was developed by thinking 
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with/in Walden, and was the fire of his passion as a zealous topophiliac. 
Thoreau’s overall ethos of place – his ethical outlook developed from place-
produced thought – can be described as a profound care for place, or what Lucy 
Lippard was later to refer to as a “place ethic.” Lippard defines this term as “a 
respect for a place that is rooted more deeply than an aesthetic version of the 
'tourist gaze' provided by imported artists whose real concerns lie elsewhere or 
back in their studios.”69 In Thoreau’s case however, I would modify Lippard’s 
definition to also include a respect rooted in the profound realization of the 
agency of place. 
 Through his 26-month settlement with/in Walden, Thoreau appears to 
have developed a spiritual bond with place. Through the development of place-
produced thought, Thoreau cultivated a greater interest in place and its 
“connections, what surrounds it, what formed it, what happened there, what will 
happen there.”70 This Transcendentalist connection to the vitality and 
idiosyncrasies of place became an integral part of Thoreau’s future activities and 
philosophy. Many of his projects that followed the Walden experiment were 
framed around an engagement with, and love of, a specific place. Thoreau’s 
books The Maine Woods and Cape Cod are clear examples of his continued 
exploration of the intricacies of place. In addition, his “excursion” series, 
including A Yankee in Canada and A Walk to Wachusett, also indicate his love of 
place. In many ways Thoreau wanted to achieve what Estella Conwill Majozo 
describes as “map[ping] the terrain of the outside world through confrontation 
with the inner territory of the soul.”71  
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Thoreau’s topophilia was due partly to his understanding of individual 
places as distinct confluences of human and non-human traces functioning in 
dialogue with one another, but also because of their special ability to produce 
indigenous epistemologies. Because of Thoreau’s awareness of the power of 
place, which became more substantial during the Walden experiment, he also 
developed a strong conservation ethic. Thoreau demonstrates his conservationist 
tendencies when he writes: “I should be glad if all the meadows on the earth were 
left in a wild state.”72 As James McIntosh suggests, when “we read Walden 
something similar happens to us. Our own feeling for nature deepens as we 
register facts, savor descriptions, share Thoreau’s many perspectives, and 
appreciate one valuable moment after another” – which are all facets of his place-
produced thought.73 Thoreau himself expresses a direct conservationist concern in 
his chapter “The Ponds.” “Since I left those shores the woodchoppers have even 
further laid them waste,” laments Thoreau, “and now for many a year there will 
be no more rambling through the aisles of the wood.”74  
Through his place-produced thought, Thoreau developed a greater 
appreciation for “placeness.” This type of appreciation and care prompted 
Thoreau to worry about Walden and other natural places losing their unique 
character – whether through the capitalist pursuits of urban expansion and railway 
construction or by the conquest, mapping, and taxonomy of space. Through his 
development of a place ethic, Thoreau has become widely recognized as an 
important figure in the American Conservationist movement. Organizations such 
as the Walden Woods project and the Thoreau Institute have been formed to 
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continue Thoreau’s “ethic of environmental stewardship and social 
responsibility.”75  
I contend that this ethic of respect and care for place had its greatest 
development in the thinking produced with/in Walden, because it was through 
that experience that Thoreau gained a greater insight into the agency of place. 
There is a telling shift towards the particularities of place—of how a place pushes 
back—and its role in the co-production of knowledge. Through his encounter with 
Walden, Thoreau seems to recognize nature and place not just as a means to 
experience a “sense of greater space and freedom,” but as an independent agent.76 
In his Journal, Thoreau writes, “What is this pond a-doing? I must know a little 
more.”77 The phrasing that Thoreau repeatedly uses to describe or discuss Walden 
addresses the place as a personification or animation of Walden as its own entity 
without becoming anthropomorphized. “Of all the characters I have known,” 
writes Thoreau, “perhaps Walden wears best, and best preserves its purity. Many 
men have been likened to it, but few deserve that honor.”78 It seems as Thoreau is 
speaking to a dear old friend rather than a place when he looks into its “face” and 
asks – “Walden, is it you?”79 
 The engagement with/in Walden in order to produce thought was deeply 
moving for Thoreau and served to confirm the important role of place and nature 
not only in a healthy, simple, and truthful human existence, but also in the vital 
co-development of new thought. These feelings and ethos of place agency is 
something that Thoreau continued to carry with him, as they became intimately 
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inscribed into his production of thought, and even more so into his very mode of 
being. 
 
ONTOLOGICAL SHIFTS 
By burrowing in and thinking with/in place, Thoreau altered not only his own 
being, but also that of Walden. Both place and thinker became etched into the 
other’s being, creating an ontological and epistemological bond. Thoreau’s place-
produced thought left a tenable mark on the place of the Walden experiment so 
haunting that the ontology of Walden has undergone lasting modification. The 
online Massachusetts Tourism Information Guide declares that because Thoreau 
“immortalized the area in his book, one result has been that it is now a tourist 
attraction.”80 During Thoreau’s lifetime, the pond did not receive many visitors.81  
In the summer, small groups of swimmers would seek respite from the summer 
heat. In the winter, the pond would be regularly harvested as a water source, as 
blocks of ice were hauled back to Concord. Today, in contrast, Walden Pond is a 
National Historic Landmark and a state reservation (Figs.2 and 3).  
By 1935, some 485,000 people visited the Pond each year with Sunday 
crowds often numbering 25,000.82 Today, one can still visit Walden Pond and 
take an interpretive guided walk with a stop off at a replica of Thoreau’s cabin – 
albeit one not located at the original site (Fig. 4). One can also visit the gift shop 
or bookstore, though none of this will be possible until you pay your five-dollar 
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Figure 2. Entrance sign for Walden Pond, March 2008 
Image courtesy of Ron Cogswell 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The park has a limit of 1000 visitors at a time, and  
once that limit is reached (approx. 330 cars in the gated  
parking lot), no more cars are allowed in.  
Image courtesy of watrlily.blogspot.com. 
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Figure 4. The replica of Thoreau’s cabin, near the entrance of Walden Pond  
State Reservation. Image courtesy of Melissa Rae Cohen. 
entry fee at the gates.83 Most notably, the ability to visit Walden is restricted and 
controlled. The park has a “people capacity” of 1000 visitors and once this limit is 
reached, the entrance to the park is closed.84 These changes to the place of the 
Walden experiment are not detailed here as a reflection on the corruption of 
commercialization or commodification that the place has witnessed, but rather as 
a means to indicate the gravity of the alterations to the ontology of Walden.   
The thought produced with/in Walden has transformed it for many into a 
site of creative and spiritual inspiration. People still travel to Walden in search of 
inspiration. The place of Walden has become a signifier for the thinking and 
experience Thoreau once had there. Thoreau’s passing intimacy has left an 
unretractable social mark that includes the cult of nature, in which nature is 
endowed with a connection to “reality,” the transcendental, and the spiritual. 
Walden’s ontology has also taken on socio-historical importance due to the 
thinking that Thoreau produced there.  The place is now often referred to as the 
“birthplace of the conservation movement.”85 Today, the ontology of Walden is 
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also explicitly discursive, full of signage and didactics, directing visitor’s views, 
attention, and movement.  Ironically, the sort of societal regulation that Thoreau 
was hoping to escape now mediates the Walden landscape. 
Just as the thinker transforms place and leaves marks upon it by 
developing place-produced thought, the place also pushes back on the thinker, 
modifying his or her perceptions, thoughts, and being. The agency and 
subjectivity of both place and thinker are central in the development of place-
produced thought because thinking occurs through a dialogical negotiation that 
reworks the nature of both their beings. This distinction is a significant criterion in 
the development of place-produced thought because it entails a relationship that is 
more think place than thinking place. Thoreau’s Walden experiment is an 
important instance of place-produced thought because it demonstrates this 
distinction in the co-production of thought between thinker and place. Thoreau’s 
encounter with Walden included the recognition of the agency of place as an 
active force, rather than relating to place as a utility. For Thoreau, Walden was far 
more than a setting or backdrop to act out his own desires; Walden was a 
sovereign entity that he became intimately immerged with/in.  
Although Thoreau’s encounter with Walden constitutes a celebrated 
instance of place-produced thought, it is also a fairly straightforward and widely 
accepted example of a thinker cultivating a remarkable correspondence with 
place. In the following chapters, other instance of place-produced thought will be 
explored that are not as readily interpreted as an occasion in which thinking has 
inextricably and intimately been made with/in place. Many of these complicate 
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and challenge some of the notions of place-produced thought that we have 
described and considered including the materiality of an encounter, definitions of 
place, methods of engaging place, how place pushes back, the problematics of 
exclusion and otherizing, and even the limitations and pernicious hazards of 
creating place-produced thought.
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BEING A LANDSCAPE: MARTIN HEIDEGGER  
 
 
Not where man hides himself troglodyte-fashion in caves, eternally individual 
and never finding humanity outside himself; nor where he moves nomadically 
in great hordes, eternally plural and never finding humanity inside himself; 
only where he dwells quietly in his own hut, communing with himself and, as 
soon as he issues from it, with the whole race – only then will her [nature’s] 
lovely bud unfold.                           
                                                    – Friedrich Schiller  
 
Growing up in the shadowy fingers and rolling foothills of the eastern side of the 
Rocky Mountains, in a family that prized outdoor activities, I quickly developed 
an affection for, and fascination with, less urbanized spaces. I have memories of 
sitting through lessons in middle school while I dreamt of being in a place in 
nature outside of the city. One of my favorite daydream spots was a particular 
parcel of pasture that my grandparents owned. It was a wide-open space on the 
edge of the Red Deer River valley infested with prairie scrub and dotted with 
evergreens. The only sounds one heard out there were like oatmeal – subtle and 
robust.  
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Much of my experience of this place centered around walking. From my 
grandparents’ farmhouse, we would head east past the dusty corrals and the 
sleeping farm machinery until the ocean of grass swallowed us up. The journey to 
that field felt like a transformation as the physical signs of civilization dissolved 
in my peripheral vision. The skin of urbanity was slowly sloughed off, layer by 
layer, until I had a feeling that I was surrounded by nature. It was a place that 
seemed both wild and lonely, where you could yell as loudly as you wanted and 
no one would care – save for a small killdeer darting from her nest. Walking was 
an integral part of the experience that provided a literal and metaphorical shift. 
With these types of experiences and background in tow, whenever I encounter 
nature writing that is excessively Romanticized, a piece of me fathoms the 
enticement. I understand the allure; I understand the engrossing nostalgia, but I 
also acknowledge that those places have meanings and mnemonic qualities that 
have been imposed upon them.  
It is hard to deny the attraction of the natural world – the magnetism of a 
place that has undergone relatively limited transformation by a human hand, a 
seduction of the sort that E.O. Wilson has termed biophilia. Kant expressed a sort 
of biophilia in his belief that nature was the greatest source of beauty and of the 
sublime, far exceeding anything created by the poet or artist. Specifically, Kant 
claimed, “nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances… of which brings 
with them the idea of its infinity… [and furthermore] the inadequacy of even the 
greatest effort of our imagination.”1 According to Kant, in the sublime moment, 
nature provides something exceeding the cognitive capabilities of the human 
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mind. Perhaps this is the source of its appeal, as countless writers, poets, visual 
artists, and musicians have maintained a special inclination toward the natural 
world. Paul Cézanne, for example, was one of the first modern painters to break 
from the Renaissance tradition of depicting illusionistic space and faithfully 
imitating nature. But in rejecting the “faithful imitation of nature,” he by no 
means rejected nature itself. Instead, he decreed “I must always come back to this: 
painters must devote themselves entirely to the study of nature and try to produce 
pictures which will be an education.”2 In his attempt to move aesthetics beyond 
the quest for accurate mimesis of the natural world, Cezanne still looked to the 
natural world for guidance. It was through the study of nature that he discovered a 
new method of looking and of representation that enabled him to break from 
traditions of mimetic rendering. 
Martin Heidegger also felt the magnetism of a soft breeze, the charming 
appeal of a serenading songbird, and the awesome power of a developing 
windstorm on the horizon. For Heidegger, though, building a humble cabin in the 
Black Forest served as far more than just a nature lover’s refuge or a place for a 
weekend respite. Instead, it served as a counterpoint to his home and existence in 
Freiburg. Indeed, I contend that this counterpointing was crucial in Heidegger’s 
development of the concept of aletheia. As an unveiling, opening, and disclosure, 
aletheia is used by Heidegger to describe how being is revealed in time.  He 
understood the process of aletheia as a continuous cycle of uncovering and 
concealing of being, as a movement between states of being – the same sort of 
flux Heidegger himself experienced in the passage from one of his dwellings to 
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the other through the activity of walking. This chapter will focus on Heidegger’s 
concept of aletheia – one small part of his contribution to philosophy, but one that 
was crucial to his exegesis of being. I contend that the transition from city home 
to mountain cabin, particularly through the activity of walking, provided 
Heidegger with an experiential understanding of aletheia, one that clarified its 
significance. The place of Heidegger’s thought has most often been posited as his 
mountain cabin and while this place serves as a critical component, the complete 
landscape of his thought actually encompassed the cabin, the city home, and the 
transition between them. 
 
DIE HÜTTE  
The process of the cabin’s construction was conceived by Heidegger’s wife 
Elfride, who drew an initial sketch based upon a cabin owned by the Women 
Student Union of the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg.3 The land where it 
would be sited was purchased from a local farmer and the dwelling was 
completed in 1922. During that summer, on August 9th, Heidegger and his family 
moved in.  The cabin lies approximately one kilometer (approximately one 
thousand yards) from Todtnauberg, and is literally nestled in the hillside, with its 
northerly side half buried in the valley wall.  The position of the cabin 
intentionally provides majestic views of the valley sprawled below; the tips of 
Alps are visible in the expanse to the south.  
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The cabin itself (Heidegger refers to it as die Hütte) was unassuming and 
practical. The entire footprint measures a mere four hundred sixty square feet and 
was divided into four equally sized rooms. In his text about the cabin, 
Heidegger’s Hut, Adam Sharr provides a lush architectural reading of the 
dwelling, including a description of its construction: 
The hut is primarily a timber-framed structure. Details of its 
construction suggest that it was made and assembled using hand 
tools. Walls are framed using a series of vertical studs, braced with 
horizontal members and filled with rubble. Some pockets in this 
frame are fitted with window frames. Externally, walls are clad 
with timber shingles in equal courses, lapped in two directions. 
Internally, walls are lined with vertical planks, finished and treated, 
of approximately equal size and spacing.4 
 
Through this description and extant images of the cabin (Figs.1 & 2), we can 
deduce that the cabin was plain, and free from superfluous luxury or 
ornamentation. The interior was austere, minimally stocked and fairly empty – 
even Heidegger’s study area was mostly free of books as he kept the bulk of his 
library in Freiburg (Fig.3).     
From 1923 until 1928 Heidegger was chair of philosophy at Marburg 
University. Before this stint, however, and then again after Edmund Husserl’s 
retirement in 1928, Heidegger taught at the Albert-Ludwig University of Freiburg, 
which is only a short journey from the cabin.  Thus, Heidegger was able to 
frequent the cabin often – reading, writing, and thinking there for over fifty years. 
This cabin was the site where he developed many of his lectures, essays, and 
texts.  
 
  102
 
Figure 1. Heidegger’s Hut, outside Todtnauberg, Germany. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Exterior of Heidegger’s Hut. 
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Figure 3. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger at his desk in the study of the cabin. 
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz. 
Even though his wife oversaw the placement, orientation, and design of 
the cabin, these specifications were strictly determined by Heidegger’s intentions 
for the cabin. What he sought was a place of his own, a place where he could 
locate and generate thoughts about being and existence.  His hope was that 
through reciprocal cultivation with the landscape, his thinking would become 
ensconced in place, rooted in “its hourly changes, day and night, in the great 
comings and goings of the seasons.”5 Heidegger’s desire to stand face to face with 
the bare essence of existence resonates with Thoreau’s description of his aims for 
the Walden experiment. “It would be some advantage to live a primitive and 
frontier life…” declared Thoreau, “if only to learn what are the gross necessaries 
of life.”6 The lack of modern amenities (electricity was not installed until nine 
years after the original construction) gave Heidegger a feeling of closeness to the 
elements. For both Thoreau and Heidegger, the quest to be near the essence of 
nature and existence became tied to the aspiration of establishing a place to think 
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on these concepts – a location to center and engender a new body of thought 
gleaned through the relation with/in place. 
As a place for the focus of thought, not just for reading and writing, the 
cabin also served Heidegger as a place for being. This distinction was imperative 
for Heidegger because within the development of his philosophy, activities such 
as dwelling, building, being, and thinking are folded into one another. By 
situating and focusing thought, Heidegger expected to garner new insights about 
existence and the nature of being. The phrase “work-world,” especially in terms 
of describing his cabin, had important implications for Heidegger. By conjoining 
the two terms, he illustrated their status as mediating and co-creating one another. 
Heidegger is stressing that the place of work (what we are calling the place of 
thought) is inseparable from the work itself. Moreover, the phrase “work-world” 
contains hyphenation, an important mode of combining terms that recurs 
frequently in Heidegger’s lexicon. Placing a hyphen between two words seems 
such a simple gesture. Yet, the amalgamation of two entities such as work and 
world, notions that had traditionally been kept separate in metaphysics, proved to 
be a profound strategy that permeated the reaches of Heidegger’s philosophy.7 
Perhaps most famously, his notion of “da-sein” renders coming to being as 
inseparable from the place in which it exists.  Through situated thinking with/in 
place, Heidegger’s affirmed his belief that being is intimately connected to place, 
as expressed in his celebrated dictum on the nature of being: being-in-the-world. 
This glimpse into Heidegger’s imbrication of place with being does not 
afford the entire picture of the process by which he developed and delineated his 
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think place. Some critical questions still to ask include: How did Heidegger 
choose the place to locate and focus his thinking? What led him to this particular 
spot as opposed to all others? The answer to these questions reveals that the 
motivation and attraction towards the parcel of land and the cabin above 
Todtnauberg were formed through a series of complex and interwoven factors. 
The first of Heidegger’s considerations in locating a place for thought was 
practicality. After constructing the hut, other than the five years spent teaching in 
Marburg, Heidegger lived on his property in Freiburg until the time of his death in 
1976. The close proximity of the cabin made it easily accessible and readily 
available. Weather permitting, Heidegger often hiked the thirty-one kilometers 
(approximately nineteen miles) from his home in Freiburg to the cabin. And yet, 
despite this literal proximity, the cabin was remote enough to be removed from 
town, surrounded by the natural world. The environment around the cabin was 
just as important as the cabin itself because, as a passionate hiker, Heidegger 
frequently explored the local topography through long walks. The forest’s 
undulations and remoteness were deeply connected to the identity and constitution 
of his work-world and place for thinking.  
Heidegger’s own biography needs to be considered as an influence on the 
decision about where to locate his place of thought. Born in the town of 
Messkirch near the edge of the Black Forest, Heidegger’s affection for the 
countryside of his youth persisted throughout his life. The site for the cabin above 
Todtnauberg mirrors the landscape found in the Black Forest region near 
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Messkirch and perhaps gave Heidegger a sense of his childhood, not only through 
the flora and fauna, but also in the cultural habits and customs of its inhabitants. 
Beyond any nostalgic childhood yearnings, the identity and concept of the 
Black Forest peasant held even further significance for Heidegger. As a persona, 
it was also closely connected to German Romanticism. Indeed, much of 
Heidegger’s relationship with his locus of thought needs to be read through a 
screen of early German Romantic philosophy. One aspect of this school that 
seems especially germane for Heidegger is the notion “that ‘external’ nature is not 
just a causally determined object and is part of ourselves as subjects in ways that 
we cannot explain.”8  
Another determining factor for Heidegger’s choice of the cabin as a think 
place was an awareness of the long historical lineage of thinkers who had also 
utilized huts for reflective thought in solitude. Heidegger was certainly aware of 
“the Tübingen tower of Hölderlin, Goethe’s picturesque Gartenhaus in Weimar, 
and Nietzsche’s convalescent home at Sils Maria in the Austrian Alps.”9 The 
reclusive and ascetic lives of the pre-Socratic philosophers were also models that 
Heidegger tried to emulate by dwelling/thinking at the cabin. By some accounts, 
the creation of the cabin was a strategy for Heidegger to locate and insert his 
philosophical legacy into the trajectory laid out by these other thinkers.10 
Heidegger’s retreat to the cabin was not, however, an act of escapism or 
isolationism. Often a harsh critic of escapism, Heidegger seemed, to the contrary, 
interested in a form of Socratic solitude that sustained reflection and inquiry of 
the sort he believed possible only in concert with the natural landscape. 
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Some of the other influences on Heidegger circulating throughout his 
landscape of thought are illustrated in the images displayed in the cabin’s interior. 
The absence of any other decoration calls particular attention to these few images 
and their importance to Heidegger. They suggest that German Romanticism and 
the ideology of the Black Forest peasant were significantly entwined with 
Heidegger’s existence at the cabin. In the bedroom hung an image of a woman 
wearing traditional Black Forest garb (Fig.4). In the dining area or Vorraum (front 
area), hung a portrait of the German bucolic poet Johann Peter Hebel (Fig.5). In 
1957, Heidegger wrote an essay entitled Hebel der Hausfreund (Hebel - Friend of 
the House). In the study, where Heidegger did most of his writing, hung a portrait 
of the Romantic/Idealist German philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Since so little  
 
Figure 4. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger in the bedroom of the cabin.  
On the wall is an image of a woman wearing traditional Black Forest garb.  
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz. 
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Figure 5. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger seated in the dining area of the  
cabin. On the wall to his right hangs a portrait of the poet Johann Peter Hebel.  
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz. 
adornment is displayed in the cabin, we can surmise that the placement and 
symbolism of the images was intentional and carefully considered. Therefore, we 
can read these images as meaningful constituting forces permeating the place of 
Heidegger’s situated thought.  
The identity of the Black Forest was so thoroughly ingrained in his life 
that Heidegger requested to be buried with branches from the forest.11 “This 
philosophical work does not take its course like the aloof studies of some 
eccentric,” asserts Heidegger, “it belongs right in the midst of the peasants’ 
work.”12 The hut was not just a location, but an embodiment of the entire world of 
the Black Forest peasant – echoed in each piece of grass, each clapboard shingle, 
each rustle of the trees, each movement of a writing hand, and in each thought. 
These influences and forces, as part of the constitution of Heidegger’s think place, 
gave him a “particular configuration of meaning,” in which he could begin to 
develop thought.13 
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HEIDEGGER’S LANDSCAPE 
The cabin was certainly esteemed by Heidegger, and he enjoyed staying there as 
often as he could. Yet, the cabin itself was only a portion of his complete locus of 
thought. What Heidegger developed as a think place or “work-world” was a 
landscape – a system of places and the movement between them. That 
Heidegger’s own concept of place is more akin to a landscape than to a discrete 
locale is suggested by the fact that he often utilized the German word gegend to 
communicate a specific notion of place.14 With no direct English translation, the 
term sheds polymorphic synonyms, reading as everything from area or region, to 
locality and neighborhood.  
For example, in “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking” from 
1966, Heidegger uses the term as such: “The region gathers… each to each and 
each to all into an abiding, while resting in itself.”15 The important distinction is 
that the Heideggerian concept of place (gegend) comprises a “gathering of 
elements [places] that are themselves mutually defined only through the way in 
which they are gathered together.”16 This articulation of place, resembling the 
multiplicity and variability of a landscape, should come as no surprise. Thinking 
back to the concept of place already established here, place was established as a 
“sequence of events and actions through space.” Therefore, place exists as a zone 
of active exchange between the elliptical paths of its constituting forces. This 
conception is quite consistent with Heidegger’s use of gegend. 
 Taking into account this conceptualization of place in locating and 
delineating Heidegger’s landscape of thought, let us reconsider the role of the 
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cabin. In contrast to the traditional reading of the cabin as the place of 
Heidegger’s thought, the cabin needs to be read as one of many places gathered 
together in the landscape of Heidegger’s thought. One of the other places that 
should also be examined is Heidegger’s home in Freiburg. Planned and completed 
in August of 1928, the Freiburg home was necessitated by Heidegger’s 
replacement of Husserl as chair at the University in Freiburg.  
The style of the home is in line with Heidegger’s fondness for traditional 
Black Forest farmhouse architecture – a stone filled timber frame and walls 
covered will timber shingles.17  With three stories of space available, Heidegger 
chose to locate his study on the second floor, with a view of the backyard and the 
silhouettes of the slanted hills beyond. The study was the largest room in the 
house and contained a voluminous wooden desk. Heidegger’s writings and an 
ample library were housed in floor-to-ceiling shelves (Fig.6). As a spatial strategy  
 
Figure 6. Digne Meller-Marcovicz, Heidegger in his study at his Freiburg home. 
Image courtesy Digne Meller-Marcovicz. 
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for being closer to the essence of existence, the organization of the Freiburg study 
seems a departure from the modesty of the cabin. In fact, the organization and 
furnishing of the whole Freiburg domestic space appears more discursive – 
conditioned by traditional cultural roles and by Heidegger’s position in society as 
a leading figure at the University. Although the home tried to exude a traditional 
Black Forest persona, “it is effectively a suburban house in Black Forest 
clothing.”18 The Freiburg house was equipped with all of the comforts available 
during the time of its construction – running water, working sanitation, and 
electricity. While this place served as the center of Heidegger’s family life and his 
academic appointment, he remained relatively silent in his writing concerning his 
thoughts and feelings about it. Some of the impetus for this might be because the 
house was much more of a shared family place, serving the various needs of many 
other people and as a point of contact with children, students, friends, and 
colleagues. The cabin, on the other hand, was very distinctly Heidegger’s place. 
Throughout his life, Heidegger wrote about many of the locations that 
inspired him, but the home in Freiburg remained relatively, and almost 
purposefully, undisclosed.19 Heidegger preferred his existence at the cabin, 
claiming that, “my work up there is interrupted for long stretches by conferences, 
lecture trips, committee meetings and my teaching work down here in 
Freiburg.”20 However, even though it was not preferred, the Freiburg home filled 
an important role opposing the cabin. For Heidegger, it occupied one end of the 
transitional spectrum of being, and was therefore integral to understanding being.  
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In this sense, Heidegger utilized a strategy of negation analogous to that 
discussed in Thoreau’s Walden experiment. Within this strategy, the gathering of 
elements helps to define each place – through what they negate just as much by 
what they affirm. The actual landscape of Heidegger’s locus of thought should be 
considered as the cabin, the Freiburg home, and the movement between them. Just 
as Thoreau had hoped that his Walden experiment would be generative, 
Heidegger expected that a think place, which included a contrast between country 
and city, would proliferate new ideas about being and existence. As Sharr 
suggests, “a continuous and complex tension [existed] between the provincial and 
cosmopolitan throughout the philosopher’s mature life and work.”21 The transition 
between these two places was key for Heidegger’s understanding of being as (in) 
a continuous cycle of disclosure and concealment. 
 
THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY  
The distinction between country and city had a significant impact on Heidegger’s 
life and the development of his place-produced thought. In many ways, Heidegger 
essentialized each of their identities and associations to uphold a strict dichotomy. 
For Heidegger, the country was a compendium of attributes associated with the 
Black Forest peasant – simple, hard working, and connected to nature. The city on 
the other hand, was filled with distraction and noise, chicanery and lip service – a 
disengagement from being. Time and again, Heidegger makes these sentiments 
clear, as when he asserted that: “The world of the city runs the risk of falling into 
destructive error.”22 Similarly, in an address given in Heidegger’s hometown, at 
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the celebration of the birthday of composer Conradin Kreutzer in 1955, he warns 
that, “Many Germans have lost their homeland… They have been caught up in the 
turmoil of the big cities, and have resettled in the wastelands of industrial 
districts.”23 
A similar differentiation between the country and city is explored by 
Raymond Williams in The Country and the City, which examines changing 
historical perceptions toward country and city. Williams begins his text with a 
forthright statement: “‘Country’ and ‘city’ are very powerful words, and that is 
not surprising when we remember how much they seem to stand for in the 
experience of human communities.”24 As Williams makes clear, the power of the 
two terms is the result of the accretion of centuries’-worth of rhetoric and 
discourse. The central concern for Williams is that both country and city are 
historical – transformed over time toward a multiplicity of ends. By parsing 
through centuries of British literary examples, Williams demonstrates that the 
relationship between country and city depends upon rhetorical contrast. For 
example, the Charles Cotton poem, The Retirement, from 1676, yields this 
description of the country:  
Good God! How sweet things are here! 
How beautiful the Fields appear! 
How cleanly do we feed and lie! 
Lord what good hours do we keep! 
How quietly we sleep! 
What peace! What unanimity!25 
In clear contrast to this joyously empathic proclamation, other authors such as 
George Crabbe have painted dour portraits of city life. In Book I of The Village 
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from 1783, he writes “From Truth and Nature shall we widely stray, Where 
Virgil, not where Fancy, leads the way?”26 And in Book II, “Yet here Disguise, 
the city's vice, is seen, And Slander steals along and taints the Green.”27 Much of 
this rhetoric utilizes an utopian/dystopian split that appeals to the morality of the 
reader – the country is clean, quiet, and good – while the evil denizen of the city 
slander and steal. A particularly important moment in the development of British 
literature occurred in the 17th and 18th century, as the evocation of the rural shifted 
from a tone of veneration to one of melancholic loss. The concern for the loss of 
rural life in British Romanticism is paralleled in the German Romanticism that 
influenced Heidegger.  
 
THE CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS TECHNOLOGY  
In many ways, a perception of the rural as melancholic is also apparent in 
Heidegger’s writings. For Heidegger, an authentic form of existence was slowly 
being eroded and taken over by urbanization, mechanization, and technology. 
These concerns about technology are important when analyzing Heidegger’s 
place of thought because they further the distinction between country and city.  
The lack of amenities at the cabin, and his resistance to incorporating modern 
conveniences, such as electricity, were rooted in the equation of technology with 
the city, and by extension, with the concealment of being. 
 For Heidegger, the abstention from modern technology was not based 
merely on personal phobias; rather, it had much more significance for existence 
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and the nature of being. As an example, we can return to Heidegger’s words from 
the “Memorial Address” for Kreutzer mentioned above:  
those who have stayed on in their homeland... Hourly and daily 
they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the 
movies carry them off to uncommon, but often merely common, 
realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is 
no world (Heidegger’s italics).28 
Several of Heidegger’s writings address the dangerous diversions of technology, 
but no other speaks as directly about the nature of technology as does “The 
Question Concerning Technology” from 1954. There, Heidegger posits a 
discrepancy between the “challenging-forth” of technology and the “bringing-
forth” of poiesis. The bringing-forth of artwork is aligned with the revealing in 
aletheia as a means to open the clearing of being. In contrast, the form of 
revealing delivered by technology is described by Heidegger as such: “wherever 
we try to point to modern technology as the revealing that challenges, the words 
‘setting upon,’ ‘ordering,’ ‘standing-reserve,’ obtrude and accumulate in a dry, 
monotonous, and therefore oppressive way.”29 The concern for Heidegger is that 
technological pursuits distract us from Husserl’s imperative of getting to “things 
themselves.” In Heidegger’s understanding, technology inhibits aletheia and the 
disclosure of being. 
Heidegger’s great concern about technology arises with his 
acknowledgement of its powerful ability to cover over being, hiding the true 
nature of being from us. In “Memorial Address,” for example, Heidegger warns 
that there is a “process that gnaws at the very marrow of man today: man today is 
in flight from thinking (Heidegger’s italics).”30 Heidegger goes on to explain that 
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humanity has been losing the recognition and practice of meditative thinking to 
the summons and fervor of scientific calculative thinking. Meditative thinking, for 
Heidegger, is a means of being-in-the-world. It is to “dwell on what lies close and 
meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and 
now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history.”31  
 
ALETHEIA  
For Heidegger, meditative thinking is also aligned with aletheia. A term 
conventionally thought to have been used by the Greeks to mean “truth,” 
Heidegger reinterprets aletheia as the “unconcealment of being.” In his fresh 
interpretation, the truth of being is more suggestive of revealing or uncovering. 
For Heidegger, aletheia describes how being becomes unconcealed, and then soon 
covered over by the familiar and mundane, by the everydayness of the world, only 
to be revealed again in time as a new understanding of being. By traversing 
between cabin and house, Heidegger was able to build an understanding of the 
unveiling and concealment cycle of aletheia through the actual walk from 
Freiburg to the mountain cabin (and back again). In fact, walking from one to the 
other provided Heidegger with an experience of aletheia—an embodied metaphor. 
Like the experience I often had walking out into my grandparent’s field, this hike 
put Heidegger in a transitional state, one between concealment and disclosure, 
during which he shed the distractions/concealments that threatened to cover over 
the truth of being. This visceral understanding of aletheia, developed through 
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thinking with/in place, was a vital portion of Heidegger’s place-produced thought 
and one of the central concepts of his philosophy. 
The connection of aletheia to walking is implicit in the language 
Heidegger used to describe it. For example, he often describes aletheia in terms of 
walking upon a wooded path. In the essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task 
of Thinking,” he wrote that the “path to it [aletheia] is distinguished from the lane 
along which the opinion of mortals wanders.”32 In Being and Time, Heidegger 
reflects on a specific experience of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides – 
“The goddess of truth who leads Parmenides places him before two paths, that of 
discovering and that of concealment… the path of discovering is gained only in… 
distinguishing between them understandingly.”33 The metaphor of walking on a 
path as a means to understand thinking and the disclosure of being also appears in 
Heidegger’s collection of essays entitled Holzwege. The German word translates 
as “wood paths” and the essays in this book derive from Heidegger’s experiences 
walking in the woods around the cabin, and from walking in the landscape 
between the cabin and Freiburg (Fig. 7). These essays further confirm 
Heidegger’s connection of life experience with philosophical understanding.  
For Heidegger, walking on a woodland path afforded a type of thinking 
absent of teleological design. It was a method of revelation that was fully 
engrossed in the world without predeterminations. Aletheia is also like a journey 
on a path toward a clearing in which presence and being is revealed.  And like the 
references to a “path,” the metaphorical language of the “clearing” was likely also 
a product of Heidegger’s walking activities. The clearing of being (die lichtung  
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Figure 7. The landscape surrounding Heidegger’s cabin, seen here in the central cluster of trees. 
des seins), used by Heidegger in his discussions of aletheia, and rendered in 
colloquial German as (eine lichtung) has a connotation not so much of brushing 
away, but rather of a forest clearing of the kind one might encounter walking on a 
forest path. In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Heidegger 
writes that the “forest clearing [Lichtung] is experienced in contrast to dense 
forest… the free space thus originating is the clearing.”34 A few pages further 
along in the same essay, Heidegger explains that “in that clearing rests possible 
radiance [the other translation of Lichtung is light], that is, the possible presencing 
of presence itself.”35 
Heidegger’s own clearing of being was at the mountain cabin where “he 
perceived greater authority in the bluntness of existence he found intensified by 
mountain terrain.”36 In sharp contrast, the return to the city was equated with the 
concealment of being, swarming as it was with technological distractions and 
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meaningless, fleeting interactions. In Parmenides, Heidegger writes that 
“concealing is for us displacing – a kind of ‘putting away’ or putting aside.”37 
However, by remaining at either dwelling for too long, Heidegger felt displaced 
from the clearing of being. Despite his preference for the cabin, he never 
remained there for any great length of time. Therefore, he regularly found himself 
between the two dwellings; the temporal state of being in each place was 
disrupted by the transition back to its counter part allowing him to experience the 
recurring dance of concealment and disclosure. Significantly, the concept of 
aletheia implies just such an endless sojourn, one in which being never comes to 
rest as either permanently concealed or unconcealed. 
The notion of movement as integral to Heidegger’s understanding of 
aletheia is connected to the importance both of this landscape and also of walking 
to him. As previously mentioned, Heidegger was an avid hiker. Whenever 
possible, he would walk from Freiburg to the cabin – no small feat considering 
the mountainous terrain. He also enjoyed taking long walks while staying at the 
cabin. For Heidegger however, walking was far more than a form of calisthenics; 
walking was a lived experience of aletheia. Heidegger’s mentor, Husserl, shared a 
similar belief in the conflation of walking with revelation.  Husserl described 
walking as a special activity that brings about both an inward and outward 
attentiveness. Inwardly, walking “brings home to me that I am a total organism 
[and not just a collection of parts],” wrote Husserl.38 Yet, it also reveals “being-
here is the absolute product of my body and my immediate place, the two together 
in indissoluble composition.”39 Heidegger viewed walking in similar terms, not 
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only as an experience of aletheia that is transitory and moves us closer to, or 
farther from, the clearing of being, but also as an experience of interconnectivity 
between place and being – of the basic state of da-sein, of being-in-the-world.  
Husserl and Heidegger are hardly the only thinkers to connect walking 
with the discovery of place and being. A large body of discourse has drawn 
walking together with ontological understanding as a “state in which the mind, the 
body, and the world are aligned, as though they were three characters finally in 
conversations together.”40 Geoff Nicholson, author of The Lost Art of Walking: 
The History, Science, and Literature of Pedestrianism, assertively claims – “Tell 
me how you walk and I will tell you who you are.”41 Other writers identify 
walking as a special type of human activity. Rebecca Solnit, for example, writes 
“it is the movement as well as the sights going by that seems to make things 
happen in the mind, and this is what makes walking ambiguous and endlessly 
fertile.”42 Thoreau was also a champion of walking, dedicating an entire essay to 
the emancipatory activity. For him, when done properly, walking allowed one to 
be “absolutely free from all worldly engagements.”43 Both Thoreau and 
Heidegger seem to agree on the efficacy of walking as a means to inhabit the 
world, as a method for synchronizing being with place.  The pace and physicality 
of walking bring to attention otherwise unseen aspects of the landscape, including 
subtle shifts in environmental minutia. Walking requires greater observation than 
do other types of travel, as one literally negotiates the particulars of the terrain. 
For Heidegger, the changing terrain compounded the experience of transformation 
from one state of being to another.  Beginning in an urban setting and then 
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moving to a rural one, the elevation changes markedly over the 19-mile hike. 
Beginning in Freiburg at around 900 feet, Heidegger would wind his way to the 
cabin at an elevation of over 3700 feet. The paths that he used were often 
unmarked and partially overgrown (Fig. 8). Along the walk, Heidegger would  
 
Figure 8. A still from the German documentary film “Im Denken Unterwegs”  
(On the Way of Thinking) produced in 1975 showing one of the paths that  
Heidegger would have likely walked upon. 
 
have been able to feel the landscape change, as the chill of the cool mountain air 
settled into his bones. On the 25th anniversary of the construction of the cabin, 
Heidegger wrote a poetic essay, called Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (The 
Thinker as Poet) in which he describes parts of the landscape seen on the journey 
between cabin and house. The landscape is fairly challenging and the demands of 
the climb (either up or down) could be taxing. Yet, in the poem, Heidegger 
describes the details of the landscape with a certain tenderness: “When in early 
summer lonely narcissi bloom hidden in the meadow and the rock-rose gleams 
under the maple” something amazing is revealed – “The splendor of the 
simple.”44 As an activity that brings one closer to a place, walking is 
transformative as it enables embodiment and reflection – leading to a different 
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state of being. Heidegger’s walking changed the walker, through engagement, 
movement, and thinking with/in place.  
One renowned Heideggerian scholar contends that the apparent correlation 
between physics and metaphysics “does not mean the real origin of such work 
(philosophy) can be construed in terms purely of the particular details that make 
up each philosopher’s life-situation.”45 Such an assertion might make us hesitate, 
wonder whether too much importance is being placed upon walking and the 
physical landscape in Heidegger’s understanding of aletheia.  However, in 
Heidegger’s case, it does seem tenable to translate his experience of place directly 
into philosophical thought. Heidegger’s method of practicing philosophy was one 
heeding Husserl’s call – “to the things themselves.”46 Heidegger was not a 
proponent of speculative metaphysics; instead he was a firm believer in direct 
experience. For example, in a lecture given early in his career, he stated that 
practicing philosophy was a “way of behaving.”47  Therefore, I argue that the walk 
from Freiburg to the cabin created the conditions for arriving at that the idea of 
aletheia and as a means of practicing a rigorous investigation of its process.  
Upon Heidegger’s death in 1976, the New York Times published an 
obituary by Hannah Arendt, who wrote “Heidegger never thinks ‘about’ 
something; he thinks something.” For Heidegger, thinking something meant doing 
something, which means that he lived and breathed aletheia in order to gain 
knowledge of its origins and process. In this sense, the understanding of the 
philosophical concept of aletheia was structured by the metaphor of walking 
between two places of existence. In George Lakoff’s terms, the strategy of using 
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walking to reveal the fundamental process of aletheia can be considered as an 
“ontological metaphor.” In The Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
describe how “our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) 
provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors.”48 
It must be noted that while the emphasis on the experience of walking has been on 
the physical, lived, and immediate, it is recognized that these experiences 
transpire within a wider framework of contingent influences such as political, 
cultural, and personal forces. For Heidegger, the mental and physical 
transformations that occurred through walking became an ontological 
transformation – comprised of the concealing and disclosure that characterizes 
aletheia. 
 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RETREAT  
Since his death, both the mountain cabin and the Freiburg home have remained in 
the possession of Heidegger’s extended family; however, their respective 
ontologies have been irrevocably transformed by the thought developed with/in 
them. As noted earlier, place-produced thought leaves unretractable traces on the 
being of place as well as that of thinker.  Both experience an ontological 
alteration. Just as place acts upon the thinker, and the thinker acts upon place, the 
product of their co-dependence leaves the being of both parties indelibly 
transfigured. 
 For many, the landscape of Heidegger’s thought remains a source of 
distressing intrigue. Much of this is due to Heidegger’s well-documented 
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involvement with the Nazi party.  Many scholars have criticized the ideology of 
Heideggerian thought for being rooted in the rhetoric of blut und boten, which 
itself was embraced by the Nazi party. In many ways, this association has become 
a permanent addendum to the being of the place.  
Because a love of a particular place can engender that kind of regionalist 
ideology, some believe that place-produced thought should necessarily be viewed 
with a wary eye.  It can prompt misguided thinking.  And certainly, many scholars 
would agree with Jeff Malpas when he claims that “there are elements of 
Heidegger’s thought and action that those of us committed to a broadly liberal, 
democratic form of life must find repugnant.”49 
 However, in the examination of aletheia, we have shown that as a 
philosophical concept, it is not so much entrenched in the particulars of a specific 
ethnogeography (Deutschland) as it is derived from the physical experience of 
movement between places and states of being – movement unfolding over time. It 
was Nietzsche who first revealed that universal truths were historical and 
grounded in time, emerging as new truths each time they are uncovered. As a 
passionate follower of Nietzsche, Heidegger also understood this as the essence of 
being, revealed in the cycle of aletheia.50 Through movement in time – by 
walking – the nature of being was exposed to Heidegger. Remaining stationary in 
either Freiburg or the cabin would have resulted in the concealment of being, as 
the ubiquity of the familiar would have drawn the clearing of being to a close. 
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Whether one condemns the use of the cabin in Heidegger’s thought or 
instead, chooses to celebrate it, there is little doubt of the pervasive influence of 
Heideggerian thought on later 20th century thinkers – Levinas, Sartre, Derrida, 
and Agamben are counted among them. The weight of this prominence has made 
the landscape of Heidegger’s thought something of a tourist attraction, not unlike 
Walden Pond. A walking tour of the landscape has been established and the 
Todtnauer-Feriendland website describes the path as a “panorama circular route” 
known as the Martin Heidegger Rundweg that takes one on a 4 mile hike from a 
parking lot along a trail through the valley that passes above Heidegger’s cabin 
before looping back around below the cabin (Figs. 9 and 10).51 The trail was 
designed by the Heidegger family in 2002 and has five markers scattered along  
Figure 9. Signpost for the Martin Heidegger 
Rundweg. 
 
Figure 10. Map of the Todtnauberg area with the 
Martin Heidegger Rundweg displayed in red at  
the top right corner. 
Image courtesy of Tomas Nygren. 
the way providing biographical information and direct quotations. The first of 
these signs seems, at first glance, to read as a contrite vindication wer gross denkt, 
muss gross irren (he who will think greatly, must err greatly). However, irren, 
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which can also be translated as wander, rove or ramble. The phrase can therefore 
be re-read with an emphasis on movement: “he who will think greatly, must 
wander greatly.” 
The establishment of Heidegger’s trail can be read as a product of the 
ontological shift that occurred when thought and place were fused together. The 
imminence of the traces from Heidegger’s thought is still negotiated by the family 
today. “He is still living here, as far as I am concerned,” claims Heidegger’s son 
Hermann.52 A sign near the cabin has been erected that reads – “The hut is still 
owned by the Heidegger family and used privately by them. Visitors are not 
permitted. Please respect the privacy of the family.”53 A similar note appears 
within Sharr’s book asking for the privacy of the Freiburg home as well. That 
such signs are necessary points to the continued interest people have in the locales 
where Heidegger worked.  The way that Heidegger’s landscape of thought is 
encountered, perceived, and interpreted remains ineradicably mediated by the 
thought produced there. 
Complicated though Heidegger’s relationship with the cabin, the Freiburg 
home, and the movement between them may have been, the main concern of this 
chapter has been to argue the imbrication of this place with thought in 
Heidegger’s philosophy. A body of knowledge was produced that was situated 
and focused in a fusion of thinking, place, and action. Much of Heidegger’s 
writing touches upon the relationship of physical engagement and metaphysical 
erudition. For him, philosophy was a lived experience, one that directly taught the 
philosopher about aletheia. The clearing of being emerged like an opening on one 
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of the paths that Heidegger regularly traveled through his landscape of thought, as 
he attempted to navigate between the two poles of his own existence.
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SITE UNSEEN: GORDON MATTA-CLARK 
 
 
This world just drops a bunch of rules on top of you… 
                                                                                 – Donald Draper, Madmen   
     
Each space, each spatial interval, is a vector of constraints and a bearer of 
norms and ‘values.’  
                                                                 – Henri Lefebvre 
 
During his rather short lifetime, Gordon Matta-Clark (1943-1978) produced an 
astonishingly diverse group of artistic projects. Experimenting with photography, 
film, sculpture, performance, site-specificity, and installation, Matta-Clark’s 
activities were consistent with the emphasis on fragmentations and accumulations 
that characterized much of the artwork of the 1970s. While he voraciously 
explored an assortment of approaches and media, Matta-Clark is perhaps best 
known for his “cut” pieces—physical interventions into architectural spaces—
typified by his project Splitting from 1974. In Splitting, Matta-Clark made an 
incision through the entire structure of a suburban New Jersey house—both 
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literally and metaphorically cutting the place open to reveal and deconstruct its 
spatial organization (Fig.1). 
 
Figure 1. Matta-Clark, Splitting, 1974. 
Image courtesy Barbican Art Gallery. 
 Some critics have interpreted Matta-Clark’s “cut” pieces negatively, 
seeing them as a form of transgression that borders on violence; in fact, Matta-
Clark received several angry letters about Splitting. One such letter from an 
architect railed that Matta-Clark was “violating the sanctity and dignity of 
abandoned buildings by interrupting their transition to ruin.”1 Another, from the 
critic Maud Lauvin, claimed that Matta-Clark’s “wounding of a house can be seen 
as a male violation of a domestic realm with female associations.”2 These 
criticisms, like many of the others that Matta-Clark received, posit the 
architectural space as sanctified and secure. Therefore, any transformation is cast 
as degenerate. This is especially true of the domestic space used in Splitting, as 
the home can be read as a symbolic “spatio-temporal retreat [and respite] from a 
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public sphere.”3 This association of violence to Matta-Clark’s artwork is 
reasonable. Many of his pieces required extreme physical exertion and labor 
involving heavy tools.  The incisions that he made into buildings have a strong 
tactile and visceral quality, and the evidence of the cutting action, such as 
splintered wood or frayed edges of plaster, feature prominently in the photo 
documentation of many of his projects (Fig.2). However, a close and rigorous 
reading of Matta-Clark’s “cuts” can reveal that they are not primarily (or even 
predominantly) acts of mindless violence. 
  
Figure 2. Matta-Clark, Conical Intersect, 1975. 
Image courtesy David Zwirner Gallery. 
 As an artist whose development was rooted in the New York avant-garde 
of the late ‘60s, Matta-Clark, along with many other artists, felt the urge to 
critically question the established norms of their contemporary environments. I 
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argue that his work—including the cuts—should be considered as strategies of 
resistance to the spatial distribution of power and the discursive reorganization of 
urban space. Moreover, it was through the development of place-produced 
thought that Matta-Clark formulated this strategy of resistance, one that began to 
emerge through his situated thinking with/in the odd shaped properties of his Fake 
Estates project from 1973.  
Matta-Clark’s aversion to the hegemonic tropes of Modernist architecture 
and urban planning began during his studies at Cornell in the late ‘60s. Those 
early intimations became more fully developed through Matta-Clark’s thinking 
with/in place—grounded in the intimate encounter with place that he had as a 
resident of NYC.  There, Matta-Clark witnessed first-hand the means by which 
Modernist architectural projects privileged simple, clean, and functional design 
over anything else.4 Several iconic buildings displaying the aesthetic philosophy 
of Modernist architecture began to dot the skyline of NYC in the 1950s, including 
the Seagram building designed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and the United 
Nations Headquarters designed by Le Corbusier and Oscar Niemeyer. By 
thinking with/in place, Matta-Clark enacted a form of political resistance that was 
both a response to the “abstract tendencies of modern architecture… [and to] the 
degeneracy these models wrought in the urban environment.”5 As Matta-Clark 
witnessed the indifference or lack of concern for landscaping, aesthetics, and local 
usage of space, a failure epitomized by Robert Moses’ newly constructed freeway 
system, he was impelled to cultivate a politics of place that resisted such 
impositions.  
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For Matta-Clark, the obtrusive imposition of power upon the landscape 
was disturbing because it radically altered the ontological value of different places 
in one fell swoop. He deplored these state regulated spatializations of power and 
knowledge and sought a means to subvert them. Recognizing that, I argue that the 
Fake Estates project is not only Matta-Clark’s think place, producing critical 
insights about the philosophy of “the cut” and the reiteration of power, but also a 
political act, an attempt to subvert the dispersion of power that defined the form 
and being of the lots that became part of Fake Estates. Before examining that 
project and Matta-Clark’s later “cuts,” though, some historical and cultural 
context regarding NYC of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s is in order.  That context is 
deeply connected to Matta-Clark’s entire artistic output. 
 
GEOGRAPHIES OF RESISTANCE  
Beginning in 1969, New York City experienced a particularly unfavorable eight-
year period. Police corruption was rampant, and economic and political 
turbulence cast a veil of distress over the spirit of most New Yorkers. As early as 
1968, one of mayor John Lindsay’s commissioners even commented: “The city 
has begun to die.”6 No single event can be pinpointed as the start of the downturn 
for NYC. As is the case with many crises on this level, a convergence of political, 
social, and economic problems yielded a general malaise. As Jefferson Cowie 
explains, the melancholy stemmed from the realization that “the immense 
institutional achievements of the previous generation… were both sources of 
power as well as systems of constraint on the future fortunes of the American 
  133
working class.”7 Polarizing war efforts in Vietnam, racial backlash, and an 
economic downturn compounded this anxiety.  
In addition to budgetary woes, the city also saw increases in “white flight” 
and ghettoization. With the escalation of felonies in NYC throughout the ‘60s, 
many members of the upper middle class migrated to the perceived safety of 
suburbia. During the same period, public housing for low-income families in the 
urban center proliferated. Public housing “by the sixties… became ethnicized as 
‘ghettos,’” claims Lucy Lippard, “confining social evils (and resistance) in 
specific places.8  
Within this environment, the power relations related to place became 
especially evident. “Isolation epitomizes the ghetto, which has become a fortress,” 
contends Lucy Lippard, “a last bastion, to keep some people in and others out.”9 
Many New Yorkers in the ‘70s felt frustration with their seeming inability to 
affect change, with the crushing sense that there were stuck in place – 
geographically, socially, and economically. The frustration and dissatisfaction are 
implicit in Matta-Clark’s “cuts” into buildings. His “cuts” were conceptualized as 
a form of resistance against these cultural conditions, against the use of place as 
an instrument of power that delimits in these injurious ways.  Matta-Clark 
believed that his interventions into architectural spaces could engender important 
perceptual shifts in the way that places were occupied and utilized.  
As a graduate of Cornell’s architecture program, Matta-Clark was well 
versed in the current tropes and theories circulating in the world of architecture. 
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Rather than buying into the dominant Modernist ideology typified by Le 
Corbusier however, Matta-Clark left Cornell feeling disturbed by the canons of 
Modern architecture and the political control of urban landscapes. His desire to 
question the formalism of Modern architecture and to create a sense of an 
ambiguity regarding place were also reflective of shifting cultural sentiments. 
Cowie describes this disposition as an “outward contest of power relations that 
defined the first half of the seventies.”10  
A widely recognized example of such contestation is proto-punk, which 
blossomed at this same moment. Many proto-punk musicians effectively 
expressed the vitriol and exasperation of the collective existential crisis in the 
early ‘70s. One American proto-punk band, The Stooges, captured the converging 
hopelessness and dissatisfaction that many felt, distilling it into short caustic 
bursts of buzzing guitars and snarling lyrics. In songs such as Search and Destroy, 
lead singer Iggy Pop desperately moans:  
I am a world's forgotten boy 
The one who searches and destroys 
Honey gotta help me please 
Somebody gotta save my soul.  
 
While epitomizing the sense of frustration and angst in the early ‘70s, these lyrics 
also appear as a fitting description for Matta-Clark’s own own artistic sensibility, 
expressing as they do the marginalization that Matta-Clark identified with, as well 
as the desire to question and destroy dominant forms of power. 
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The ballooning agitation with the architectural old guard came to a head 
for Matta-Clark in 1976, when he was invited to participate in an exhibition at the 
Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in NYC. Around 3 o’clock in the 
morning on the day that the show was to open, Matta-Clark entered the space of 
the exhibition while the installation was still in progress and gained permission 
from the curator to shoot out some of the already cracked windows with a BB 
gun.  What ensued was both a performance and political statement. While blasting 
out all of the windows on the floor of the exhibition, Matta-Clark delivered an 
acerbic diatribe “against its esteemed members and the architectural ideologies 
they supported.”11 As Matta-Clark later claimed, “These were my teachers. I hate 
what they stand for.”12  
While the physicality of this act is undeniable, I propose that it was most 
significantly a type of conceptual violence, and an important point on the arc of 
thought that characterized Matta-Clark’s developing practice. And while the 
connection between the blasted windows and the later “cuts” is readily evident, 
that arc did not begin with blasting out the windows.  Rather, evidence of it can be 
discerned as early as the Fake Estates project from 1973. From the thinking 
cultivated with/in the Fake Estates project, Matta-Clark was able to re-affirm the 
intimate linkage between place and identity, as well as appreciate how the “cut” 
(in its various articulations) could act as a form of reinscription and reclamation – 
as a means to play with the constitution of place and allow for it to be made 
“anew.” 
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FAKE ESTATES  
The Reality Properties: Fake Estates project (commonly referred to as Fake 
Estates) from 1973 was an important juncture in the development of Matta-
Clark’s artistic theories and practice. Further, this project is a significant instance 
of place-produced thought; Matta-Clark derived much of his mature theory and 
practice from his thinking with/in the small urban properties of the Fake Estates 
project. The development of Matta-Clark’s ideas about, and deployment of, “the 
cut” as both a philosophical concept and a spatial strategy of resistance are 
inextricably connected to the fusion of place and thought initially manifest in the 
Fake Estates project.  
The project began with Matta-Clark’s acquisition of five small parcels of 
real estate from the city of New York. Gradually, he acquired a total of fourteen 
parcels in Queens and a fifteenth on Staten Island (Fig. 3). The crucial question to 
consider when analyzing the Fake Estates project is why Matta-Clark chose these 
precise bits of the urban landscape.   
In a broad context, their location within NYC was of utmost importance. 
Beginning with re-zoning in the late ‘50s (the first major re-zoning since 1916), 
the rapid rearrangement of the city continued through the early ‘60s. In the 
escalating transformations of NYC by city planners, private redevelopments, and 
the movement of people and capital, the city underwent a radical reorganization. 
The primary player behind the restructuring was Robert Moses. And, perhaps not 
surprisingly, “Moses’s vision derived from the popular urban design theory of the  
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Figure 3. Aerial Map of Queens and Staten Island identifying the location of the 15 lots.  
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine – http://cabinetmagazine.org/events/oddlots.php 
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day promoted by French architect Le Corbusier in his 1925 plan for “Voison for 
Paris,” which included the ruthless demolition of the current urban landscape in 
favor of a “revolutionary re-design of the city.”13 Beginning in the period 
immediately following the war, Moses set about reconfiguring NYC to be more 
automobile friendly, in part by integrating an expansive set of freeways that 
connected Manhattan to Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Staten Island. The design of 
many of these expressways prioritized efficient, accessible car travel over 
landscaping, aesthetics, and local traditional usage of space.   
In a sense, these freeways acted as cuts, restricting and redirecting 
pedestrian and automotive traffic. They also cut off neighborhoods from places 
that had contiguous exchanges before the road was created. The cutting up and 
division of space transformed the identity and value of places by disrupting or 
severing the types of relationships and exchanges that were possible with other 
places in the landscape. As Roberta Brandes Gratz writes, Moses’s plans 
effectively “erase[d] neighborhoods, undermine[d] social capital, and wipe[d] out 
longstanding economic investment.”14  
The creation of the freeway system also generated “gutterspaces,” parcels 
of land that were deemed valueless.  In fact, research suggests that the 
gutterspaces purchased by Matta-Clark were likely created by Robert Moses’s 
freeway infrastructure reorganization of the post-war period.15 Guy Debord 
vilified the ability of urban expansion or reorganization to remove the uniqueness 
and value from places when he wrote that “Urbanism is capitalism’s seizure of the 
natural and human environment in which banalization dominates.”16 These 
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banalized gutterspaces are often compact, and have unorthodox shapes and 
dimensions (Fig.4). For instance, one of the Fake Estates properties measured 
2.33’ by 355’ while another was 1.83’ by 1.11’. Matta-Clark acquired each these 
properties for very little money (around $35.00 a piece) after the previous owners 
had failed to pay taxes on them and they were seized by the city. Many of the 
properties, including a 2.77’ by 100’ lot were surrounded by other properties or 
fenced off, making them completely inaccessible (Fig. 5).  
Matta-Clark was intensely aware of how the face of his home city was 
altered by the freeway systems and re-zoning of the Moses administration. In an 
undated note, Matta-Clark wrote that, “as a native New Yorker my sense of the 
city as home runs deep, being full of an honest regard for its state and the quality 
of life available there.”17 The relationship between quality of life and the 
organization of space was a long-term concern for Matta-Clark.  And while 
observing the spatial reorganization of the city, Matta-Clark became increasingly 
conscious that the reorganization of place was being undertaken as an instrument 
of power. In an interview from 1976, Matta-Clark declared: “what I am reacting 
to is the deformation of values (ethics) in the disguise of Modernity, Renewal, 
Urban Planning, call it what you will.”18  
During the early 1970s, Matta-Clark expanded his thinking regarding the 
relationship of place and identity. Rather than only focusing on the people who 
have been marginalized, Matta-Clark began to more directly examine how places 
can exacerbate the disenfranchisement of certain groups. The concern for the 
ways that a place may condition and contain its inhabitants also led Matta-  
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Figure 4. Schematic drawings of all 15 properties.  
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine – http://cabinetmagazine.org/events/oddlots.php 
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Clark to consider how places themselves can be marginalized within a larger 
spatial organizational system. For Matta-Clark, place and identity were so closely 
related that their relationship was ontological. He realized that when the world of 
an entity is altered, the being of that entity also undergoes a radical 
transformation. In the case of the Fake Estates properties, Matta-Clark recognized 
that the designation of the small parcels as “unusable” spaces had transformed 
their very being. More importantly, Matta-Clark also recognized that this 
determination of being was a product of the spatial reconfiguration of the city 
through state intervention, and did not represent their entire measure of being. 
Another crucial attribute of the places that Matta-Clark acquired for the 
Fake Estates project was their inaccessibility and marginalization. For Matta-
Clark, these places were victims of demarcation processes that served the 
dominant power structure, as exercised through the state and the exchange of 
  
Figure 5. Lot 1 - Block 2497, lot 42 between 69th St. & 79th St. on 53rd Drive 
Image courtesy Cabinet Magazine - 
http://cabinetmagazine.org/issues/10/GMC_lotpages/lot1.html 
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capital.19 Matta-Clark was drawn to the condition of these properties because 
“their level of disinterested abandonment virtually removed the property from the 
realm of society.”20 Matta-Clark was specifically drawn to exposing the multiple 
systems of power responsible for this “virtual removal” – including Modernist 
ideology, Moses’ freeway plan, rezoning laws, and the rule of the grid. In his text 
from 1966, The Order of Things, Foucault discusses the relationship between 
power and geography, asserting that the a priori episteme “in a given period, 
delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, [and] defines the mode 
of being of the objects that appear in that field.”21 This notion is applicable to the 
episteme of the Moses regime responsible for the delineation of the Fake Estates 
properties. Within this episteme, these spaces were seen as unusable and simply 
byproducts of making “conscious determinations about the future of the city 
through state intervention.”22 
The properties of the Fake Estates lacked conventional value because they 
could not be readily accessed or built upon.  They deviated from the concept of 
property in the episteme of NYC during the early ‘70s.  Thus, they ceased to have 
an understandable meaning or significance.  In Non-Places: Introduction to an 
Anthropology of Supermodernity, Marc Augé makes a distinction between a place 
and a non-place:  “if a place can be defined as relational, historical, and concerned 
with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, historical, and 
concerned with identity will be a non-place.”23 Augé’s notion of non-places is 
reflective of Foucault’s concept of the heterotopia, a counter-site: “real sites that 
can be found within the culture [that] are simultaneously represented, contested, 
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and inverted.”24 By thinking with/in the non-places of Fake Estates, Matta-Clark 
transformed them into a new type of heterotopia.  These spaces that had been 
removed from an active role and function in society – having been virtually 
erased by the spatial reorganization of the Moses urban planning strategies—were 
remade.  
That the properties were marginalized non-places was of great 
significance to Matta-Clark.25  He had a longstanding interest in activities and 
entities operating on the “edge of a system.”26 For example, he had a strong 
passion for graffiti writing, which he regarded as the inscriptions of maligned 
youths attempting to inject their voice into the facade of the city.27 This 
fascination was manifested in the Photoglyphs and Graffiti Truck projects of 
1973.  Photoglyphs consisted of photomontaged graffiti from the outer boroughs 
while Graffiti Truck invited locals to tag Matta-Clark’s truck with spray paint, 
which he then cut into sections and sold as works of art. Both works were 
displayed under the title Alternatives to Washington Square Art Show after his 
joke application was rejected by the actual Washington Square Art Fair. Both 
projects demonstrate Matta-Clark’s concern for empowering the marginalized and 
for rejecting established conventions. Further suggestion of Matta-Clark’s affinity 
for the maligned is evident in his own words: “I have based my outlook and my 
work on those given things in the environment which have passed over into a 
neglected state… just as much out of a very personal identification with the 
cultural and social sense of being.”28 Not only did Matta-Clark identify himself 
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with the properties of the Fake Estates project, he also viewed these places as 
potential geographies of resistance. 
 The strategy of resistance that Matta-Clark developed by thinking with/in 
place was not strictly opposed to power, but rather sought to expose the 
distribution of power in place, including the limitations and conditions thrust upon 
a place. This strategy of resistance derived by thinking with/in place should not be 
overestimated, however, as Matta-Clark’s intention was not to emancipate or 
grant the places agency. Rather, his strategy should be thought of more as akin to 
play. By playing with place, Matta-Clark hoped to loosen the grips of the imposed 
state authority used to designate the character and value of place.  This 
playfulness encouraged the possibility of yielding a “sense of ambiguity of a 
structure, the ambiguity of a place.”29 As Matta-Clark added, this is “the quality I 
am interested in generating.”30 At the heart of the Fake Estates project was a 
desire to reveal the power relations that had shaped the identity of the properties 
and show that places have a multiplicity of identities—not simply the one 
prescribed by the state. By doing so, Matta-Clark was able to demonstrate that the 
creation of these spaces was part of an ideological agenda that saw the urban 
landscape as a “sprawling chaos that needed replacement with functions spatially 
separated from each other, and therefore needed to be questioned and disrupted.31 
 
 
THE CUTTING OF FAKE ESTATES 
While Matta-Clark had begun exploring “the cut” several years before he created 
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the Fake Estates project, those earlier efforts lack the conceptual rigor and focus 
of his later ones.  In many ways, the thinking with/in place that Matta-Clark 
undertook in Fake Estates enabled him to evolve his understanding of the 
possibilities of  “the cut.”  In 1971 while working in the basement of 112 Greene 
Street in Soho, Matta-Clark generated his first project that included a laceration 
into an architectural structure. Cherry Tree consisted of a hole cut into the floor of 
the basement that was dug out to the depth of six feet. Within the hole, a cherry 
tree was planted. After surviving only a few months, the vestiges of the tree were 
buried in the hole. The entire cavity was then sealed off with concrete and lead 
before being conceived as a new work with a new title – Time Well, also from 
1971. The next year, Matta-Clark began a more ambitious exploration of the “cut” 
in his series of projects collected under the shared title Bronx doors, Bronx 
Floors, all of which were much more radical than any of Matta-Clark’s previous 
endeavors. The Bronx doors, Bronx Floors pieces consisted of chunks of walls, 
ceilings, and floors removed from old abandoned warehouses in the Bronx 
(Fig.6). While the project predates Fake Estates by over a year, and seems to react 
“precisely to the imposed… order” of the place, just as Fake Estates also does, it 
was the fragments of the displacements – along with photo documentation – that 
were displayed in the gallery as works of art.32  The focus of the cutting actions 
were on the extraction of pieces of wall, ceiling, and floor, that then acted as 
minimalistic sculptural forms aestheticized as art objects. Therefore, while the 
Bronx doors, Bronx floors projects utilized cutting techniques, the “cut” was not 
yet employed as a strategy of resistance because there was not a significant 
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conceptual response to the site of their execution and extraction. The place of “the 
cut” was not deliberately and carefully chosen for its particular perceptual and 
political attributes. Rather, locales were chosen for more practical reasons: they 
were easily accessible and could be modified without too much hassle or 
restriction.  
The next step in Matta-Clark’s evolution of “cuts” came early in 1973, 
when he traveled to Milan, Italy. There, in an abandoned warehouse, Matta- 
 
Figure 6. Matta-Clark, Bronx Floors: Threshole, 1972 
Image courtesy The Estate of Gordon Matta-Clark and David Zwirner, New York. 
Clark constructed Infraform, consisting of “a right-angled triangle [cut] through 
the perpendicular intersection of two block walls.”33 In many ways, Infraform 
seems to have been more a logistical experiment to further test the possibilities of 
  147
building incisions – almost a form of practice for later projects. Only a few 
photographs survive as documentation of this project. In both Bronx doors, Bronx 
floors and Infraform, Matta-Clark does not seem to have achieved the same 
deliberate thoughtfulness and situatedness of “the cut,” as will be evident in his 
post-Fake Estates activities. That major transition in the nature of his “cuts” 
began by developing thinking with/in the Fake Estates project, when Matta-Clark 
actively situated his thinking within a particular place (the 15 lots). By cultivating 
his thinking with/in place, he was able to engender a conceptualization of “the 
cut” that was metaphorical, conceptual, and political rather than just literal.  
The notion of “the cut” as a philosophical concept and strategy of 
resistance realized through Fake Estates allowed Matta-Clark to move beyond 
employing more literal cuts simply as physical acts.  The broader understanding 
of their significance also enabled him to refute the accusations that the strategy 
was rooted in violence and hostility. By identifying and purchasing the lots of 
Fake Estates, Matta-Clark created his first metaphorical cut – carving them from 
the urban fabric and wresting them from their designation as gutterspaces. Matta-
Clark was able to bring awareness to the sites that were previously unseen—
calling into question the identity and limitations foisted upon them. In a sense, 
these sites, which were banal and invisible, were brought into a dialogical play of 
spatial relations, imposition of power, agency of place, and identity. 
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THE CUT: DISRUPTING POWER  
Matta-Clark’s development of the “cut” as a philosophical concept and spatial 
strategy of resistance and Michel Foucault’s writings of that era share a concern 
for the distribution of power through spatial organization. In an interview from 
1976, Foucault explains how the division of spaces, through both physical 
demarcation and taxonomical language, can be spatial strategies for the dispersal 
of power. “There is an administration of knowledge,” asserts Foucault, “a politics 
of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one 
tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by 
such notions as field, region and territory.”34 Foucault here indicates that these 
spatial concepts and the language used to articulate them are devices through 
which the relations of power are transmitted. Foucault recognizes language as a 
mechanism of power. Once an entity, such as a specific place, has a certain 
taxonomical description, it is shaped and restricted by that linguistic term. 
Classifying a site as a “gutterspace” or non-place simultaneously prescribes the 
limits of knowledge about, and the potential of being for, such a place.  
Foucault also addresses the possible subversion of the spatial dispersion of 
power within a lecture entitled, Des Espace Autres (Of Other Spaces), in which he 
discussed his notion of heterotopias as being “outside of all places, even though it 
may be possible to indicate their location in reality.”35 Foucault expands upon the 
idea of some places being “outside” of other places by introducing the concept of 
heterotopias of deviation.  These heterotopias are established when the exchanges 
or power relations within a place deviate from those taking place in other cultural 
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spaces. In many ways, the properties of Fake Estates fit this description of a 
heterotopia because they were perceptually and even physically outside of the 
entrenched norms of properties in NYC.   
Heterotopias (such as the Fake Estates properties) fascinated Foucault 
because they do not operate by the same rules as other cultural spaces. As 
Foucault explains, heterotopias of deviation—prisons and hospitals for example—
are places where people are sent when their behavior strays from normalized and 
established rules. This concept can be adapted to thinking about places 
themselves. As in Fake Estates, the places exist “outside” of the regular practices 
and codes of the contextual urban spatial organization.  
The sites that were to become the Fake Estates properties lacked capitalist 
value – they had relatively low exchange value or use value. Henri Lefebvre has 
written about the values forced upon spaces by the hegemonic social and 
economic class as a means to serve its own needs and maintain its dominant 
position. While Lefebvre does not share Foucault’s emphasis on the role of 
language in the production of a place, he does agree that “nowhere is the 
confrontation between knowledge and power, between understanding and 
violence, more direct than it is in connection with intact space and space broken 
up.”36 When space is broken up, a dialectic emerges between the knowledge of or 
within a space and the power exercised through demarcation. For Lefebvre, the 
economic and social relations acting upon and within a place determines the 
nature of the confrontation between knowledge and power. Robert Moses and his 
urban planners were acutely aware of this relationship and of how it could be 
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manipulated to control behavior. Moses’s view was that the state needed to 
intervene in economic and social relations occurring in place and that the city 
needed to be “reshaped, thinned out, [and] controlled” in order to do so.37 
 This understanding of the prescriptive control of space and its function in 
the Moses regime brings us back to the development of the “cut” established 
with/in the Fake Estates project. It also allows us to see how Matta-Clark 
activated the Fake Estates as a different kind of heterotopias of deviation—one 
that was much more political—as a means to subvert the state control of space. In 
doing so, the “cut” became less as an act of violence and more a form of play. As 
a form of play, the strategy of resistance developed by Matta-Clark with/in Fake 
Estates is akin to what Judith Butler calls a “reiteration of power.”38 This 
reiteration enables physical acts to become political actions, and through 
repetition exposes the conditions of power responsible for the formation of a 
subject/place. This reiterative process can become a strategy of resistance because 
“the reiteration of power not only temporalizes the conditions of subordination 
but shows these conditions to be, not static structures, but temporalized – active 
and productive.”39 As a reiteration of power, which is also a means to play with 
power, Matta-Clark’s “cuts” were able to reveal the contingent and fluctuating 
conditions of power being imposed upon a place—by taking the means of control 
and using it as a means to subvert that control. In Fake Estates, Matta-Clark calls 
attention to, and plays with, the contingencies of the lot formations and their 
designation as non-places/gutterspaces by the Moses planning projects. By 
revealing these conditions, Matta-Clark was hopeful that the places could 
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temporarily exceed the limitations of power to which they remained tethered—
that the places could push back against their forced designations. 
By thinking with/in place Matta-Clark was able to arrive at a new 
realization of the non-physical implications of “the cut.” Through the situated 
nature of the Fake Estates project, Matta-Clark was able to respond to the 
particular conditions of the place and conceive of the “cut” as a method to 
question the decisions “regarding how we order and organize entities, subjects, 
bodies [and places].”40 Through the crucial situatedness of thought, the Fake 
Estates project enabled Matta-Clark to employ “the cut” in an entirely original 
manner that did not require a physical incision, but created the potential to disrupt 
the existing perceptions and supposed fixed identity of the properties. 
 
CUTTING AND FOLDING – WHAT DOES PLACE WANT?  
After Matta-Clark purchased the various lots that became the Fake Estates 
project, he intended to display them as artworks, albeit indirectly, via written and 
photographic documentation. Even though he was not able to assemble this 
documentation himself before his death, Matta-Clark did leave some vague 
instruction as to how they should be displayed as a complete work of art 
including: “a) documentation of the land with dimensions and whatnot, b) an 
overall photograph of the actual site, c) the collaged photo-strips, and d) the 
property itself.”(Fig.7).41 Following these directions, Matta-Clark’s widow, Jane 
Crawford, posthumously assembled these collages for a Matta-Clark retrospective 
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exhibition held in Spain in 1992.  Though these collages are the only remaining 
material expression of the project, the lasting impression on the properties has 
been far greater than their inclusion in a collage.  
 
Figure 7.  Matta-Clark, Reality Properties: Fake Estates, “Jamaica Curb,” Block 10142, Lot 15, 978 
Collaged gelatin silver prints, deed, and three maps.  
Image Courtesy The Estate of Gordon Matta-Clark and David Zwirner, New York. 
Like Thoreau and Heidegger, Matta-Clark left unretractable marks that 
have served to transform the ontology of his think place. And again like the 
situations of Thoreau and Heidegger, the place pushed back, inscribing itself onto 
the thought and being of Matta-Clark. As Donald Goddard writes in his review for 
Cabinet magazine’s re-examination of Fake Estates in 2006: “There are so many 
ways in which these parcels of space barely register, or are deliberately played 
down, yet they are among the most evocative things Matta-Clark did as an artist 
and person, partly because there is no separation between the two [Matta-Clark 
and the Fake Estates properties]; one cannot be forgotten for the other.”42  
As was also the case in the other instances of place-produced thought, the 
place chosen for the development of thought does not passively receive the 
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imposition of the thinker’s activity. The place has its own agency that resists, 
filters, or supports the thinking produced with/in its locale. Consequently, the 
place necessarily has to negotiate the new thinking into its ontological status 
through what Gilles Deleuze refers to as “folding;” through “folding” an entity 
incorporates new forces or influences to “produce new modalities of being.”43 
This notion is consistent with the contingent constitution of place as a network of 
relations ceaselessly morphing over time. It also resonates with our conception of 
place explored in the introduction—a bio-socio-historical zone of active 
exchange. 
In considering how place pushes back against the thinker, a pertinent 
question to ask might be: What does place want? Perhaps the properties of Fake 
Estates did not want to be part of an artistic project. Perhaps they did not want to 
be involved as a site and tool of resistance to the spatial distribution of power in 
the urban landscape. Matta-Clark ruminates about whether this is the case, in an 
entry in his notebook from 1970:   
RATHER THAN FINDING MORE WAYS OF USING AND 
EXPLOITING WHAT IS LEFT AND FORGOTTEN AND 
REMAINS EMPTY, IT WOULD BE FAR MORE USEFUL TO 
ALLOW THE DEAD ENDS THE THEIR PEACE AND 
QUIET… THE FAILING OF THE ARCHITECTURAL STATE 
SET MENTALITY IS ITS HOMOGENOUS ACCESSIBILITY 
FOR TO ALL AND AN OPPRESSIVE MANIA FOR 
INFLUENCING THE ENTIRE FABRIC DOWN TO THE IN 
ALL OF ITS DETAILS OVER ALL ITS SURFACES… 
THEREFORE ROOFTOPS, WATER FRONTS EMPTY LOTS, 
WHATEVER KNOWN USABLE SURFACES THAT ARE 
DOING ALL RIGHT ON THEIR OWN ARE TARGET FOR 
‘IMPROVEMENT.’44  
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Here, Matta-Clark seems to recognize the sovereignty of place, the sense that it 
might be better to allow place to remain free from the inscriptions of the 
“architectural state set mentality.” In these types of statements, Matta-Clark 
implicitly acknowledges the subjectivity and agency of place.  
While it is difficult to know precisely what the sites in Fake Estates 
wanted, the properties did, in fact, revert to their condition prior to Matta-Clark’s 
inclusion of them in the project, giving them—for a time—“their peace and 
quiet.”  Upon his death in 1978, his estate—including the fifteen properties—was 
turned over to his wife Jane Crawford.  Not knowing that taxes needed to be paid 
on them, she disregarded the tax bills and by 1980 the properties were reclaimed 
by the city. Each of the sites became, once again, a gutterspace.  
This is how they remained until 2003 when the editors of Cabinet 
magazine became curious as to what happened to the Fake Estates properties. 
They discovered that four of the properties had since been sold, but the others 
were still owned by the city. They attempted to acquire the properties as part of a 
venture (including an initial essay, an exhibition, and publication) that revisited 
the Fake Estates project. But the city, suspicious of the magazine’s motives, 
refused to sell the properties.  Eventually they agreed to temporarily license the 
properties to the magazine. Cabinet then commissioned sixteen contemporary 
artists to develop imaginary and actual projects that could be realized within one 
of the remaining properties. These were eventually displayed in 2005 as an 
exhibition and subsequent publication entitled Odd Lots: Revisiting Gordon 
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Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates at the White Columns Gallery (formerly the 112 
Greene Street art space) in New York City. 
The revitalized interest in the place of Matta-Clark’s thought speaks to the 
ontological shift that occurred through the production of situated thought. 
Apparently, the sites did not entirely return to their status as gutterspaces.  
Instead, some thirty years after the activation as a place for thinking, the interest 
in the history, identity, and being of the places was reignited. Even though the 
places may have resisted the influence of the thoughts situated within them, the 
network of their relations had irrevocably come to include and incorporate (fold) 
in the thought of Matta-Clark.  
Still another closely related project, this one by architect Martin Hogue 
called [Fake] Fake Estates: Reconsidering Gordon Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates, 
was created in 2006. Hogue’s intent was to ask “some interesting questions: can 
the site constitute an end product within architecture? Is a constructed site 
somehow less than a building?”45 As Hogue states “the Fake Estates become both 
a site to be critically reinvested as well as the starting point for other, more 
speculative endeavors… This project seeks to visually articulate the agency of 
maps through a consideration of those moments when conventions for 
establishing the location and the precise boundaries of a site produce a conceptual 
‘excess of surveying.’ Maps constitute not simply a way to locate parcels—in a 
way, one might argue that the Fake Estates and the [Fake] Fake Estates are by-
products of mapping and surveying activities.”46 This is perhaps further evidence 
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of the ontological transformation of the properties, as they now are utilized by the 
likes of Hogue as the source of “speculative endeavors.” 
I want to make a brief note here about the critical role of mapping and 
surveying in Matta-Clark’s project as a means of making an breaking boundaries 
as an important link to Thoreau’s place-produced thought. Both thinkers shared a 
keen interest in thinking with/in place in order to reconfigure and reterritorialize 
the borders of place in defiance of the existing physical, ideological, and political 
delineations. 
Since the Cabinet magazine project and Hogue’s [Fake] Fake Estates, the 
properties themselves have for the most part faded from artistic and critical 
consciousness.47  When asked in 2012, Jeffrey Kastner, senior editor for Cabinet 
said “I’m afraid I don’t actually know if the city owns them or not.”48 Perhaps this 
is evidence of the place pushing back? While these places will always retain the 
unretractable marks of Matta-Clark’s thought and encounter, they are not 
absolutely defined by this exchange, just as their label as “gutterspaces” did not 
wholly determine them. These properties have pushed back by remaining in flux 
and moving along the paths of their own divergent histories. Some of the 
properties have been purchased by adjacent property owners and are now 
amalgamated with neighboring properties, others have remained untouched, while 
others have faded into the banalization of the urban landscape… and maybe they 
want it that way. Perhaps they have found the “peace and quiet” that Matta-Clark 
thought they should be allowed. 
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Given the cultural climate of New York City in the early ‘70s, it is not 
surprising that an analysis of Matta-Clark’s conceptual development would 
demonstrate that he was compelled to resist the power relations that were present 
in that environment. Many of his contemporaries in art, music, and literature also 
found themselves concerned with the often frustrating and confusing cultural 
impositions of the era. However, Matta-Clark’s reaction and strategy against these 
conditions was wholly unique. Through the situatedness of his thinking he was 
able to produce localized knowledge that enabled the conceptual shift of “the cut” 
from the literal to the metaphorical. 
My main contention here has been that this development was place-
produced, largely through his work on the Fake Estates project, and reflected the 
interests of those sites, producing an understanding of “the cut” that was more 
thoughtful and deliberate than Matta-Clark had been able to achieve in earlier 
articulations. Most importantly, the Fake Estates project rescued Matta-Clark 
theories and practice from a reading that suggests an insensitive macho artist, 
recklessly and violently slashing into the spaces of our existence. Instead, we can 
understand how Matta-Clark utilized the “cut” in an attentive and prudent manner, 
“aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and 
insidious.”49 The logic of the “cut” became a response to the city being cut up 
through state intervention. Matta-Clark’s response to the Robert Moses spatial 
ideology was to make place “anew” and to recognize that “the city was not a 
machine for living, as architect Le Corbusier had pronounced. Urban life [and 
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places] could not be reduced to engineering models for traffic, housing, 
entertainment” or gutterspace.50  
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DESERT OF THE REAL: JEAN BAUDRILLARD  
 
 
 
The picture [of the desert] implies many and sometimes contradictory features 
beyond our first mental glimpse of it. 
                                                          – Peter Wild, The Opal Desert       
 
As an environment of extremes, the desert has often been viewed as a place that 
can confuse, disorientate, or alter one’s perception of reality (maybe even open 
the doors of perception—if you are more of a mystic). The impression of the 
desert as a place of altered states stems, perhaps, from the seeming endlessness of 
sky and land, or possibly from the almost frightening lack of verticality. In the 
desert, the horizon—an important reference point for spatial orientation—can 
seem as miniscule or imperceptible as a single pencil line traced across a blank 
white page. The discombobulation and confusion of the senses felt in the desert is 
often partly attributable to physiological effects. As the temperature does a mighty 
pendulum swing from the crippling heat of the day to the snapping midnight chill, 
the body can be exposed to hyper- and hypothermia within the very same day. In 
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fact, the desert is renowned for its effects on the body. Many tales of traversing 
the desert include descriptions of seeing mirages—ethereal images that arise out 
of the sand right before a traveler’s eyes as apparition, trick of light, or actual 
hallucination. 
 When the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard visited the deserts of the 
American southwest in the early 1980s, he also had an experience that altered his 
perceptions. Although Baudrillard does not note any specific physiological 
trauma, such as hallucinations, he does describe a profound cognitive 
metamorphosis that transpired in the desert. I argue that Baudrillard’s experience 
in the desert should be considered as a notable instance of place-produced 
thought, one in which the place pushed back against the pretensions of the 
thinker. By thinking with/in the place of the desert, Baudrillard was able engender 
a new strategy of thought and investigation, one based upon what I am calling 
here “rapid excursive successions.” Through the development of place-produced 
thought, Baudrillard was prompted to reconsider his theoretical commitment to 
the idea that cultural signs are the primary means by which things have meaning. 
The experience of the desert marked a turning point for Baudrillard—it became 
his think place as it reshaped not only his style of writing, and strategy of 
investigation, but also—and most consequentially—the development of his 
thought.  
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COMING TO AMERICA  
The first of Baudrillard’s longer sojourns in the United States took place in 1975, 
when he taught for a few months in both San Diego and Los Angeles. In the early 
1980s, Baudrillard again spent time traveling through America, especially through 
the desert regions of the southwest. “As soon as I had a free moment, I went off 
into the desert,” writes Baudrillard, “For me that was the real scene.”1 These 
wanderings were not meant as escapist vacations allowing Baudrillard to unwind. 
Instead, they were motivated by the intention to gather evidence supporting his 
pre-existing theoretical concepts about America. As the sociologist Arthur J. 
Vidich claims, Baudrillard came to “America not to discover it, but to confirm his 
already fixed images of it.”2 Most of Baudrillard’s “fixed images” were 
influenced by his theory of simulacra, the notion that in contemporary culture, 
signs were responsible for creating what Baudrillard called a “hyperreality.”   
In his 1981 publication, Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard argued that 
in the postmodern world, mass media technologies provide the individual with a 
hyperreality that is more exciting and engaging than everyday life, and is 
therefore preferable to everyday realities. Baudrillard stressed that hyperreality 
informs and orders the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors in the everyday life of 
the individual. In large part, Baudrillard’s desire to travel America was because he 
believed it was the epitome of the hyperreal, a place where simulated experiences 
and images had supplanted reality and where any sort of clear differentiation 
between the real and hyperreal had dissolved. In Simulacra and Simulation 
Baudrillard uses cinema as an example of the hyperreal: “the relation that is being 
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formed today between the cinema and the real is an inverse, negative relation: it 
results from the loss of specificity of one and of the other.”3 According to 
Baudrillard, cinema had become hyperreal because it was no longer presented as 
imaginary or unreal. For Baudrillard, American culture, specifically, had similarly 
abandoned a distinction between everyday realities and the cinematic. By coming 
to America, Baudrillard wanted to see this for himself, to immerse himself in the 
simulacra. “America is neither dream nor reality,” claims Baudrillard, “It is a 
hyperreality.”4  Baudrillard had a definite agenda for his travels, namely the desire 
to bask in what he believed to be the full realization of the hyperreal. Yet, within 
his collection of observations about America and the desert, published in 1986 as 
America, Baudrillard reveals still other motivations for his American journey.   
 The first of these motives was to get away from Europe—not simply 
geographically but also psychically, emotionally, and philosophically. For 
Baudrillard, the culture of Europe weighed heavily on the thoughts and behaviors 
of its inhabitants. “The essential thing was to escape from Europe 
metaphysically,” Baudrillard stated in a later interview with Philippe Petit, to be 
“far from a nostalgic culture and history.”5 Baudrillard believed that America had 
a novelty unencumbered by tradition, custom, and historical cultural rules. In 
America, any concept could be manifested in (hyper) reality without having to 
acknowledge, or adhere to, moral, aesthetic, or critical traditions. Another reason 
Baudrillard wanted to travel to America was because of his fascination with the 
desert. For Baudrillard, the desert was heterotopic—in the Foucauldian sense that 
it was a place that deviated from the established norms of place—a place of 
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otherworldly fantasy so unusual that a metaphysical awakening seemed likely to 
occur there. Of course, much of Baudrillard’s perception of the desert as a place 
of awakening or transformation actually relied on representations of it in popular 
literature and cinema.  
 In fact, throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard makes several 
references to the cultural influences shaping his perception of the desert, including 
Reyner Banham’s book, Scenes from America Deserta, published in 1982. Within 
Scenes, Banham details the visual splendor and intellectual insights that he 
observed in his own travels through the American deserts. “Reyner Banham is 
right [about the desert],” states Baudrillard, “you have to accept everything all at 
once, an unchanging timelessness and the wildest instantaneity.”6 Thus, while 
Baudrillard regards the west as “wild”—a place with a visible untamed 
primitivism, he gets that idea (at least initially) not from direct experience of the 
desert but through a written source.  
 Another key influence on Baudrillard’s perception of the American desert 
was popular cinema, especially the iconic Westerns of John Ford. Films such as 
Stagecoach (1939), My Darling Clementine (1946), and Rio Grande (1950) were 
shot in the Monument Valley region along the Utah-Arizona border (Fig.1). The 
Western themed films of Ford (seven in total) revitalized the genre of the 
American Western film and supplied both Americans and Europeans with 
defining images and ideas about the landscape of the American southwest. 
Baudrillard mentions Ford in his writing and shares the director’s slightly neo-
romantic view of the desert. In Ford’s films, the desert is often depicted as a 
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rugged and unforgiving stage for playing out human conflict. “Monument Valley 
is the geology of the earth, the mausoleum of the Indians,” writes Baudrillard, 
“and the camera of John Ford.”7 
 
Figure 1. John Ford and John Wayne on location in Monument Valley shooting Stagecoach in 1939.  
Image courtesy www.moviediva.com  
 Baudrillard not only indicates some of the well-defined ideas he held 
about America and the desert even before crossing the Atlantic, he also reveals 
some specific tasks he hoped to achieve during this American sojourn. “I went in 
search of astral America,” he declares, “the America of desert speed, of motels 
and mineral surfaces.”8 Baudrillard’s aspiration was that this search would yield a 
“marvelously affectless succession of signs, images, ritual acts on the road,” that 
is, that it would enable an experience of hyperreality.9 These were his 
expectations—to escape Europe and to reaffirm his theories of simulacra and 
hyperreality by relishing the artificial signs and simulations of America. At the 
same time (and perhaps ironically), Baudrillard was also curious about having an 
experience that would put him in contact with the real. Underlying Baudrillard’s 
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travels in America was the question of whether there was any place left in which 
the real and hyperreal could be differentiated from one another—this was a 
crucial part of Baudrillard’s theory about the hyperreal—not that it was the 
antithesis of the real, but that it subsumed the real. It seems that Baudrillard 
believed the most likely possibility for temporarily disrupting the hyperreal was to 
have a material experience in the desert – to find the desert of the real. Even 
though Baudrillard bought into many of the tropes and mythologies about the 
American west—such as Fordian and other Western films, Kerouacian travel 
adventures, hippie counter culture, hot rod custom car culture, mysticism, the 
frontier myth—he experienced much more than those myths would suggest.  
 Baudrillard’s notion of having a material/embodied experience in the 
desert that was connected to the real was by no means a novel one. The ritual of 
using the desert as a catalyst for personal metamorphosis through direct 
engagement has a long history, dating back several thousands of years in the 
Judeo-Christian mystical tradition. Many Native American cultures have also 
included the desert as a vital component for the vision quest, a transformative 
ritual in which one gains acumen about themselves and the world through 
engagement with the energies of the landscape. In assorted media, the desert is 
presented in similar ways—as a magical place where personal growth and 
transcendental change can happen.   
A good illustration of this perception is in one of Ford’s westerns, The 
Man Who Shot Liberty Valence, from 1962. The narrative of the film unfolds with 
James Stewart’s character (Ransom Stoddard) arriving in the small desert town of 
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Shinbone, fresh from some law school out east, full of optimism, naiveté, and a 
somewhat idealized notion of human relations. Stewart’s character goes through a 
series of physical and emotional tribulations that test the limits of his beliefs and 
values, transforming him into a wiser, seasoned, and more accomplished person. 
At the end of the film, having survived the challenges of the desert town, 
Stewart’s character emerges anew, completing his transformation from a wide-
eyed novice attorney to worldly-wise U.S. Senator. The film reiterates and 
codifies the trope of the desert as a place of transformation that, by the 1960s, was 
well ensconced in popular culture. “I think you can say that the real star of my 
Westerns has always been the land,” claimed Ford.10  
The Fordian depiction of the desert may have helped to fortify 
Baudrillard’s expectation that a radical new type of experience could (perhaps 
even would) occur there. This expectation, along with notions of shamanistic and 
psychedelic transformation, was a large part of the attraction of the desert for 
Baudrillard. By traveling to Disneyland, Las Vegas, and Times Square, he was 
able to ratify his theories of simulation and the hyperreal. Since these places 
conformed to his theory of the hyperreal, Baudrillard sought to discover a place 
that might resist his theories. He wanted to know if there were any places left in 
America that were not completely absorbed by the hyperreal. Baudrillard 
wondered if there was anywhere in which one might experience the real. 
 While it is absolutely the case that Baudrillard’s motivation to experience 
the desert was based upon pre-existing, media-driven perceptions, I argue that in 
many ways, his desire to witness the real was nonetheless realized during his 
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wanderings in the desert. Baudrillard did have a type of mystical episode there, 
although it did not consist of discovering the essence of life or making a new age 
spiritual connection with a Gaian force; it was more of an interruption of cultural 
signs. What happened in the desert was that the place pushed back—it resisted the 
meanings given through the cultural signs of hyperreality. As the raw self-
evidence of the real was laid bare, Baudrillard noticed how what one can call the 
“immanent signs of the real” created a disruption in the existing cultural signs and 
altered their meaning. For Baudrillard, this meant that the landscape of the desert 
contained bits of the real that could sometimes distinguish themselves from, and 
modify, the signs of the hyperreal.  
An important ancillary effect of this resignification was that the place also 
fended off (some of) Baudrillard’s preconceptions about America, a consequence 
that is discernible in the transformation of his attitude and beliefs about America. 
Before arriving in America, Baudrillard’s judgment of American sociality was 
quite dismal. He believed America to be an exemplar of the simulation order, in 
which “real” interaction and meaning had been replaced in favor of the 
“hyperreal.” In Simulations and Simulacra, Baudrillard writes that in America, 
“people no longer look at each other, but there are institutes for that. They no 
longer touch each other, but there is contactotherapy. They no longer walk, but 
they go jogging, etc. Everywhere one recycles lost faculties, or lost bodies, or lost 
sociality, or the lost taste for food.”11 In another paragraph from the same text, 
Baudrillard again pejoratively describes America: “a mental implosion and 
involution without precedent lies in wait for a system of this kind, whose visible 
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signs would be those of this strange obesity, or the incredible coexistence of the 
most bizarre theories and practices, which correspond to the improbable coalition 
of luxury, heaven and money.”12 Baudrillard’s indictment against the media-
fueled consumerism of America seems evident as he predicts an implosion of the 
escalating American fixation on excess and artifice.  
In many ways, Baudrillard’s early view of America is aligned with the 
stereotypes of global mass media—that Americans are obese, overindulgent, and 
vapid. The apparent inclusion of these sorts of stereotypes in Baudrillard’s writing 
has caused many critics, including Vidich and Denis Dutton, to view America as 
irresponsibly reductive and overly disparaging. However, upon a close reading of 
America, one may discern a shift in Baudrillard’s perception of America. 
Baudrillard relates how the experience of place pushed back against his 
stereotypes, giving him a greater appreciation for American culture. Toward the 
end of the text, Baudrillard extols the emancipatory dimension of American 
thought: “We criticize Americans for not being able either to analyze or 
conceptualize. But this is a wrong-headed critique. It is we who imagine that 
everything culminates in transcendence… their perspective is the very opposite: it 
is not conceptualizing reality, but realizing concepts and materializing ideas.”13 
For Baudrillard, the emancipatory quality lies in the break that America has made 
with old world European theory and history. As Baudrillard claims, Europe may 
have “invented a certain kind of feudalism, aristocracy, bourgeoisie, ideology and 
revolution” that are meaningful for Europeans, but they simply have no resonance 
in America, and therefore have been cast aside.14 
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Following his experience of thinking with/in the American desert, 
Baudrillard grew into a proponent of America, acknowledging both his new 
vision of American culture and also the radical shift in his philosophical strategy 
and conceptual development that took place there. As the experience of the desert 
translated into the writing that became the Cool Memories series, Baudrillard even 
seemed to become a staunch defender of America. Near the end of the first Cool 
Memories text he proclaims, “I shall never forgive anyone who passes a 
condescending or contemptuous judgement on America.”15 Of course statements 
like this one should be considered in the light of Baudrillard’s roguish personality, 
as he himself at times seems to write of America with disdain. However, after 
traveling through its landscapes, Baudrillard’s view of America does seem to have 
morphed from one that sees a world “rotten with wealth, power,” into one that 
celebrates speed, freedom, and jubilant possibility.16  “Lets us grant the country 
the admiration it deserves,” states Baudrillard.17 Beyond a new affection for 
American culture, the experience of the desert more importantly provided a 
radical alteration to Baudrillard’s intellectual strategy and theoretical 
development.  
 
PHENOMENAL REDUCTION  
Through situated thinking with/in the desert, Baudrillard was compelled to take 
account of the immediacy of the landscape—the craggy physicality and stark 
visuality of the desert. Of all the places that Baudrillard traveled as he crossed 
America, the deserts of the southwest seemed to have most fully captured his 
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attention. A large majority of the pages in America include a discussion of the 
desert, with the entire final section of the text collected under the heading “Desert 
for Ever.” Baudrillard’s sustained interest in the desert seemingly emerged from 
several interconnected and situated cognitive developments. I argue that each of 
these developments came to Baudrillard while thinking with/in the desert and are 
linked to the transference of physical experience to philosophical thought—
physics becoming metaphysics. Like Thoreau’s experience in the Walden 
experiment, Baudrillard seems to have been engaged by, and infatuated with, the 
physicality of the landscape. 
By confronting the physical landscape of the desert, Baudrillard was led to 
exclaim that “This is the only place where it is possible to relive, alongside the 
physical spectrum of colors, the spectrum of the inhuman metamorphoses that 
preceded us, our successive historical forms: the mineral, the organic, salt desert, 
sand dunes, rock, ore, light, heat, everything the earth has been, all the inhuman 
forms it has been through, gathered together in a single anthologizing vision.”18 
The philosopher of hyperreality was presented with a place where the real 
managed—even if ever so slightly—to make itself distinguishable from the 
hyperreal, a place where cultural signs did not determine meaning without some 
resistance. In a sense, the place shook Baudrillard, dislodging the assuredness and 
totality of the logic of Simulacra and Simulation. It brought Baudrillard to the 
immediacy of experiencing and thinking of the real through the phenomenal 
encounter of the landscape. This was momentous in the development of 
Baudrillard’s thought, as the poststructuralist philosopher found himself struck by 
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the phenomenological force of the desert. For Baudrillard, the real of the desert 
seemed to subvert some of the cultural signs and images that continuously 
modified and mitigated its meaning. “The very idea,” writes Baudrillard, “of the 
millions and hundreds of millions of years that were needed peacefully to ravage 
the surface of the earth here is a perverse one, since it brings awareness of signs 
originating, long before man appeared (My italics).”19 In the desert, Baudrillard 
witnessed scenes with extraordinary visceral tangibility. The bodily experience 
opened his awareness to the possibility that things and places can have meanings 
beyond those supplied by cultural signs.   
By thinking with/in place, Baudrillard was challenged to examine the 
tactile and material surface of things. What emerged from this challenge was that 
Baudrillard recognized and acknowledged distinctive types of signs: on the one 
hand, those derived from the semiotics of culture, and on the other, those that 
were immanent surface signs of the real landscape. What Baudrillard discovered 
was that the sensory wonders of the surface signs often served to disrupt the 
meanings transmitted by cultural signs. For Baudrillard, the desert seemed to have 
a unique ability; “a geology, a sidereality, an inhuman facticity, an aridity that 
drives out the artificial scruples of culture.”20 Baudrillard also recognized the 
influence this disruptive capacity could have on the perception and constitution of 
a place. I argue that the turn in Baudrillard’s experience can be referred as 
“phenomenological.” However, it should not be misconstrued as an abandonment 
of poststructuralist semiotics in favor of phenomenology. Baudrillard himself 
makes this clear in response to a question by Philippe Petit, in which he is invited 
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to clarify his position on the experience of the desert. He responded by saying that 
he was “on the side of – not a phenomenological, but almost a phenomenal 
reduction of things. You never, in fact, escape transcendence, any more than you 
can escape discourse, but at a given point the lighting changes, and even ideas 
pass by the landscape like unidentified objects.”21 In this statement we again find 
an example of Baudrillard’s playful impishness. He refuses to concede to a 
phenomenological experience in the desert, even though he says as much only a 
few lines later in the same text: “Everything [in the desert] is restored to its raw 
self-evidence.”22 Instead of offering a direct assertion, Baudrillard engages in 
semantic word play, calling his desert experience a “phenomenal reduction.” 
Despite recognizing the magnitude and power of immanent signs in the 
desert, Baudrillard also retains the belief that cultural signs are still at least 
partially responsible for framing his experience.23 The persistence of cultural 
signs is evident in the literary and cinematic allusions that recur in Baudrillard’s 
references to the desert. Throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard often 
mentions the cinematic quality of the desert, as when he observed, “the desert you 
pass through is like the set of a Western.”24 For Baudrillard, the identity of the 
desert remained entangled with its representations in films, even to the extent that 
the images from the screen often take “precedence over reality.”25 “It is useless,” 
contends Baudrillard, “to seek to strip the desert of its cinematic aspects in order 
to restore its original essence; those features are thoroughly superimposed upon it 
and will not go away (Fig.3).”26 However, as Baudrillard also discovered, the real 
of the desert had the ability, every so often, to stand out from the signs of the  
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Figure 3. Chris Richardson, Frontispiece. This image appears at the beginning of  
the section entitled “Vanishing Point” in the new edition of America published in 2010.  
Image courtesy of http://www.chris-richardson.net 
 
This image shows the integration of the cinematic in the desert by depicting a cowboy watching a 
movie on a large screen in the landscape of the desert. The mural itself also functions as a 
cinematic screen, painted in a trompe l'oeil manner on the side of a building facing a parking lot. 
There is a blurring of distinction between the “real” cars parked in front of the wall and the 
“virtual” landscape unfolding in front of them. 
hyperreal in film and mass media. For Baudrillard, the subversive encounter with 
the real was a “way of sweeping away all the cultural superstructures.”27 Yet 
Baudrillard also saw how the appearance and subversion of the real was fleeting, 
as it was quickly subsumed by the hyperreal. The “raw self-evidence” of the real 
could briefly meddle with the hyperreal, and then just as quickly be gone in the 
flood of unrelenting cinematic effects. That brief moment was enough, however, 
to enable the real of immanent signs to create a possible fissure in, or parallax to, 
the stream of signs in the hyperreal. 
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NEW SEMIOTIC ORDER  
Perhaps as important as the geography of the desert was the experience of 
physically moving through the desert. Motion was crucial for Baudrillard because 
it helped to illustrate that the relationship between place, immanent signs of the 
real, and the cultural signs of the hyperreal is not static; rather, it is—at least 
sometimes—in flux and negotiation. Prior to his desert excursions, Baudrillard’s 
theories had drawn heavily on semiotics as articulated by Saussure via Barthes. 
Baudrillard’s analysis of the sign, however, broke way from Barthes’ because he 
posited that both the structure of the sign and its operation had progressed through 
history beyond what Barthes had described. While Barthes had explored how the 
relationship of the signifier to the signified was transformed within a particular 
context to create a mythology, Baudrillard believed that at the end of the 20th 
century, in a world governed by mass media, that signs had evolved to the point 
where, as part of the hyperreal, they were cut off from their referents. Baudrillard 
deemed these signs “floating signifiers” because they did not have a “referent or 
ground in any ‘reality’ except their own.”28  
For Baudrillard, the experience of the desert triggered a reconsideration of 
his theories about “floating signifiers” and the hyperreal. The revelation of the 
real, through situated thought, presented Baudrillard with signifiers that were not 
completely free floating. Instead, the immanent signs of the real in the desert were 
connected to the physical phenomena of the desert landscape.  This challenged 
Baudrillard’s existing theory in which there was no longer any differentiation 
between the real and the hyperreal. It was not that all cultural signs had been 
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erased in the desert, but rather, for Baudrillard, their meaning could sometimes be 
subverted by the physical rawness of the primal landscape. Baudrillard refers to 
this as “desertification,” in the sense that the meaning of a sign in the hyperreal 
could be altered or drained to a “zero sum of meaning.” As he describes, the 
awesome corporeality of the desert topography has a way of interrupting cultural 
signs: 
The natural deserts… create a vision expurgated of all the rest: 
cities, relationships, events, media. They induce in me an exalting 
vision of the desertification of signs and men. They form the 
mental frontier where the projects of civilization run into the 
ground. They are outside the sphere and circumference of desire. 
We should always appeal to the deserts against the excess of 
signification, of intention and pretention in culture.29 
 
In the desert, Baudrillard experienced a “phenomenal reduction,” in which some 
cultural signs, and “even your sense of belonging to the human race are all 
numbed by the fact of having before you the pure, unadulterated sign of 180 
million years.”30  
I suggest that Baudrillard’s experience of phenomenal reduction in the 
desert led him to recognize a new semiotic order. This new semiotic order 
allowed him to accommodate what seemed to be anomalies to his existing 
theories:  the immanent signs of the real in the desert.  Baudrillard’s own 
language makes clear what those are, when he refers to having before you the 
“pure, unadulterated sign of 180 million years”31 or “signs originating, long 
before man appeared.”32 Through phrases such as these, the reader is again 
confronted with the notoriously slippery and puckish side of Baudrillard. On the 
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one hand, Baudrillard acknowledges that the signs of the hyperreal do not wholly 
define some aspects of the desert, but on the other hand he still uses the language 
of semiology to describe them. While it seems like these “signs originating, long 
before man appeared” have subverted the Baudrillard’s theory of sign structure, 
he does not relinquish the logic of the sign, and instead incorporates a reading of 
the physical rawness of the primal landscape into his theoretical system by 
creating a new semiotic order.  
Throughout the pages of America, Baudrillard uses the word “sign” in 
several different ways, marking a change from one based on the hyperreal to one 
that is employed loosely (and playfully) enough to encompass a variety of signs, 
including immanent signs of the real. For example when Baudrillard writes “I 
looked for it [America] in the speed of the screenplay… in the marvelously 
affectless succession of signs”33 or “the desert you pass through is like the set of a 
western, the city a screen of signs and formulas,”34 he is using the term “sign” to 
indicate a cultural sign. For Baudrillard, a cultural sign of hyperreality is akin to 
his description given in Simulacra and Simulation—“It has no relation to reality 
whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.”35 In contradistinction, Baudrillard 
also uses “sign” in other passages of the text to denote another type of sign. For 
instance, Baudrillard writes about “signs with no hierarchical ordering… [and] the 
power of pure open space, the kind you find in the deserts. The power of the 
desert form: it is the erasure of traces in the desert, of the signified of signs in the 
cities, of any psychology in bodies. An animal and metaphysical fascination – the 
direct fascination of space, the immanent fascination of dryness and sterility.”36 
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Another quote, already mentioned above, also indicates a type of sign distinct 
from cultural signs: “The natural deserts tell me what I need to know about the 
deserts of the sign… we should always appeal to the deserts against the excess of 
signification, of intention and pretention in culture.”37 In the first examples the 
term “sign” seems to refer to signs of the hyperreal and in the latter, to immanent 
or surface signs of the real. By employing the term “sign” for disparate usages, 
Baudrillard seems to want to have it both ways—signs with signifiers that are free 
floating and others in which the signifiers are grounded by a real topographical 
referent—further evidence of his elusive and mischievous disposition.  As Mike 
Gane writes, “Baudrillard does occasionally appeal to a radical empiricism of 
experience against ridiculously out of date concepts. Experience is never purely 
empirical in Baudrillard.”38 Gane is referring to the same sort of description for 
Baudrillard’s desert experience as mentioned above—Baudrillard wants to have it 
both ways. He is not willing to abandon his commitment to semiotics and 
simulacrum, yet, he also realizes that there is a “phenomenal reduction” in the 
desert—“the mineral substance of light, the corpuscular fluid of the colours, the 
total extraversion of one’s body in the heat”—that exceeds the reaches of the 
hyperreal.39 
Baudrillard’s openness to modifying his own theory of signs should come 
as no surprise. As already mentioned, the notion that the structure of signs could 
be altered over time was an inherent part of Baudrillard’s overall argument for the 
progression of the sign. As part of this progression, Baudrillard conceived of the 
3rd order of simulation, which moved beyond Barthes semiology to the hyperreal. 
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The notion of a shifting, historical, or culturally specific structure of the sign was 
central to Baudrillard’s theory of sign structure. This brings us back to the new 
semiotic order necessitated by the experience of the real in the desert. Through 
glimpses of the real in the desert, Baudrillard seemingly (temporarily) adjusted his 
theory to account for the presence of real phenomena in the physical landscape. 
As early on as the third page of America, Baudrillard presents the apparent 
adjustment in his implementation of the term “sign” as part of a new semiotic 
order, both informing and confounding his reader, like a trickster poet: “The very 
idea of the millions and hundreds of million years that were needed to peacefully 
ravage the surface of the earth here is a perverse one, since it brings with it an 
awareness of signs originating, long before man appeared… And yet they are 
signs. For the desert only appears uncultivated (Baudrillard’s italics).”40 Later in 
the text, Baudrillard describes the relationship between the cultural and immanent 
in even more direct terms. “It would be wrong headed to counterpose Death 
Valley, the sublime natural phenomenon, to Las Vegas, the abject cultural 
phenomenon. For the one is the hidden face of the other and they mirror each 
other across the desert.”41 In both of these quotations, Baudrillard seems to be 
wrestling with the relationship of the real and the hyperreal – of the immanent and 
the cultural. In his experience, the desert actually allowed for a distinction 
between the real and hyperreal, rather than dissolving their differences, as the 
hypereal so deftly accomplishes. Therefore, Baudrillard needed a means of 
accounting for the experience of the real in the desert. His solution to the 
seemingly contradictory handling of “sign” is the development of a new semiotic 
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order in which multiple types of signs co-mingle. As Richard G. Smith writes, 
Baudrillard’s strategy “is to deconstruct the apparently impervious surface, or 
continuum, of the code, or the Semiotic.”42 In Baudrillard’s hands, the place of 
the desert is shown to be a confluence of immanent signs of the real and cultural 
signs of the hyperreal within a zone of active exchange. 
While I argue that the physical rawness of the desert prompted Baudrillard 
to reconsider his theory of the structure of the sign in the hyperreal, I also contend 
that this adjustment was limited and contextual. It does not seem that the 
recognition of the real in the desert motivated an overhaul of his theory in terms 
of the operation or reach of the hyperreal. Instead, Baudrillard seemed to regard 
the desert as the last bastion of the real, the only remaining place where the real 
was discernable.  Moreover, he seemed to suggest that as the reach of the 
hyperreal continued to extend, even these places would soon vanish. “Everything 
has now turned into culture and it has even become very difficult to go beyond 
one's own culture since one finds it everywhere,” claimed Baudrillard in an 
interview from 1995. “There will even be a moment when one will not be able 
find any deserts. Deserts are a metaphor for disappearing objects, evanescence 
beyond culture. Now they have become increasingly culturalized they are 
virtually impossible to find.”43  
 
RAPID EXCURSIVE SUCCESSIONS  
While the experience of the real in the desert constituted an important part of 
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Baudrillard’s place-produced thought, it does not represent the situated thinking 
that would have the greatest impact on the development of his subsequent 
theories. The portion of Baudrillard’s desert experience that would have the 
greatest legacy on his thinking is what I think of as “rapid excursive successions.” 
Baudrillard provides a sense of the experience of these “rapid excursive 
successions” in the desert when he writes that: “The absence of discrimination 
between positive and negative effects, the telescoping of races, technologies, and 
models, the waltz of simulacra and images here is such that, as with dream 
elements, you must accept the way they follow one another, even if it seems 
unintelligible.”44 What Baudrillard observed was how a certain movement and 
speed through the expansive landscape of the desert allowed one to fly from one 
image to the next, or from one thought to the next, without a logical correlation 
between successive images or thoughts. Baudrillard called this emancipatory 
thought process a “spatial, mobile conception – freed from historical centrality.”45 
The discursive practice that highlights such a type of thinking for Baudrillard is 
being termed here “rapid excursive successions.”  
The locomotive relationship that Baudrillard had with the desert, a 
relationship that was central to his experience, can be characterized by one word: 
speed. As we have examined in other instances of place-produced thought, the 
method and rate of locomotion through place informs the experiences and thought 
produced with/in place. For Thoreau and Heidegger, the slow and contemplative 
nature of walking played a significant role in their projects. Baudrillard’s 
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movement through place by car was much faster than a walking saunter, and 
therefore, provided him with a different type of encounter with place. 
 In his descriptions of the desert, Baudrillard regularly celebrates the 
mobility and freedom of driving through the desert. “Driving is a spectacular form 
of amnesia,” writes Baudrillard, “Everything to be discovered. Everything to be 
obliterated.”46 The ecstasy of this celebration is reminiscent of Filippo Marinetti’s 
connection between speed, mobility, and freedom in the Futurist Manifesto. “Up 
to now literature has exalted a pensive immobility, ecstasy and sleep,” denounces 
Marinetti, “we intend to exalt aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the racer’s 
stride, the mortal leap.” Just as the Futurists did, Baudrillard celebrates the 
liberation he associates with the speed of the automobile both by physically 
allowing him to have great mobility, but also by conceptually facilitating 
detachment from a traditional theoretical base. In his descriptions of American 
cars, such as the one he used to traverse the desert, Baudrillard makes a particular 
note of the ability they “have of leaping into action, of taking off so smoothly, by 
virtue of their automatic transmission and power steering. Pulling away 
effortlessly… riding along as if you were on a cushion of air, leaving behind the 
old obsession with what is coming up ahead, or what is overtaking you.”47  
The duration and pace of Baudrillard’s desert excursions—a small number 
of fast-paced campaigns—afforded him insight into the conceptual possibilities of 
rapid succession. Baudrillard’s experience was defined by the freedom of the 
open throttle of the automobile on the spacious roads of the desert. This particular 
type of movement was essential to Baudrillard’s experience of rapid succession 
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because it enabled him to witness the desert landscape as an unchanging expanse, 
which hardly changes mile after mile, which is then shattered by passing through 
a settlement, roadside attraction, or unique landscape formation. The flashing of 
successive images, as one passes through a town, is even more punctuated by the 
perpetual views of the desert vastness preceding and following these encounters. 
This flurry of visual information does not encourage lingering on any one 
impression for very long.48 The type and method of Baudrillard’s movement in 
the desert is significant because it served to alter his perception of time and space. 
Between his method of travel and the desert environment itself, Baudrillard 
quickly discovered that his typical perception of time and space was almost 
useless. The dizzying expansion and compression of time and space in the 
desert—for example, when something on the horizon looks fairly close, but after 
hours of driving, still appears to be the same distance away—forced Baudrillard 
to observe things differently, latching onto the visual fragments as they flew past.  
The ability of the desert to play with perceptions is well documented. As 
the desert writer William L. Fox notes, the desert has a tremendous power of 
“absconding our expectations of how to measure time and space.”49 Baudrillard 
also comments on this type of perceptual shift: “when you emerge from the 
desert, your eyes go on trying to create emptiness all around; in every inhabited 
area, every landscape they see desert beneath, like a watermark. It takes a long 
time to get back to a normal vision of things.”50 The way that Baudrillard moved 
through the desert, with the speed of the open road, assisted in this perceptual 
shift and marked a key component of his experience.51  
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Following his desert excursions, Baudrillard began to utilize the rhetorical 
equivalent of the disconnectedness he experienced while speeding through the 
desert—a succession of fleeting fragments and aphorisms—in his writing. 
Baudrillard asks himself near the end of America: “Why are the deserts so 
fascinating?” He then promptly answers himself, saying, “It is because you are 
delivered from all depth there – a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality,” which 
is “a challenge to meaning and profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an 
outer hyperspace, with no origin [in cultural meaning?], no reference-points.”52 
For Baudrillard, this meant that the rapid movement through the desert created a 
sense of active exchange between signs and images in which the solidity of 
meaning, origin, or singular reference was denied. This experience was significant 
because it prompted a shift in the development of Baudrillard’s thought, 
germinating from the desert experience of rapid excursive successions. As an 
embodied metaphor, Baudrillard realized that assemblages of pithy snippets 
gathered from immediate and fleeting observations offered alternate perspectives 
to those derived by traditional theory and close analysis.  
While I am arguing here that the speed and movement through the desert, 
and the rapid transition from one impression to the next, contributed to 
refashioning Baudrillard’s thought, I would add that he was undoubtedly primed 
to find that approach valuable by a well-established tradition of philosophical 
aphoristic journal writing. Some of the aphoristic literary collections that 
Baudrillard may have been familiar with included books by Goethe, Kierkegaard 
and Wittgenstein. He was also definitely aware of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and 
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Evil, a text divided into numbered sections, many of which consist of a single 
aphorism. In Baudrillard’s writing, Nietzsche is a constant companion. 
“Nietzsche, as far as I am concerned, is the one who has continued to be the most 
important,” writes Baudrillard, “but not as a point of reference, as someone I 
would cite, but as a spirit (esprit), as a stimulus (impulsion), or inspiration.”53  
Baudrillard knew of the aphoristic tradition used by Nietzsche long before 
he arrived in the desert.  In principle, therefore, he could have adopted this 
approach prior to his desert engagement. But he did not. For Baudrillard, it was 
the phenomenal reduction and the movement through the landscape (adapted as a 
sort of vanguard empiricism) that impacted him so greatly. “I knew about all of 
this [the desert]… when I was still in Paris of course,” claimed Baudrillard, “But 
to understand it, you have to take to the road.”54 Baudrillard refers here to the pre-
existing perceptions acquired from the hyperreal of mass media versus the 
immanent signs of the real in the landscape of the desert. The latter remained 
unrecognized until Baudrillard was immersed and thinking with/in the place. 
On the road, careening through the desert, Baudrillard witnessed the 
“succession of signs, faces, images” through the windshield of his car, as if they 
were flashing on a screen.55 From these fleeting impressions, Baudrillard gleaned 
observations and insights, prompting him to fall in love with the fragment.  And, 
as Geoff Dyer claims, he came to adore “slipstream exaggerations, heat-ripple 
visions and switchback revelations.”56 Baudrillard relished the subversion and 
outbreak of new possibilities in using a fragmentary and excursive observational 
strategy. What Baudrillard was able to accomplish with this style is a sort of 
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postmodern mash up of often-disparate thoughts to create new meanings. In his 
post-America writing, Baudrillard opened up his range of analysis to include 
myriad topics, and bears the stamp of what Gane calls “remarkable 
experimentation and play.”57  
Many of his detractors, however, have assumed Baudrillard’s fragmentary 
style and strategy to be a misstep. As Vidich claims, in writing America, 
Baudrillard was “substituting impression for analysis, feeling and intuition for 
careful study.”58 Vidich chastises Baudrillard for this strategy, asserting that 
America “creates a literary aesthetic by sacrificing intellectual and artistic 
precision” and that it is “largely empty of insight.”59 Another philosopher, Denis 
Dutton, declares in his review of America that Baudrillard “leap[s] from one 
bombastic assertion to the next, no matter how brazen.”60 In making these 
critiques, Vidich and Dutton seem to miss the point. It is no accident that 
Baudrillard avoids a traditional, rigorous academic analysis. Instead, he puts into 
practice the strategy learned in the desert, hoping that an alternative perspective 
and understanding of America could be produced that stood in contradistinction to 
those offered by traditional analytical methods.  
Baudrillard uses the strategy of rapid succession as a means to avoid the 
paralysis of analysis. “If you approach this society [USA] with the nuances of 
moral, aesthetic, or critical judgment” claims Baudrillard, “you will miss its 
originality.”61 Although Baudrillard here seems to suggest this style of 
observation is especially well suited to analyze contemporary American culture, 
throughout the remainder of his life he continued to use a strategy of rapid 
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excursive successions to create new perspectives and meanings between 
established fields of study and cultural theories that address everything from 
terrorism to mass media. Immediately following his desert experience, the 
profundity of a strategy of rapid excursive successions seems to have deeply 
resonated with Baudrillard, as he adopted it with even more zeal for his very next 
book, Cool Memories, which was published in 1987, one year after America. 
Baudrillard was so pleased with the outcome of the first Cool Memories 
publication that he eventually extended it into a series of five texts (Cool 
Memories I-V). The impact of Baudrillard’s place-produced thought seems 
evident, as each of these texts reflects Baudrillard’s desert experience and the 
thinking developed there by presenting a “whirl of things and events as an 
irresistible, fundamental datum.”62 Each of the Cool Memories books consists of 
short bursts of thoughts, snappy witticisms, and tiny morsels of biting cultural 
criticism assembled together. This structure can be related back to Baudrillard’s 
desert experience, flying along in his car while a visual pastiche of signs, images, 
and impressions flashed across his windshield. While this rhetorical equivalent of 
rapid excursive successions is an important element of the Cool Memories series, 
the experience in the desert—of fragmentary and fleeting impressions—had still 
another, and even more significant, impact on the development of Baudrillard’s 
thought, leading to a profound turn in the progression of his philosophy. 
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RADICAL UNCERTAINTY  
Many scholars agree that a significant shift occurred in Baudrillard’s thought 
during the late 1970s or early 1980s, around the same time as his travels in the 
desert. Mark Poster identifies an important shift in Baudrillard’s thought with the 
publication of Fatal Strategies in 1983. It is in this text that Baudrillard fully 
adopts the analysis of the hyperreal over the “representational subject.”63 Gane 
also designates a similar time period in which Baudrillard’s theories undergo a 
transformation, although he asserts that “Seduction [from 1979] is the work that 
marked the turning.”64 In Baudrillard’s writing from the period when he began 
spending time in America, according to Gane, one finds the first evidence of both 
his shift away from Marxism and from traditional argumentation and toward more 
fragmentary and aphoristic writing.  In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard begins to 
challenge the logic of the subject in which the “Kantian categories of time, space, 
causality” are believed to be rationally applied to the experience of reality.65 
Within this text, Baudrillard also begins to criticize the footing of critical social 
theory, pointing to how, in the post-modern world saturated with the hyperreality 
of mass media, “rationalist epistemologies are inadequate for the analysis of the 
media and other new social activities.”66  
I argue that the impetus for this shift is rooted in the rapid excursive 
successions of the desert experience. In an interview with CTheory from 1995, 
Baudrillard gives an indication of this connection. Asked about his travels and 
whether he considers himself as “The Accidental Tourist,” Baudrillard responded:  
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I guess a form of speculation, a capacity for crossing, traversing, 
yes… If going around an object or looking at it from multiple 
viewpoints, defines the tourist, yes that is true. But there is also the 
fact that tourists avoid, let off, abandon a number of belongings 
and I did strive to do that… I tried not to refer to all of the history 
of ideas, philosophy even, to all of that richness I admired the 
most. Somewhere they are still close to me, but I did try not to 
make references to them, I chose to forsake them.67 
Baudrillard’s response reveals the adoption of a strategy of rapid excursive 
successions that came to inform his thought through investigative strategies that 
“avoid, let off, abandon” traditional theoretical grounding in favor of thoughts 
formed through scraps of passing observation. 
From the early-1980s onward, Baudrillard further expanded the 
fragmentary strategy of rapid excursive successions formulated in the desert, as 
his theorizing and philosophy attempted to subvert the boundaries of various 
fields of study and remain “without a school or an attachment to a social 
movement or intellectual discipline.”68 During the period following his desert 
travels, Baudrillard began to increasingly display his preference for the fractal and 
enigmatic. This is evident in the proliferation of topics that Baudrillard began to 
address in his writing—leaving nothing off limits—as is suggested in the blurb on 
the back of Cool Memories. “Baudrillard’s last book was about America,” it reads 
“His new one is about cats, Foucault, Alfa Romeos, leukemia, Catholicism, the 
Berlin Wall, mattresses, Laurent Fabius, Jean-Paul II, roses…” Cool Memories II 
(1987-1990), published in 1996, continues with a similar wide array of topics. 
Touted by the back cover as a “wide ranging discussion of events and ideas,” 
moving “between poetry and waterfalls, strikes and stealth bombers, Freud and La 
Cicciolina, shadows and simulacra… Reagan’s smile and Kennedy’s death.” Even 
  189
the organization of the Cool Memories series demonstrates evidence of the move 
away from a traditional linear sequencing for a text, as the grouping of sections 
under the year they were written is abandoned in Cool Memories II, and is 
replaced by a continuous stream of aphorisms.  
Gane has referred to this turn toward the fragmentary in Baudrillard’s 
thought during the early ‘80s as a move towards “radical uncertainty.” In his post-
desert writings, Baudrillard progressively incorporates uncertainty and 
fragmentation to investigate the contradictions and inconsistencies of culture. For 
Baudrillard, the utilization of a fractured and uncertain methodology seemed well 
suited for analyzing a world which itself had become fractured and uncertain. “If 
the world is paradoxical, [then Baudrillard believed that] theory must be even 
more paradoxical.”69 In the rapid excursive successions experienced in the desert, 
Baudrillard found the perfect strategy for theorizing about the world. In this way, 
we can consider Baudrillard’s place-produced thought as an instance of thinking 
through place, even after the physical interaction with the place had ended. This 
lingering presence of Baudrillard’s think place in his philosophy was profoundly 
influential—even to the point of altering Baudrillard’s existence. By transforming 
Baudrillard on an ontological level, the desert seemed to have radically 
transformed his development as a thinker and human being. “Long before I left,” 
laments Baudrillard “I could not get Santa Barbara out of my head.”70  
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REAL AMERICA DOES NOT EXIST  
While Baudrillard was deeply impacted by his travels in America, he also had 
some lasting influence on America. As the writers Aurelian Crăiuțu and Jeffrey 
C. Isaac assert, Baudrillard has been the “most prominent postmodern thinker 
who has written on America.”71 I claim that Baudrillard’s writing on America can 
be considered as an investigation about how Americans experience place, one 
emerging out of his own place-based experience of the American landscape. 
Written nearly thirty years ago, Baudrillard’s critique foresaw the increasing role 
of the hyperreal and the proliferation of technology that now defines how 
Americans experience place.  
In his book, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Baudrillard suggests that 
the Gulf War never happened in the sense that it was only experienced in the USA 
as hyperreal signs and images. For Baudrillard, the experience of the Gulf War 
was so mediated by mass media that it was something cinematic and artificial—
successfully subsuming the real war into the floating signifiers of the hyperreal. 
The hyperreality presented by the 24-hour news cycle was not the war itself, but a 
discursively constructed version of the war. In his writings about America, 
Baudrillard implies that a similarly discursive construction through the hyperreal 
occurs in how Americans experience place. The real places of America do not 
exist because they are so thoroughly experienced through the mediation of 
cultural signs and technologies (hyperreality). 
In his experience of certain places in America (Disneyland), Baudrillard 
realized just how pervasive the hyperreal is, which enabled him to predict how its 
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unrelenting growth would soon lead to the domination of the fourth order of 
simulacrum in the experience of place—the virtual. This is the ontological leap 
that Baudrillard makes in his gathering of information about America. Baudrillard 
was able to forecast, and in many ways assist, in the radical shift of how place is 
experienced in America, ultimately modifying the very ontology of America. 
 Although Baudrillard was surprised and perhaps somewhat elated by the 
distinction of the real from the hyperreal in his desert excursions, he also 
acknowledged that distinction as increasingly less likely to occur. Baudrillard’s 
prediction of the onset of the virtual in America, as part of the historical 
progression of simulacra, helped to define a shift in the way that Americans 
would experience place in the wake of the digital information age that would 
exchange the real for the virtual. The use of the virtual as a mediator between the 
viewer/traveler and the landscape has become commonplace in the 21st century 
digital era. Navigation and digital mapping software or applications (Google maps 
being one of the most popular) have become regular features on everything from 
automobiles to hand held digital devices, accessible at almost any time or 
location. These types of technologies provide a virtual representation, which users 
can then utilize to navigate a real place. This virtual layer has become so 
ubiquitous and widespread—even in the form of geotagging images on social 
media sites—that it is often perceived as part of the place, and absolutely 
mediates our experience of place.  
 Devices that provide augmented realities, the Google Glass for example, 
have the same effect of blurring any remaining distinction between the real and 
  192
the virtual. Google Glass is a computer in the form of a pair of glasses worn by 
the viewer.  By using voice commands, images and information are displayed on 
the lenses of the glasses so that from the perspective of the user, images are 
overlaid onto what they see before them, effectively merging the virtual with the 
landscape (Fig.4 and Fig.5). This merger changes the way that place is 
experienced, which also means that the place is changed. It is through the 
exchange with place that we gather information and organize our thoughts about 
individual places—which is a major force in the constitution of its being (and 
ours, presumably). Baudrillard makes this connection when he reflects on driving 
in America: “This [he refers to the fluid experience and freedom of driving in 
America] creates a new experience of space, and at the same time, a new 
experience of the whole social system.”72 
Just as Baudrillard had his perceptions of time and space altered by 
travelling through the desert, he also foresaw how a similar type of alteration or 
shift in the perception of place would coincide with the spread of the virtual. 
Baudrillard’s thoughts about how place would be experienced in the fourth order 
of simulacra—the virtual—stemmed from his own experience of the hyperreal in 
America. Baudrillard understood that the evolution of the hyperreal into the 
virtual would likely be embraced first in America and would radically change the 
manner in which Americans experience the place of America, and indeed this 
occurs on a daily basis with the implementation of digital navigation and mapping 
technologies.  
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Figure 4. A view from the perspective of a Google glass user showing the navigation graphics 
overlaid onto the landscape. Image courtesy www.google.com/glass/start/what-it-does/ 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Another view from the perspective of a Google glass user showing the navigation 
graphics overlaid onto the landscape.  
Image courtesy http://www.howitworksdaily.com/technology/how-smartglasses-work/ 
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All of this proliferation of geolocational technology has rendered an even 
greater variation in the experience of place. “Place” is now more than ever 
heterogeneous “places,” depending on which technologies are used or activated in 
the navigation and understanding of place. The ubiquity of these mediations has 
increased the impossibility of having the same experience of place more than 
once. The pervasiveness of technology in the experience of place for many 
Americans has reached the point in which media and technology pundits such as 
J.D. Lasica have made claims that “geolocation capabilities will simply be baked 
into our everyday on-the-go lives.”73 The use of geolocational technologies 
reshapes sensory data in powerful ways – they can often initiate rapidly changing 
exchanges with place as the technology may even change or update as the 
experience is occurring. This means that multiple experiences of “places” can 
occur within a seemingly singular experience of “place.” These types of 
technologies have facilitated the proliferation of exchanges within a situated 
socio-historical zone to become more diversified, complex, and networked. 
The alteration to the way that Americans experience place through the 
mediation of geolocational technologies will ultimately lead to a transformation of 
the place itself—this is Baudrillard’s ontological leap. As previously mentioned, 
Thoreau shared a similar assertion about the transformative power of technology 
more than one hundred years before Baudrillard when he claimed that “the 
railroad rides upon us.” For Baudrillard, I argue that the first indication of this 
transformation comes out of his place-produced thought with/in the American 
landscape. Baudrillard believed the alterations to the experience and 
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understanding of place should not be taken lightly. With the further disappearance 
of the real, the virtual will increasingly modify the understanding, organization, 
and classification of place, essentially forming an ontological transfiguration.
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THE NEGOTIATION OF THIRD SPACE:  
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK 
 
 
One would cut through all the heavy layers of ideology that have been borne 
down since the beginnings of the family and private property: that can be 
done only in the imagination… to change the imaginary in order to be able to 
act on the real.  
                                                                                 - Catherine Clement     
 
The human imagination can significantly transform the everyday. In this sense, it 
can be thought of as a place of revolutionary innovation, an incubator for what 
might seem impossible in a given epoch. For example, Leonardo da Vinci 
imagined flying machines in the pages of his notebook long before the first 
airship or the flight of the Wright Brothers. As the writer Virgil Nemoianu claims, 
the human imagination is a potent resource because it can “introduce us to a series 
of things that have not happened in our own worlds.”1  
In aggregates, such as the “collective imagination,” the human 
imagination is also a site for originating new forms of knowledge, identity, and 
subjectivity. Indeed, a collective imagination is a place in which the hopes, fears 
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and desires of a collective are negotiated, a place where disparate ideologies and 
cultures encounter each other in a dialogical exchange. This chapter argues that it 
is such a place—specifically the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination—that the philosopher Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak used as the setting 
for situated contemplation, for the development of thought produced with/in 
place. As an interstitial site of negotiation and invention between the body politic 
of the colonized and the imposition of colonial rule, the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination had a particular and significant impact on Spivak’s 
methodology of analysis, object of critique, and development of thought.   
 
THIRD SPACE  
I have borrowed the term “third space” from Homi K. Bhabha. If first and second 
spaces are meant to indicate those of the colonized and the colonizers, then the 
third space is identified as something else besides; a space that mixes elements of 
the two other spaces in order to map an alternative geography that can remain 
contested and unsettled. According to Bhabha, a “third space” is a place of 
hybridity and exchange. Within these exchanges there is an “emergence of 
interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – [in which] 
the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, 
or cultural value are negotiated (Bhabha’s italics).”2 It is the character of the 
Indian collective imagination as a “third space” – a place of contestation and 
negotiation – that Spivak especially interacts with, in developing her place-
produced thought. In many ways, the development of Spivak’s thinking has been 
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deeply grounded within what she refers to as the “inventive equivalence” of the 
third space of the Indian collective imagination. As Spivak explains, inventive 
equivalence does not involve a removal of difference, but rather entails, “thinking 
without nation, [using] space-names as shifters, in a mythic geography”3 that can 
disturb “measures in terms of a standard at whose heart is Western European 
nationalism.”4 She has utilized this place-produced thought to develop an 
insurgent critique of the discursive tropes of Western metaphysics and 
Eurocentricity. Viewed with this awareness of its integral relationship to “mythic 
geography” and intimate relation to place, I argue that Spivak’s philosophy 
contains a critical spatial and topographical quality that is often unrecognized. As 
such, this chapter will demonstrate the crucial roles of materiality, situadedness, 
and the co-production of thought with/in place, in the development of Spivak’s 
thought.  
Spivak’s philosophical development is especially noteworthy within this 
overall project because it includes the production of a situated epistemology 
with/in place, but without an explicit terra firma. The geographical borders of 
India do not absolutely define the third space of its collective imagination 
(Spivak’s think place), as the third space is not completely defined along 
nationalistic, ethnic, or religious lines.  As a zone of active exchange, the third 
space of a collective imagination can be diasporic, extending beyond the borders 
of established nation-states (which are themselves temporal human constructs).  
Thus, Spivak’s place-produced thought is not directly imbricated with physical 
topography in the same manner as the other examples described in this text.  
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Nonetheless, by thinking of the third space of the Indian national 
imagination as a type of place, we can regard it within the parameters of a place as 
first established in our initial discussion of place and space, that is to say, as a 
socio-historical zone of active exchange between various forces and ideologies—
and therefore, a dynamic space of negotiation. The third space of the Indian 
collective imagination functions as a focalizing locus for Spivak’s thought in the 
same manner that physical geographies operate in other instances of place-
produced thought. 
 
DISCURSIVE MATERIALITY  
The absence of materiality in Spivak’s place of thought might, at first, seem 
problematic, particularly because materiality was critical to the other instances of 
place-produced thought that we have explored. However, we need to recall that 
the materiality in other instances of place-produced thought was significant 
because of how it demonstrated the agency of place. The encounters with 
materiality for these other thinkers are examples of the place pushing back, 
asserting itself against the presumptions of the thinker and the impositions of 
culture. This distinction emphasizes that the agency of a place is part of, but also 
more than just its materiality. Instead, the agency of place should be considered as 
a product of its stratified histories, encounters, and the forces acting upon and 
within its margins. The sum of its agglomerated particulars is what provides place 
with a continuously shifting agency, not merely a singular aspect of its material 
constitution. 
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The third space of the Indian collective imagination—while lacking the 
actual materiality that other sites of place-produced thought may possess—still 
has a similar force of indigenous agency, making it capable of pushing back 
against the presumptions of the thinker. Even so, there is still more to be 
considered in terms of materiality for Spivak’s locus of thought. By further 
examining materiality in place-produced thought, not only can we better explicate 
the character of materiality, but we can also reveal a vital materiality operating at 
the core of Spivak’s thinking. 
First, we would do well to recognize the influence of language, discourse, 
and ideology on the materiality of every occurrence of place-produced thought. In 
the Walden experiment, for example, even though Thoreau perceived that by 
living in a cabin on the edge of Walden Pond he would be brought closer to the 
“essence of things,” he brought his own discursive presumptions to the experience 
of materiality within the place. For example, Thoreau expresses that “a taste for 
the beautiful is most cultivated outdoors, where there is no house and no house 
keeper.”5 The possibilities for the materiality of a place are in some ways 
determined by the thoughts, language, and capacities of the person experiencing 
the encounter. Baudrillard’s engagement with the material desert was undoubtedly 
filtered through interlocutors such as Jack Kerouac, John Ford, Reyner Banham, 
and pop culture representations. All of these discursive layers came with 
Baudrillard to the desert, injecting his experience with pre-existing notions of 
materiality. Each encounter with materiality is marked by the concept and 
perceptions of materiality that the specific person brings with them. Therefore, 
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while other instances of place-produced thought may seem to have a more direct 
engagement with raw materiality, we need to remember the discursivity of 
materiality particular to each thinker within the context of their encounter with 
place. For example, when Matta-Clark first learned of the “gutterspace” properties 
and was able to visit one of them, he was struck by the nature of their existence 
and the conditions responsible for their creation. For most other observers, these 
small parcels of land were meaningless and useless, and a material encounter with 
them would likely have done little to changed that conception. Materiality in the 
same location is experienced very differently for each individual, depending upon 
the background, intentions, and motivations framing his or her experience.  
Secondly, even though Spivak’s thinking may not be explicitly anchored 
to a terra firma, there is still a material basis to the development of her thought. 
This includes her childhood experiences living in Kolkata, her own body, her 
movement(s) between the USA and India, and perhaps most importantly her 
continued encounters with Subaltern women. Even though Spivak has lived in the 
USA for most of her life, she has maintained close relations with various 
Subaltern groups. For instance, Spivak speaks about her experiences with a group 
of Sabar women—how they demonstrate within their songs an inventive 
equivalence and negotiation akin to that which animates the third space of the 
Indian collective imagination. Spivaks notes that the inventiveness of their lyrics, 
which often mix fact with fantasy, are a microcosm of third space processes and 
productions. As Spivak explains in an anecdotal format: 
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Imagine the frisson of delight that passed through me the first time that I 
heard these women weave a verse that began: Manbhumer Man raja—
‘King Man of Manbhum’—using the precolonial name of this place that 
nobody uses. The next line was even more delightful: Kolkatar rajar 
pathorer dalan bé—‘the King of Kolkata has a stone mansion.’ Kolkata 
was in the place of what I am calling ‘inventive equivalence.’ They were 
going to Kolkata, a little group for a fair, so they were honouring the 
King of Kolkata by preparing these songs. Kolkata is my hometown and 
I was thinking, as I sang with these women in that remote room… who 
would the King of Kolkata be? Kolkata is a colonial city and, unlike 
older Indian cities had never had a Nawab… it never had a Hindu Raja 
either. But the women were singing ‘The King of Kolkata has a stone 
mansion,’ where Kolkata occupied the place of a shifter, and who was I 
to contradict?6  
 
Through song, these women were able to construct a narrative about 
Kolkata that wove together histories and invented attributes into their present 
collective experience of traveling to Kolkata. For Spivak, these types of 
encounters have provided a materiality or grounding to the play between positions 
or claims that characterizes the function of the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination. These encounters have also revealed to her how the third space can 
“appropriate material of all sorts into its machine, robbing the content of its 
epistemic charge.”7  That ability to become “neither the One… nor the Other… 
but something else besides,”8 is markedly present in Spivak’s thinking and notable 
when she proclaims: “I realized that, as for all peoples who are not the felicitous 
subject of the European Enlightenment, their perennially blocked path to 
‘modernity’ has been hybrid, not ‘European.’”9 In terms of this type of play or 
hybridity, the third space of the Indian collective imagination (and therefore 
Spivak’s thinking) echoes Jacques Derrida’s thoughts about the nature of a text. 
For Derrida, a text is “at the same time open, proffered and indecipherable, even 
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without our knowing that it is indecipherable (Derrida’s italics).”10 When Derrida 
speaks about a text, he urges us to understand the inseparability of the text from 
context, meaning that the text is never fixed. The text operates as more of a “third 
space” in which diversified voices intermingle and clash in continual play. 
Derrida insists that this play means that the text is “constituted by its never-fully-
to-be-recognized-ness.”11 There is an important connection between Derrida’s 
assertions, Spivak’s thinking, and the function of the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination, because it emphasizes the performative tendencies utilized 
to produce knowledge and meaning.  
 
CRICKET AND COLONIALISM  
Some historical context for the anatomy or framework of the Indian collective 
imagination and its development in the 20th century is in order here. The Republic 
of India, as it is known today, had been a trading partner with numerous European 
companies since the beginning of the 18th century. In 1848, British regulation of 
the region was strengthened when an English lord was appointed to the top 
position in the East India Company, which was the most powerful organization in 
India. The East India Company controlled trade and flexed its muscle through the 
use of private armies. Once the company was dissolved in 1874, England took 
over direct control of India, which was subsumed under colonial rule. India 
remained under stringent British control until 1947, when it became an 
independent nation. The shift for India from being a colony to being a post-
colonial nation, and the exchanges between colonizer and colonized during that 
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process, were significant in the development of Spivak’s thinking. Of particular 
import for her was the third space of the Indian collective imagination and its 
relation to British attempts to produce, maintain, and promulgate its authority in 
India. One of most explicit and readily understood instances of this confluence 
can be found in cricket. 
First introduced during the 1840s as a segregated sport, one in which 
English and Indian players never mixed, cricket “evolved into an unofficial 
instrument of state cultural policy,” serving as a vehicle to further disseminate 
ideas about imperialist standards of character and social behavior.12 The 
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai writes that the structure, etiquette, and rules of 
cricket were intended to “transmit Victorian ideals of character and fitness to the 
colony.”13 As the reach and popularity of cricket flourished in India, cricket teams 
from England began to tour India playing matches against “Indian” teams – 
originally comprised of Englishmen living in India. However, as the number of 
highly skilled Indian cricket players increased, there was a sense of public 
urgency (closely tied to the rise of Indian nationalism) for Indians themselves to 
represent India on its national cricket teams. This demand mean that there “had to 
be other parallel entities in the colonies against which the English nation-state 
could play: thus, ‘India’ had to be invented, at least for the purposes of colonial 
cricket.”14  
Through its growing popularity and its representation of a collective 
identity, Indian cricket became firmly established in the realm of the national 
imagination. Once a part of the national imagination, cricket became subject to 
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the agency of the social collective, molded at the interstices of heterogeneous 
cultures and ideas. Through representations in the collective imagination via 
cultural outlets such as mass vernacular literature, public broadcasting, popular 
cinema, and increased indigenous patronage, Indian cricket was presented as a 
“critical instrument of [Indian] subjectivity and agency in the process of 
decolonization.”15  
Indian cricket grew into a means of actively playing out, in a physical and 
visual manner, the ideological and political conflicts swirling within the third 
space of the Indian collective imagination. As a form of ideological play, cricket 
can be considered as a “microcosm of the fissures and tensions of a deeply 
divided society: fissures that it both reflects and plays upon, mitigates as well as 
intensifies.”16 As a visualization of the operation of the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination, cricket also served as a source of Indian identity and 
subjectivity formation. Appadurai writes that when “Indians from various 
linguistic regions in India see and hear the cricket narratives of television and 
radio, they do so not as neophytes struggling to grasp an English form but as 
culturally literate viewers for whom cricket has been deeply vernacularized.”17 
Thus, cricket transformed, and a colonial sport became a new form of “inventive 
equivalence.” A key aspect of this inventive equivalence was the tangible 
subversion of caste hierarchies and the challenge to Western constructs of the 
Subaltern subject. 
As early as 1906, the victory of a mixed caste Indian cricket team over a 
group of European cricketers was celebrated by the Indian Social Reformer 
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newspaper as having “done far more to liberalize the minds of thousands of young 
Hindus than all other attempts in other spheres.”18 As Ramachandra Guha also 
writes, these types of victories “were seen variously as a triumph over caste 
prejudice and an assertion of a suppressed national spirit.”19 That a game might 
have such far-reaching consequences is not unreasonable. Roger Callois has 
asserted that “the competition and simulation [acted out in games] may and 
indeed do[es] create cultural forms to which an educational or esthetic value is 
ascribed.”20 It is the notion of cricket as a site in which third space conflicts and 
contestations are enacted that creates a crucial connection to Spivak’s thinking. A 
comparable subversive process and assertion of Subaltern subjectivity is inscribed 
in Spivak’s thinking about the critique of Western metaphysics and 
Eurocentricity. 
Beginning as a symbol of, and instrument for, colonial power, cricket was 
transformed in the Indian context into something quite different. This production 
of an “inventive equivalence” amounted to a cultural re-visioning. Indian cricket 
became clearly distinct in its character, process, and presentation from the 
colonial English model of cricket, while still maintaining a historical connection 
to its British roots. Appadurai cites that “the impact of media, commercialization, 
and national passion have almost completely eroded the old Victorian civilities 
associated with cricket. Cricket is now aggressive, spectacular.”21 Or as Ghua 
more generally states, “the game has come to mean something quite different here 
from what it did, and often still does, in its original home.”22 The journalist 
Soumya Bhattachary also describes how the game of cricket was re-visioned in 
  207
India, particularly after the ICC Cricket World Cup in 1983, as it became the 
symbol of a “New India, a Young India, a Fearless India” and the “delirious staple 
of Indian public life and discourse.”23 The fervent embrace of cricket as a 
collective passion in India is demonstrated by their role as a major player in world 
cricket since the 1970s, winning the World Cup twice within that span. Cricket 
has been re-territorialized; in its contemporary manifestation, English cricket has 
been transformed in India into “something else besides” – not just a leftover from 
a colonial oppressor. As Shadra Ugra maintains, “India sees cricket – and indeed 
an image of itself on a global scale – through its cricket team.”24  
In the transformation from “cricket played in India” to “Indian cricket,” a 
crucial indigenous modification occurred which enabled Indian cricket to become 
a forum for the negotiation of collective consciousness and agency. This shift 
transpired when the challenges within the game of cricket were presented as the 
personal struggles of some of its most famous cricketers. These narratives of 
personal struggle came to stand as metaphors of the collective struggle for 
subjectivity and identity. Once this shift occurred, Indian cricket was no longer 
merely a game. In describing the famous cricketer Gundappa Vishwanath (Fig.1), 
Anandam P. Kavoori details how he would will “the public, his partner (so to 
speak), to reach more fully into themselves, to participate with increasing 
abandon.”25 The viewing public for cricket came to feel as though the struggles 
and victories of the individual cricketers were also their own struggles and 
victories. By becoming a metaphor of collective identity, cricket ceased to be an 
extension of colonialism, and became instead a “social practice that forms the 
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background of everyday life.”26 As Guha claims, cricket was instilled in the 
collective heart of Indians because it acted out the concerns of the collective on 
the playing field. 
 
Figure 1. The famous cricketer Gundappa Vishwanath at bat.  
Image courtesy of Getty Images. 
 
LIMINAL PHILSOPHY  
This act of translating cricket from a colonial instrument of power into a 
representation of passionate collective subjectivity is a critical illustration of the 
operation of the third space of the Indian collective imagination. However, it’s 
worth noting that Spivak never explicitly writes about cricket.27 In the context of 
this analysis, it doesn’t matter that Spivak never directly references the 
development of cricket in India, because I am using it as an example of how the 
power of the third space of the collective imagination can negotiate and alter 
existing forms of subjectivity and knowledge. Spivak’s thinking is connected to 
Indian cricket in the shared reliance on the third space of the Indian collective 
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imagination. It is the transformative and negotiative ability of the third space of 
the Indian collective imagination that is most indelible for Spivak, rather than any 
of its individual productions such as cricket. Spivak has been much more drawn to 
the third space of the Indian collective imagination in the oral-formulaic traditions 
of endemic storytelling and folk songs. “I am not asking us to imitate the oral-
formulaic,” claims Spivak, “I am suggesting that the principle of inventive 
equivalence [drawn from the oral-formulaic] should be at the core of the 
comparativist impulse.”28 
 Spivak’s connection to the oral-formulaic and the Indian collective 
imagination has a long history. Born in what was then called Calcutta in 1942, 
Spivak studied and lived there until the early 1960s when she came to America to 
continue her education at Cornell. Despite moving her main home to America 
more than 50 years ago, Spivak has continued her engagement with India by 
returning there to teach and work with various groups. It is Spivak’s sustained 
efforts to think with/in the Indian collective imagination that has enabled her to 
maintain a symbiosis, both working with, and learning from, the power of the 
third space. These encounters have helped Spivak to invigorate her connection to 
the collective imagination, as well as provide a materiality for it in the form of 
tangible bodies and subjects.  
The Indian Independence of 1947 marked a tremendously influential 
moment in the development of Spivak’s thought. Indeed, at a lecture given at the 
Centre for Advanced Study in Sofia, Bulgaria, and later published as a book 
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entitled, Nationalism and the Imagination, Spivak spoke of the impact of Indian 
independence:  
Elation in the conversation of the elders, interminable political 
discussions. Remember, we were 300 years under the Islamic 
empire and then 200 years under the British. So it was big… The 
important event was Partition, the division of the country… 
Overnight Kolkata became a burdened city; even its speech 
patterns changed. If these were the recollections of Independence, 
the nationalist message in the streets created schizophrenia.29  
 
The feeling of schizophrenia that Spivak describes came about mainly through 
Indian Partition. As nation-states were geographically reorganized, many people 
seemed to lose the “comfort felt in one’s corner of the sidewalk, a patch of 
ground… which the nation thing conjures.”30 As Spivak continues, “when this 
comfort is taken away, there is a feeling of helplessness, loss of orientation, 
dependency, but no nation thing.”31 Without a specific parcel of land in which to 
anchor and ground the sense of nationalism, the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination became a key site for the negotiation of Indian identity and 
subjectivity.  The schizophrenia that Spivak refers to is the uncertainty and open-
endedness of Bhabha’s “intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness” 
as it is negotiated within the third space of the collective imagination.  Therefore, 
for Spivak it has been the re-visioning function of the third space of the collective 
imagination that has been most profound, rather than the act of Independence or 
Partition itself. Due in part to her experience of Indian Independence and 
Partition, Spivak enthusiastically embraces a form of nationalism that “is the 
product of a collective imagination constructed through rememoration.”32 As 
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Spivak and other Indians experienced during Partition, when the piece of ground 
that one derives much of his or her identity from is radically modified by political 
or cultural actions, a loss of comfort with such a place may occur. In such an 
instance, the collective imagination takes on even more prominence as a source of 
rootedness, belonging, and identity. 
Near the end of the lecture, Spivak reiterates one of the main lessons that 
she learned from the “rememoration” or re-visioning of the state by the collective 
imagination, in the formation of an identity for itself as part of the Independence 
process: any collective imagination “trained in the play of language(s) may undo 
the truth-claims of national identity thus unmooring the cultural nationalism that 
disguises the workings of the state—disguises the loss of civil liberties.”33 
Spivak’s own development of thought is rooted within the play of language and 
negotiation of difference in the third space of the Indian collective imagination 
mentioned above. Spivak hints at this type of site-specificity for her 
thinking/speaking when she notes, “I tend to always speak in context. I always 
carry the trace of what I do, where I am.”34 
In many ways, Spivak’s place-produced thought is a form of critical 
regionalism, sharing tensions between the local and the global that are evident in 
all forms of place-produced thought. Just as Spivak’s critical regionalism attempts 
to be “free of the baggage of nationalist identitarianism” and moves beyond 
national boundaries, the overall notion of place-produced thought that we have 
been exploring endeavors to do something comparable.35 As Spivak’s project 
demonstrates, place-produced thought is often able to chip away at the legacy of 
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established norms such as the Platonic binarisms in Western philosophy because 
it often attempts to “undermine possessiveness, the exclusiveness, [and] the 
isolationist expansionism of mere nationalism.”36 Spivak’s place-produced 
thought is reflective not only of post-coloniality, but also of post-nationality. The 
emphasis of critical regionalisms over any essentialized concept of nation was 
largely derived from Spivak’s experience with the localized manifestation of the 
collective imagination in indigenous stories and song. 
 For Spivak, the product of situated contemplation in the third space of the 
Indian collective imagination has been a type of liminal philosophy, a method of 
thinking that opens “something else besides,” as an alternative to binarisms. As 
described above, the translation of cricket through the third space created a 
dialogical hybrid that was not purely a representation of colonizer or colonized.  
This type of “in-betweenness” is still present within contemporary Indian cricket. 
As Ugra writes, “Indian cricket today stands for both First World market 
domination and Third World aspiration; inclusion and insularity; arrogance and 
open-mindedness (Ugra’s italics).”37 This same type of in-betweenness has also 
marked much of Spivak’s philosophy. The nurturing of a liminal philosophy has 
been crucial for Spivak because it provides the possibility for mounting a critique 
from both inside and outside of a discourse. This has enabled Spivak to work 
within the customs of Western philosophy, but at the same time, to turn away 
from its prescriptions, generating what Bhabha calls a “re-articulation, or 
translation, of elements that are neither the One… nor the Other… but something 
else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both” (Bhabha’s italics).38 
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Being “neither the One… nor the Other… but something else besides” is a 
position that Spivak has attempted to maintain throughout her life as she openly 
acknowledges her Indian roots as well as her place of privilege teaching and 
living at one of the elite Western academic institutions. Yet, just as the third space 
of the Indian collective imagination is constantly being negotiated and contested, 
Spivak continues to think (and exist) within the indeterminate “by learning to 
unlearn her privileges as a prestigious academic residing in the USA… [and by] 
learning ‘to speak to (rather than listening to or speak for) the historically muted 
subject of the subaltern.’”39 
Spivak’s liminal philosophy also provokes questions about what, and who, 
has traditionally been outside of certain discourses, forcing one to consider the 
ideological and discursive motivations for those exclusions. Much of the thinking 
and methodology that Spivak has derived from the third space of the Indian 
national imagination has been constructed as a critique of Eurocentricity, 
hegemony, gender, and the elitist presumptions of Western thought. Spivak has 
mounted these critiques not only through the expansion of post-colonial studies, 
but also through a deconstructionist negotiation of the major philosophical works 
in Western metaphysics.  
Just as we have seen in the other instances of place-produced thought 
described here, Spivak herself was transformed through the creation of place-
produced thought. She adapted the functions of the third space of the Indian 
national imagination, such as inventive equivalence, liminality, the interstices of 
difference, and the undermining of power, into a distinct mode of discourse 
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analysis, cultural study, and mode of being. Indeed, Spivak maintains a liminality 
between the worlds of privileged Western Ivy league academia and the materiality 
of her identification as an Indian rooted in the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination. 
 
A POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUE  
One of the methods that Spivak has utilized to extend her thinking with/in place 
into critical analysis has been to recognize the third space of the Indian national 
imagination as a form of discourse. By thinking of the third space of the Indian 
national imagination as a discourse, one can see how it (re)produces subjects and 
epistemologies. In fact, in Benedict Anderson’s influential text, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, he describes 
how the development of nationalism or national consciousness is “conceived in 
language, not in blood.”40 In Anderson’s view, collective identities are 
constructed like a discourse because they entail a “re-presentation and negotiation 
of consciousness.”41 This concept of an identity formed through language is 
related to the theories of Jacques Lacan. In many ways, Anderson’s claims about 
collective identity formation are derived from Lacan’s views about the emergence 
of individual identities. For Lacan, language is a Symbolic order that precedes and 
makes possible human subjectivity. Reality is interpreted through the mediation 
of language and instigates the formation of the subject. The writer Philippe Julien 
describes the influence of the Lacanian Symbolic order as such: “Even before 
birth, the child is inscribed in a symbolic universe that determines its place.”42 
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The determination of identity through language and discourse is echoed on a 
larger scale in Anderson’s consideration of imagined communities. 
Of course, the association of the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination with a form of discourse is consistent with Spivak’s affinity for the 
deconstructionist texts of Derrida. Spivak first gained critical prominence in 1976 
by writing a pensive and celebrated preface to the English translation of Derrida’s 
1967 text Of Grammatology. Since then, Spivak has incorporated Derrida’s 
teachings, especially deconstruction, into her own thinking. Spivak has been 
particularly drawn to one of the tasks of deconstruction—to expose the 
unfinalized play between oppositional positions within a discourse.  
Herein lies a critical connection between the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination and discourse. Just as Derridean deconstruction posits 
discourse as “a play of presence and absence, a place of the effaced trace,” the 
third space of the Indian collective imagination can also be considered as a place 
that is indeterminate and interstitial. For Derrida, writing (or discourse) can be 
anything or “all that gives rise to an inscription in general.”43 By considering the 
operations of the third space as a form of discourse, Spivak has been able to take 
the same sort of transformative and negotiative functions found in the third space 
and apply them in numerous critiques, including the canons of Western 
philosophy.  
One example of this thinking is Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason. Within this critique, Spivak mounts a third space/deconstructionist 
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negotiation of three of the major figures in the tradition of Western philosophy: 
Kant, Hegel, and Marx. As Spivak claims, her goal for the critique is to “examine 
the structures of the production of postcolonial reason.”44 What Spivak reveals 
throughout this critique is the Eurocentric and normative epistemic 
presuppositions embedded within the philosophy of these three thinkers. Spivak 
then demonstrates how the Other or “native informant” is a necessary construct 
for the logic and production of thought by these three heavyweights.45 As she 
details, each of them constructs and essentializes the trope of the native informant 
as a means of otherization, one that forecloses and dismisses the possibility of 
agency and subjecthood for the native informant. By deconstructing this 
foreclosure, Spivak’s aim is to provide a “counter narrative that will make visible 
the foreclosure to the position of the narrator.”46  
One of Spivak’s main tasks in her critique of Kant, Hegel, and Marx is to 
speak to the Subaltern within and through the writings of these three men, but also 
to not allow their ideas about the Subaltern to become codified and naturalized by 
the passage of time and their popular acceptance in the study of philosophy. 
Instead, Spivak learns and unlearns their theories, pulling them apart to reveal the 
problematic complicities within each philosopher’s logic. 
 
KANT  
Beginning with Kant in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Spivak examines how 
Kant’s third Critique, The Critique of Judgment, is predicated upon a 
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geopolitically differentiated subject. Spivak insists that Kant’s subject (the one 
who holds the power of the critique of judgment) is “generally dependent upon 
the rejection [Verwerfung] of the Aboriginal.”47 Spivak’s claim is based upon her 
reading of a particular passage from the third Critique that is reproduced here 
with her notes included: 
Grass is needful for the ox, which again is needful for man as a 
means of existence; but then we do not see why it is necessary that 
men should exist (a question which is not so easy to answer if we 
cast our thoughts by chance [wenn man etwa… in Gedanken hat] 
on the New Hollanders or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego). 
Such a thing is then [alsdem ist ein solches Ding] not even a 
natural purpose; for it (or its entire species [Gattung—the 
connotation of “race” as in “human race” cannot be disregarded 
here]) is not to be regarded as a natural product.48 
Spivak acknowledges that this particular reference to “New Hollanders 
(Australians) or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego” has historically been brushed 
aside in the discussion of Kant as an “unimportant rhetorical detail.”49 Spivak 
asserts that this phrasing should not be left unexamined, as it reveals a critical 
geopolitical differentiation of Kant’s subject. “Its crucial presence in The Critique 
of Judgment cannot be denied,” stresses Spivak.50 Through her analysis, Spivak 
illustrates the necessity of the native informant within Kant’s rhetoric, produced 
as the parerga to the ergon of the Western world. As a certain outside to the ergon, 
the native informant intrinsically operates in relation to a lack within that ergon. 
“If the third Critique is read as the indirect orchestration of a universalist 
teleology,” states Spivak, “the parergon that it yields is the raw man [native 
informant].”51 As such the raw man (New Hollander or Fuegan) plays an integral 
role in the transformation of the raw into the philosophical by the Western subject 
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of reason. The raw man exists, as an empty space that can be inscribed by the 
Western subject, which Spivak believes is Kant’s global project for the Western 
subject.52 This project of the European subject, to bring the raw (East) to the 
philosophical (West), is the thinly veiled specter of “imperialism as social 
mission.”53 Throughout her reading, Spivak demonstrates Kant’s complicity in 
that form of imperialism by differentiating the native informant as raw, unnatural, 
and non-subject. Spivak’s intent is not to merely “diagnose Kant’s hidden 
‘beliefs,’” but rather to utilize the re-visioning inherent in the thinking developed 
with/in the third space of the Indian collective imagination (and the teachings of 
deconstruction) to render a “something else besides” – an alternative reading of 
Kant. 
 
HEGEL  
Just as Spivak does with her analysis of Kant’s third Critique, she attempts to 
expose the implicit foreclosure of the native informant in Hegel’s reading of the 
Srimadbhagavadgita.  Within this critique, Spivak demonstrates how the two very 
different inscriptions by dominant forces—one originating from inside India, and 
the other from outside (Hegel) —share “structural complicity.”54 By 
demonstrating this similarity, Spivak intends to avoid “some of the too-easy 
West-and-the-rest polarizations sometimes rampant in colonial and postcolonial 
discourse studies.”55 Therefore, rather than placing Hegel’s text in stark 
opposition to a Indian nationalist reading of the Gita, an endeavor which would 
really only serve to legitimatize colonial difference, Spivak attempts to navigate 
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the oppositional difference between the two readings. Spivak’s goal is to illustrate 
how both readings are strategic examples of dominance that foreclose the 
subjectivity of the native informant.  
In Spivak’s critique, both of the texts achieve this foreclosure through a 
“manipulation of the question of history in a political interest.”56 Through a close 
reading of a specific passage from Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Arts, Spivak 
illuminates how his reading of the Gita interprets the Spirit in India as stagnant 
and unprogressive. Here is an excerpt from the passage that Spivak references: 
 I am the taste in flowing water, the splendour in the sun and the 
moon, the mystical world in holy scriptures, in man his manliness, 
the pure fragrance in the earth, the splendour in flames, in all 
beings the life, contemplation in the penitent, in living things the 
force of life, in the wise their wisdom.57 
 
Spivak’s interpretation of Hegel’s reading of Krishna’s list is that the Spirit never 
changes and remains the same in all forms. According to Spivak, Hegel “needs to 
say that the Spirit-in-India makes monotonous lists in a violently shuttling way.”58 
“Hegel’s conclusions from these rather difficult passages” claims Spivak, is that 
the Spirit-in-India is “extremely monotonous, and on the whole, empty and 
wearisome.”59 This unchanging spirit does not fit into the Hegelian morphology 
of the Spirit that evolves over time. In Hegelian philosophy, if the Spirit is never 
transformed, then it would never reach its telos of a fully self-conscious 
realization. Spivak indicates how the native informant is foreclosed as part of the 
great realization of the Spirit by quoting Hegel directly: “ The Indian knows no 
reconciliation and identity with Brahma [the so-called Hindu conception of the 
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Absolute] in the sense of the human spirit’s reaching knowledge of this unity 
(Hegel’s italics).”60 Hegel’s claim is even more plainly stated here: “Indians 
cannot move history.”61 
 Along with a critique of Hegel’s reading of the Gita, Spivak demonstrates 
how an Indian nationalistic reading also serves to inscribe the “Law” onto the 
native informant. Spivak points to how some Indian nationalistic groups have 
used the Gita as a tool for identifying and preserving “national continuity.”62 For 
these groups, the Gita is supra historical, representing a “permanent truth.”63 As 
Spivak illustrates, many of these groups use their interpretation of the Gita to 
delimit the identity and agency of the native informant. In the form of a regulatory 
device, the Gita is utilized as a form of body politic, placing normative 
inscriptions upon the Indian subject. Spivak argues, therefore, that just as Hegel 
does with his reading, the nationalist interpretation of the Gita attempts to insert a 
specific figuration upon the native informant—one serving the particular needs 
and authority of each type of reading. “Nationalism,” Spivak contends, “is in 
many ways a displaced or reversed legitimation of colonialism.”64 Both Hegel’s 
and the Indian nationalist reading of the Gita are guilty of prescribing the limits 
and definition of the Subaltern subject to suit the fulfillment of their own needs. 
 
MARX  
In the final portion of Spivak’s overall critique of these three key figures in the 
Western philosophical tradition, she takes aim at the philosophy of Marx. As with 
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Kant and Hegel, Spivak details evidence of how Marx creates a complicit 
foreclosure of the native informant. For her analysis, Spivak focuses on the 
“implications of a notorious phrase that Marx probably used only once: ‘the 
Asiatic Mode of Production [AMP].’”65 Marx’s motivation for differentiating an 
Asiatic mode of production from a European one was to explain why Asia had not 
experienced the same progression from feudalism to capitalism that has 
characterized European history. As Spivak points out, Marx’s postulation of an 
AMP is wrought with Eurocentricity, as it is based upon a historical narrative of 
progress grounded in a European version of history, and the assumptions of 
capitalism as the progression of modern society. By doing so, Spivak exposes the 
foreclosure of the native informant in which the “extraordinary achievements of 
the pre-capitalist imperial civilizations are generally ignored.”66 This figuration of 
history by Marx is a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy that “makes visible the fault 
lines within the account of history as (European) modes of production.”67  
Just as it did in the works of both Kant and Hegel, the foreclosure of the 
native informant here satisfies a certain philosophical interest. Within her 
exposition of Marx, Spivak demonstrates how the “AMP has revealed itself to be 
neither historico-geographically ‘Asiatic’ nor logically a ‘mode of production.’”68 
Spivak’s main critique of Marx, as was the case with Kant and Hegel, is that 
Marx has constructed a specific Asiatic subject, history, and mode of production 
that serves to further his own logic and argument. As Spivak argues, Marx 
produces and defines the Subaltern subject to suit his own needs; so that he can 
place those subjects outside or to the side of his version of historical economic 
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evolution.  By removing the Subaltern/Asiatic subject – the native informant – 
from his theory of capitalism’s progression, he essentially removed any 
discrepancies to that history, which forms such a significant part of Marxist 
philosophy. In doing do, Marx spoke for the native informant, foreclosing and 
dismissing the Subaltern subject and their history.  
In her re-reading of all three of these figures, Spivak maintains an 
approach that is careful not to attempt a resurrection of the lost voice of the native 
informant. Rather, Spivak points towards the impossibility of such a task, 
especially in the figuration of the native informant by these three. Instead, Spivak 
anticipates the opening of a third space, in which “active interception and 
reconstellation” can occur, much like what occurred with cricket in the third space 
of the Indian collective imagination.69 Spivak also reminds us that none of her 
critiques are intended to be damning or accusatory. Instead, she hopes to “produce 
something that will generate a new and useful reading.”70  
In my summations of Spivak’s critiques of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, I 
realize that I have merely scratched the surface of these complex and rich 
critiques leveled against three of the great thinkers in Western philosophy. While 
the outcome of these critiques is fascinating and valuable, I have not to attempted 
to recount the nuanced particulars of each of Spivak’s critiques, but rather have 
focused on the strategies used to mount them. My aim here is to connect this type 
of thinking and tactical critique back to the thought produced with/in the third 
space of the Indian collective imagination. By utilizing this place-produced 
thought, Spivak has been able to deploy inventive equivalence and negotiation of 
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difference as a critical method of re-visioning – of producing a “something else 
besides” – not only for the Subaltern subject of the native informant but also for 
the legacy of thought cast by Kant, Hegel, and Marx on the history of Western 
metaphysics. 
 
SPEAKING TO THE SUBALTERN  
A recurring concern in these examinations of place-produced thought has been the 
ontological shift that occurs for both thinker and place in the process of 
developing place-produced thought. In the case of Spivak and the third space of 
the Indian collective imagination, an argument can be made for a similar type of 
transformation. While we have already addressed the bearing of the third space 
upon Spivak’s development of thought and mode of being, we have yet to 
consider the ontological shift in the third space itself that has been precipitated by 
her place-produced thought. One means of gauging this transformation might be 
to study one of Spivak’s most celebrated lines of inquiry: Can the Subaltern 
Speak? Spivak has revealed the complexity of the answer—much more than a 
straightforward “yes” or “no”—through her work in post-colonial and Subaltern 
studies.  
 Through writings such as Other Asias, In Other Worlds: Essays In 
Cultural Politics, Outside in the Teaching Machine, and A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Spivak has 
shown how the Subaltern subject and native informant have been foreclosed upon 
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and shut out of the processes or logic within traditional Western hegemonic 
discourses. Calling for a re-visioning of the Subaltern subject(s) by “wrenching 
them out of their assigned functions,” Spivak has helped to remap the territory of 
its consciousness. She has also influenced the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination to continue and expand its negotiation of collective identity, the 
nation-state, and Subaltern subjectivity.71 Through the continuous negotiation 
within the third space, some conceptualizations of Indian nationalism have begun 
to move away from the solidarity of the nation-state toward a mutating collective 
of critical regionalisms. Within this non-essentializing view of nationality, there is 
a deconstruction of the cohesive nation-state (Indian or any other). As Spivak 
argues, national consciousness has realized that “we can’t make a clear-cut 
distinction between self-determination and nationalism, regionalism and 
nationalism. There must be a persistent critique that operates during and beyond 
the rational arrangements.”72  
 One of the best indicators of the impact that Spivak’s place-produced 
thought has had on India may have come in early 2013 when she was awarded the 
Padma Bushan. The award is given annually by the government of India to honor 
notable service to the Republic of India. The award is the third highest award 
given to a civilian by Republic of India. However, beyond questions of Indian 
nationalism and collective consciousness, perhaps Spivak’s place-produced 
thought has been most valuable in initiating greater interest in the formation and 
ontology of the Subaltern subject. Without resorting to strict authenticity politics, 
Spivak has raised a challenge—channeled through the influences of Derridean 
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deconstruction and the powers of the third space of the Indian collective 
imagination—to produce radical analyses and newly imagined possibilities for the 
Subaltern subject.  
Perhaps this challenge is best illustrated by the growth of Subaltern 
Studies as an important field of study. As David E. Ludden claims, “In the 1990s, 
Subaltern Studies became a hot topic in academic circles on several continents; a 
weapon, magnet, target, lightning rod, hitching post, icon, gold mine, and fortress 
for scholars ranging across disciplines from history to political science, 
anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and cultural studies.”73 One of the 
outcomes of these studies has been the re-visioning of the Subaltern. Yet, rather 
than trying to speak for the Subaltern, most of this new discourse attempted to 
speak to them, and to assist in vitalizing the “integrity of indigenous histories that 
appear naturally in non-linear, oral, symbolic, vernacular, and dramatic forms.”74 
 There is evidence that this increased re-visioning and shift in ontological 
status continues. In 2012, the international edition of the New York Times 
published an article on the increased number of publications produced in India. 
Kanishka Gupta, the founder and managing director of Writer’s Side, claimed in 
2012 that there is a “new breed of writers who wanted to write books that 
connected to the average Indian reader… Publishing houses committed to 
publishing such books sprang up all over the country and big multinationals had 
to shed their elitism and enter this space.”75 While Gupta is specifically referring 
to the “watershed moment” of the publication of Chetan Bhagat’s novel Five 
Point Someone, the resonance that Spivak’s (and others) thought has had on these 
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type of developments within India can’t be underestimated.  The negotiation of 
the Indian subject continues as an ongoing discourse in the third space of the 
Indian collective imagination, due in large part to Spivak’s place-produced 
thought. Several recent publications, such as New Subjects and New Governance 
in India by Ran	abițra Samațddațra and Suhit Sen, Appropriately Indian: 
Gender and Culture in a New Transnational Class by Smitha Radhakrishnan, and 
The New India: Citizenship, Subjectivity, and Economic Liberalization by 
Kanishka Chowdhury, demonstrate the continued negotiation and investigation of 
the formation of the Subaltern subject. Each of these recent critiques is marked 
with the epistemic and ontological trace of Spivak’s place-produced thought. 
 
RADICAL RECALCITRANCE 
With all the talk of the agency of place at the beginning of this chapter, there is 
one aspect of Spivak’s place-produced thought that we have so far failed to 
consider: how place has pushed back against the thinker. Perhaps, we have made 
too much of the transformations that Spivak’s place-produced thought has had on 
her think place – the Indian collective imagination. Indeed, it seems that some 
scholars have questioned this very relationship in their criticisms of Spivak’s 
writing. In the swirling storm of controversy set off by Terry Eagleton’s caustic 
review of Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason for the London Review of 
Books, some scholars sided with Eagleton and wondered “Can Gayatri Spivak's 
'pretentiously opaque' writing make a difference in the real world?”76 The debate 
about efficacy and real world application of Spivak’s writing is nothing new for 
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philosophy, but was specifically heightened by some of Eagleton’s comments in 
his review such as: “Post-colonial theorists are often to be found agonising about 
the gap between their own intellectual discourse and the natives of whom they 
speak; but the gap might look rather less awesome if they did not speak a 
discourse which most intellectuals, too, find unintelligible. You do not need to 
hail from a shanty town to find a Spivakian metaphorical muddle like ‘many of us 
are trying to carve out positive negotiations with the epistemic graphing of 
imperialism’ pretentiously opaque.”77 In this particular excerpt, Eagleton also 
tacitly questions whether Spivak has been able to bridge the gap between her 
writing and the Subaltern subject. Part of his assault seems to ridicule a 
disconnect between one of the topics of Spivak’s writing, the Subaltern subject, 
and the Subaltern themselves.  
Yet, it is interesting to wonder whether Eagleton’s assertion really runs 
contrary to the notion that Spivak’s place-produced thought has prompted an 
ontological transformation to the place of its production – the Indian collective 
imagination? Our answer depends on how we interpret Eagleton’s critique. There 
have certainly been a number of other critics (many of them part of the Indian 
collective imagination), which have disputed or interrogated the influence of 
Spivak’s thought. Most of these critiques are based upon two distinct types of 
dispute: either with her method of analysis or the inauthenticity/appropriation of 
Indianality of her voice. For example, some critics have examined Spivak’s heavy 
use of poststructuralism and deconstructionism and “reject her reading practices 
as aiming at an accommodation of the realities of imperialism to purely textual 
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matters.”78 Some of these critics (among them—Arif Dirlik, Aijaz Ahmed, Ella 
Shohat) believe that “her privileging a theory [deconstruction]… foregrounds a 
hegemonic discourse while muting native voices.”79 Another such critic, Benita 
Parry, argues that Spivak’s methodology constructs a story of colonialism that 
“freezes the native into a limbo of speechlessness and inarticulation,” and that she 
“glosses over the documents and histories that tell the stories of the colonized 
people’s struggle.”80   
An example of criticism that focuses Spivak inauthenticity/appropriation 
of Indianality comes from individuals such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Harish 
Trivedi. In a 1997 interview with Tina Chen and S.X. Goudie of UC Berkeley, 
Bharati Mukherjee has the following exchange with her interviewers:  
•  Mukherjee: …These critics, on the other hand, though they 
locate themselves in North America and participate in the North 
American competitive, materialist economy, invent or appropriate 
the positions of populous, Asia-based communities, and worse, 
they reduce the diversity of those communities' positions into one 
that fits most neatly into their favored theory. The Indian graduate 
students and junior faculty members I have talked to on western 
Indian campuses in the last two years have expressed growing 
resentment of such usurpation. The theorist they most often named 
was Spivak, perhaps because she is the best-known of the Indo-
American group.  
Some recent publications by serious Indian literary critics 
based in India, for instance by Professors Aijaz Ahmad and Harish 
Trivedi of the University of Delhi, indicate an emerging 
resentment of the appropriation of Indianality and postcoloniality 
by scholars of Indian origin (or of non-European origin) who have 
opted for U.S. citizenship and/or permanent residence in North 
America… Professor Trivedi, who lectured here at Berkeley a few 
months ago on the Eurocentric implications of the term 
"postcolonial," was more direct in his attack on the right of Spivak, 
a U.S. citizen and long-term U.S. resident, to speak for the 
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"periphery."  
 
•  Chen and Goudie: Spivak has cautioned against reading her as 
someone who claims to "give voice" to those she represents; she 
has said in The Postcolonial Critic --and I'm paraphrasing--that to 
read her as speaking for "the periphery" is to read her, wrongly, as 
a "Third World informant."  
 
•  Mukherjee: But then she goes on to, at the same time, trounce 
others for providing versions, portraits that don't coincide with hers 
so that she, I'm not going to say that she's lying, but there's this 
problematic position . . .81 
 
Some of these cries of inauthenticity are perhaps due to Spivak’s physical 
distance from the heart of the Indian collective imagination in India. “I feel fine 
that I'm not at home either in India or in the US,” claims Spivak.82 Criticism 
grounded upon Spivak’s geographical distance from India hardly seems fair. 
Firstly, we have already discussed how the lack of physical contact or a visceral 
material encounter does not mean that Spivak’s thought is not intimately linked 
with the third space of the Indian collective imagination.  Secondly, because, as 
we have realized with other instances of place-produced thought, the thinker can 
have a lingering effect on the being of a place without remaining in physical 
contact with said place. Consider for instance, the lasting repercussions many 
thinkers continue to have on their think place even after they have deceased. 
Thirdly, due to the previously mentioned lack of topographical specificity for the 
Indian collective imagination, it is conceivable for Spivak to think with/in it from 
virtually anywhere. 
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Therefore, are we to understand these criticisms lobbied at Spivak as 
merely examples of intellectual academic sparring? Or could there be something 
more to it? I argue that we can, perhaps, read these critiques as an illustration of 
the place pushing back. Even though Spivak does well to “speak to,” rather than 
“speak for” the Subaltern subject and the Indian collective imagination, perhaps it 
does not always want to listen. Many of the criticisms against Spivak are 
unwarranted and misinformed, but some of them may be part of the agency of 
place asserting itself. Even though they may be disparaging toward Spivak, we 
need to consider these voices as part of the place of the third space of the Indian 
collective imagination, and therefore comprise the recalcitrance of place. These 
voices are part of the negotiation and interstice of conflicting views that comprise 
Spivak’s think place and may partially represent the place itself, resisting and 
challenging the thinking developed with/in its margins. Places often push back in 
uncomfortable ways, and as a place that is a collective of disparate ideologies and 
agendas, there is bound to be some resistance by place to the impact that Spivak 
has on the Indian collective imagination.  
Most scholars agree that Spivak has been a significant contributor to post-
colonial and Subaltern studies – even Eagleton states that “The political good 
which Spivak has done far outweighs the fact that she leads a well-heeled life in 
the States.”83 There also seems to be general consensus that Spivak’s work has 
gone a long way in helping to re-vision the ontological makeup of the Subaltern 
subject, whether it is in Western philosophical discourse or the Indian collective 
imagination. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
 
                             The power of place will be a remarkable one. 
                                                                                                 - Aristotle, Physics 
 
In an increasingly globalized and technological world, the intersection of unique 
placeness and the production of thought will likely continue to transform in 
surprising and creative ways. As we move into the future, the potential efficacy 
and risk of such entwinement needs to be considered. The five instances of place-
produced thought examined in the previous chapters do not comprise a complete 
or exhaustive list of the sorts of thinking with/in place being done. Rather, these 
projects were chosen for the heterogeneity of their place-produced thought. 
Through their differences, we are able to discern the variety of thought that can be 
manifested by thinking with/in place, as well as realize the distinct modes of 
engagement that a thinker may have with place. These instances were also chosen 
because they are engaged with very different types of places. This multiplicity 
helps illustrate the complex and changing nature of what can be considered a 
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think place in the various occurrences of place-produced thought. The method in 
which a locus of thought is delineated can also widely fluctuate; some of them are 
more ideological than geological (as it was for Spivak), and some of them are 
more ambiguously defined than a measured and demarcated plot on a map (as for 
Thoreau or Heidegger).  In addition, the projects of these thinkers demonstrate the 
agency of place in distinctive means—place pushed back against all of these 
thinkers, but did so in varied ways.  
Just as the thinkers, places, and projects from the previous chapters are 
heterogeneous, so too have been the approaches I have employed to examine 
them.  By analyzing these instances of place-produced thought while thinking 
through more than one methodological approach, my hope has been to remain 
open to the dynamic complexity of place and to the nuanced ways that a thinker 
may interact with a place beyond only its significations, or outside of cultural 
inscriptions, or more thoroughly than a material encounter with its topography 
might provide. 
That said, much of this discussion has emphasized the critical function of 
materiality in place-produced thought. As we have witnessed in the development 
of place-produced thought, each thinker was confronted with a certain materiality 
of place. This engagement with phenomena did not constitute a purely 
phenomenological encounter, but did often prompt a tangibility of place that 
created a rupture or shift in the thinkers pre-existing beliefs, desires, and 
assumptions. Despite their diversity, these instances collectively reveal how 
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thinking with/in/of/through/about place can produce localized epistemologies, and 
are just as much of a product of the place as they are of the thinker.  
 
MOVING BEYOND THE LOCUS OF THOUGHT 
In the instances of place-produced thought examined here, the thoughts produced 
with/in places have generated far-reaching implications, which extend beyond any 
regional or spatial confinement. Place-produced thought is simply contextually 
specific in its application, limited by what the French call terroir (the highly 
unique mixture of a specific climate, geology, and topography), it can be 
modified, grafted, and applied to a variety of other frameworks. Moreover, 
because place-produced thought has tremendous ontological weight, I have 
argued that it can transform the being of both place and thinker. The trace of the 
place-produced thought inscribed upon each entity forms an unretractable 
impression that transcends the idiosyncratic encounters with/in place. In this 
sense, I have maintained that place-produced thought, by its very nature, can’t be 
contained by the margins of its locus. Further, as we have explored here, the 
development of an ethos or politics of place is a corollary of thinking with/in 
place. These ethical and political positions do not remain locked or fixed within 
place; they infiltrate the rest of the world. In fact, the foray of place-produced 
thought into other contexts may prove to be one of its most valuable qualities.  
Applied in a new framework, place-produced thought can often be the root of 
great innovation, resistance, or change.  
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Perhaps as a reaction to the increasing reaches of globalization, in the last 
thirty years there has been a renewed interest in localized knowledge as a means 
to ameliorate the impact and banalization of globalization.1 Since the late 1980s, 
entire fields of social and cultural theory have undergone what has been dubbed a 
“spatial turn,” initiated by some key texts such as Postmodern Geographies: The 
Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory by Edward W. Soja from 1989, 
The Practice of Everyday Life by Michel de Certeau from 1980 (1984 in English), 
and Michel Foucault’s Des Espaces Autres (written in 1967 but not published 
until 1984). As one portion of this reinvigorated interest in the relationship 
between space, knowledge, power, the global and the local, place-produced 
thought can be understood as sharing many of the same concerns and sensibilities 
that are evident in other investigations into the reciprocations between thinking 
and place.2  
 
LEARNING FROM LOCALES 
I would like end with some questions to keep thinking about in terms of the future 
of place-produced thought, and some thoughts about the places of these thinking 
projects. One of the first questions to consider is what happens to these places 
once they have been recognized as a site of powerful thought generation (like 
Walden Pond), especially when these places gain certain fame – attracting 
multitudes of people with various motives? Many of these people are curious to 
see if the place will prompt or elicit some type of similar powerful or spiritual 
experience resulting in a creative epiphany. What effect does it have on place 
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when there is an accumulation of people looking for something to happen? Does 
this mean something is more likely to happen?  Can another thinker engage a 
place that has already successfully generated place-produced thought? 
 One of the problems that any one of us will run into when visiting a place 
that has already been used to develop place-produced thought is the difference of 
relations that will emerge in our own encounter. Because place is always 
relational and in flux, it continues to change even as we are in the midst of an 
encounter. Therefore, the relations of one person’s encounter may be drastically 
different than another person’s with the very same place. My point is that we can 
never experience the same Walden Pond that Thoreau did, and we can never have 
the same experience of Heidegger’s landscape near Todtnauberg as he did – I 
discovered this first hand. Part of the reason for this is the different relations we 
will have with the place, but also because we all experience the materiality of a 
place and its phenomena differently. No physical encounter can be exactly 
duplicated.  Even subtle changes to a place can resonate greatly in our overall 
interaction with, and impression of, that place. We can try to recreate the 
connection with a place that some other person might have had, but it does not 
mean that a connection will happen, or that it will produce the same results.  
This does not mean, however, that a place that was part of a past instance 
of place-produced thought is lost to the rest of us for creative purposes. It simply 
means that we will likely not have the same encounter with that place.  Exchanges 
with places can be productive in so many different ways that a singular place 
might yield panoply of diverse thinking projects. Even if we never create our own 
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place-produced thought, learning about the special relationships that others have 
had with particular places in the development of thought can still be quite 
powerful and enlightening. Studying place-produced thought also helps to remind 
us of the agency of place and of its power. These projects reveal that places, like 
things, “change in defiance of their material stability.”3 Places are not blank slates 
waiting for us to give them meaning, and in fact, places sometimes resist or refute 
the meaning and ideas ascribed to them. I believe that projects of thinking with/in 
place help us to reduce our anthropocentrism and recognize places as 
“participants in the reshaping of the world,” – to borrow Bill Brown’s description 
of things.4  
Discovering the intimate relation that some thinkers have had with place 
emphasizes the deep interconnectivity that all of us can have with place, 
reminding us that our very being is related to place, as in Heidegger’s da-sein. 
Place-produced thought can help to revitalize our consciousness of the meaning 
and value of the places we inhabit. It may allow us to see sites that often go 
unseen, and reveal new ways of thinking about and experiencing the landscapes 
that we occupy. 
Throughout this discussion, I have tried to demonstrate some of the core 
aspects of place-produced thought so that we can begin to understand it as a 
distinct method of engaging place. I have tried to illustrate how, in certain 
instances of thinking with/in place, the place itself clearly asserts its agency and 
influence in the actual production of thought.  And I have tried to elucidate how 
this connection is much different than other historical or intrinsic means of 
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maintaining a relationship with ones surroundings. Finally, I have tried to 
accentuate the innovative and irruptive possibilities of place-produced thought—
important sources for identities, thoughts, boundaries, and modes of being—while 
also recognizing its potential to be used to justify racism, exclusion, and bigotry. 
As we increasingly recognize the agency of place and non-human entities, the 
function of place in contemporary culture will truly become, as Aristotle once 
claimed, “a remarkable one.”
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